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ABSTRACT
Thomas, Daniel. M.A. International and Comparative Politics Graduate Program, School
of Public and International Affairs, Wright State University, 2019. The Use of Force:
Hard Offensive Counterterrorism.

In the following research, I investigate whether hard offensive counterterrorism
results in the failure or success of a counterterrorism strategy. In the second chapter, the
academic literature of counterterrorism strategies is examined. Next, a hypothesis is put
forth that if a hard offensive counterterrorism strategy is utilized, indicators such as high
troop levels, more civilian casualties, more negative public opinion, and an increased rate
of terrorism, will point to a failed counterterrorism strategy. Then, I put forth a
methodology to test the hypothesis while introducing troop level databases, various
public opinion polling sources, and terrorist attack databases to investigate the given
variables. In the third chapter, a case study of the Iraq War is utilized, in which the initial
invasion from 2003-2006 and the Surge/Withdrawal eras from 2007-2011 are examined.
Both time periods are compared to see if hard offensive counterterrorism used in 20032006 resulted in a less effective counterterrorism campaign than the softer
counterinsurgency strategies from 2007-2011. Data from the Brookings Iraq Index, Iraq
Body Count, and Global Terrorism Database are then analyzed to investigate the
variables of casualties, public opinion, and rate of terrorism during each era in Iraq. In the
fourth chapter, the war in Afghanistan is presented as a case study. I then evaluate
whether hard offensive counterterrorism used from 2001-2008 resulted in less terrorism
than the counterinsurgency strategies of Surge and withdrawal used from 2009-2016.
Data from the Congressional Research Service, UNAMA, Physicians for Social
iii

Responsibility, the BBC, the Asia Foundation, and the Global Terrorism Database are
then utilized to assess each variable. Finally, I present my findings and conclude that
evaluating a strategy primarily using hard offensive counterterrorism strategies is rather
complex and then present ideas for future research in counterterrorism strategy.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Terrorism has been around for a long time, yet until recently, terrorism was not a
major area of policy concern in most countries. Since September 11, 2001, however,
terrorism is a threat that many states now take seriously. The United States and other
nations have elevated counterterrorism efforts to the highest consideration in policy
circles. The main strategy of the United States immediately following 9/11 was to fight a
so called “War on Terror”. In this strategy, President George W. Bush utilized rhetoric
marked by an “either with us or against us” mantra. The new global counterterrorism
effort focused on bringing groups responsible for terrorist attacks to justice and
preventing the next attack.1 Since declaring war on terrorism, the United States embarked
on serious military campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite all this conflict, it is
unclear whether this strategy has succeeded in reducing terrorism against the
United States.
I introduce a new categorization of counterterrorism strategies to help define what
hard offensive counterterrorism is. Hard offensive terrorism is military force utilized in
effort to pre-empt terrorist attacks from occurring. Other counterterrorism strategies
confront terrorism through means that are more cooperative with populations susceptible
to terrorist activity or focus strictly on the prevention of terrorism. In some cases,
counterterrorism strategies can be hybrids of the different categories of counterterrorism,

Margaret Purdy, “Countering Terrorism: The Missing Pillar,” International Journal 60, no. 1 (Winter,
2004/2005), 4-5.
1

1

such as counterinsurgency. An important question to answer is how do we measure the
success of a hard offensive counterterrorism strategy?
A methodology is presented to structure an evaluation of whether hard
counterterrorism results in the success or failure of a given counterterrorism campaign. If
the given hypothesis that hard offensive terrorism results in counterterrorism failure, then
indicators such as troop levels, civilian casualties, public opinion, and the rate of
terrorism should indicate that is the case. Two case studies in counterterrorism strategies
are utilized. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan feature three different eras of
counterterrorism strategies. In the first phase of both wars, hard offensive
counterterrorism in the form of a “traditional war” strategy was utilized. In the second
phase of the wars, a “Surge’ featuring counterinsurgency tactics was the primary strategy
used. In the third phase of each war, a withdrawal of troops was implemented, while
tactics from the Surge were still used. In each phase, the type of counterterrorism used
will point to indicators determining whether its implementation helped the U.S. to
succeed or fail in each given era.
In the chapter covering the Iraq War, I start by examining the history and politics
of the “traditional war period” in Iraq from 2003-2006. In this section, qualitative
evidence points to a failing counterterrorism strategy that resulted in a dangerous and
chaotic Iraq. In the following data analysis section, I find that the hard offensive
counterterrorism tactic used, combined with increased troops, high civilian casualties,
and negative public opinion helped to increase the number of terrorist attacks in Iraq from
2003-2006, therefore making the initial invasion period of Iraq a failure in countering
terrorism.

2

In another subsection, the history and politics of the “Surge” and withdrawal
periods in Iraq from 2007-2011 are investigated. Evidence from the Surge period shows
that the counterinsurgency strategy of the Surge helped to dramatically improve the
security conditions from the chaotic pre-Surge period. In the subsequent data analysis, I
find that Surge counterinsurgency tactics, when combined with increased troop levels
actually helped to decrease civilian casualties, increase positive public opinion, and
decrease the rate of terrorism when the Surge was at full strength. Therefore, the Surge in
Iraq was a success. After the withdrawal was implemented, however, public opinion and
the rate of terrorism returned to pre-Surge levels. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Iraq was therefore a failure, which lends evidence that too few troops can also have an
adverse effect on the success or failure of a counterterrorism strategy.
For the chapter on the war in Afghanistan, I first look at the history and politics of
the pre-Surge period from 2001-2009. During the pre-Surge era, Afghanistan witnessed
an increase in violence and instability similar to that in Iraq. Upon examining the data
trends, hard offensive counterterrorism once again involved increasingly high levels of
troops, high civilian casualties, low public opinion, and resulted in a high rate of
terrorism, and contributed to the failure of the 2001-2009 counterterrorism strategy.
In the next section, the history and politics of the 2009-2016 Surge and
Withdrawal eras in Afghanistan are reviewed. Based on qualitative evidence, the Surge
resulted in a very brief improvement to conditions within Afghanistan, but the imminent
withdrawal helped to reverse counterterrorism gains. In the data section, the primary
counterinsurgency strategy, when paired with increased troop levels, briefly exhibited
reductions in civilian casualties, improved public opinion, and a lower rate of terrorism.

3

However, because the COIN strategy coexisted with increasingly hard offensive
counterterrorism tactics, such as leadership decapitation, and was only full strength for a
brief period, improvements were less noticeable than in Iraq. The following withdrawal
period saw increases in casualties, lowered public opinion, and higher terrorism, helping
lead to counterterrorism failure in Afghanistan.
In the final chapter, I conclude that hard offensive counterterrorism can result in
an overall failed counterterrorism strategy. In contrast, a softer method of
counterterrorism, such as counterinsurgency, can help to lower terrorism rates. However,
too few troops in a counterinsurgency strategy can also lead to failures in
counterterrorism. In addition, I argue that the success or failure of counterterrorism also
depends on context, and several other factors other than the indicators tested likely played
a complex role in the success or failure of a given counterterrorism strategy. I then
conclude this study in counterterrorism by discussing possible future areas of research.

4

CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
Academic research is largely inconclusive on the effectiveness of particular
counterterrorism strategies. For example, some political scientists support evidence that
there is an over reliance on military strategy to fight terrorism.2 They warn that trying to
solely eradicate terrorism in the short term rather than attempting to manage it long term
has significant implications that can negatively impact counterterrorism success. 3 In this
academic research, several causal mechanisms have been examined, including causal
mechanisms such as alienation and collateral damage. However, these explanations have
been largely inconclusive.
Because of this ambiguity, it is important to review the literature of offensive
counterterrorism and how it may have the capacity to backfire. In the literature review,
three prevailing trends are examined. These include research on the definitions of
counterterrorism, the various strategies of counterterrorism, and the mechanisms of
counterterrorist backlash. Additionally, a methodology is proposed to measure whether
certain counterterrorism strategies do in fact have a negative impact on counterterrorism
efforts.
First, it is important to understand the open-ended nature of counterterrorism. As
Jason Rinehart states, counterterrorism is a vague concept to define and there is no
universally accepted method of counterterrorism.4 The lack of a single monolithic use of
counterterrorism is highlighted by the fact that “every conflict involving terrorism has its

Purdy, “Countering Terrorism,” 5.
Purdy, 16.
4
Jason Rinehart, “Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,” Perspectives on Terrorism 4, no. 5 (2010),
32.
2
3
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own unique characteristics” that alters the way it is fought.5 In one definition, the US
army defines counterterrorism as “operations that include the offensive measures taken to
prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism,” which could include a vast variety of
tactics.6
Ronald Crelinsten further emphasizes the definitional flexibility of
counterterrorism by exploring two sides of what he sees as a contested strategic
argument. On one side, “the criminal justice model” emphasizes the rule of law and
views terrorism as a crime.7 On the other side, the “war model” views terrorism as a new
form of warfare.8 Because of the broad theorization common in the literature,
counterterrorism contains a plethora of different strategies that can be utilized.
There are four specific types of strategies common in the counterterror literature.
First, Nacos distinguishes between hard and soft counterterror strategies. Hard strategies
can be defined as “command power that can be used to induce others to change their
positions,” and often emphasize the use of military force.9 These strategies include tactics
such as military invasion, drone strikes, and special operations raids. Second, Nacos
discusses soft strategies, which are designed to co-opt people rather than coerce them.10
Soft power contains strategies such as economic aid, community policing, and
diplomacy, often focusing on long term terrorism mitigation.
There is also a distinction between offensive and defensive counterterrorism.
Sandler defines offensive terrorism as strategies “which seek to limit or destroy terrorist

Rinehart, “Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,” 32.
Ibid.
7
Ronald Crelinsten, Counterterrorism, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009), 13.
8
Ibid.
9
Brigitte L. Nacos, Terrorism and Counterterrorism, (New York: Routledge, 2016), 257.
10
Ibid.
5
6
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resources.”11 Offensive strategies are used primarily to pre-empt terrorist attacks. For
example, a government might choose to utilize a special operations mission to destroy
critical terrorist infrastructure. In contrast, defensive minded strategies are designed to
harden the security of terrorist targets and are often reactive measures to an attempted
terrorist attack.12 For example, Sandler cites that airport security began to screen
passenger’s shoes in response to the failed shoe bomber mission.13
In regard to counterterrorist strategy, a problem exists in categorizing specific
types of strategy. There is no general list of strategies, so individual scholars often
explain their own arbitrary lists. For example, Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva
list strategies such as deterrence, “persuasion, … economic aid and democratization,
appeasement, and military force.”14 This variation across authors makes it difficult to
compare strategies. I propose a new classification combining the insights of Nacos and
Sandler, including four different broad categories of counterterror strategy shown in
Figure 1.
The hard offensive portion of the chart includes tactics that are military in nature
and attempt to destroy terrorist resources either to pre-empt or to retaliate against terrorist
attacks. Hard defensive strategies are intended to increase protection for the targets of
terrorism, but still include the use of force. In a soft offensive strategy, pre-empting
terrorist activity is the goal, but the strategies elicit cooperation from populations
susceptible to terrorist ideology. Lastly, soft defensive strategies are non-violent reactions

Todd Sandler, “Introduction: New Frontiers of Terrorism Research: An Introduction,” Journal of Peace
Research 48, no. 3 (May 2011), 281.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done,” International
Security 30, no. 3 (2005), 89.
11
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intended to mitigate the damage of successful terrorist attacks. Counterterrorism tactics
are not limited to those listed above, but the strategic categories provide a framework for
understanding counterterrorism efforts.
Many political scientists try to weigh which types of counterterror strategies are
the most and least effective. Several political science studies focus on hard offensive
terrorism strategies, which are theorized to cause significant harm to counterterrorism
efforts. An in depth look at several hard offensive strategies is necessary to understand
why they can backfire.

Figure 1. Counterterrorism Strategies

Hard

Offensive

Defensive

Military invasion, drone

Target hardening, border

strikes, special operations, controls, airport security,
deterrence.

criminal justice.

Community policing,

Emergency preparedness,

propaganda, foreign aid,

public health precautions,

diplomacy, long term

incident response.

Soft

strategies.

First, drone strikes and special operations can often be loosely defined under the
same umbrella of leadership decapitation tactics. The main theory behind leadership
8

decapitation is that the targeted killing of leaders in a given terrorist organization often
causes the organization to collapse.15 Some political scientists, such as Patrick Johnston
and Bryan Price theorize that leadership decapitation does in fact succeed in crippling
terrorist organizations. After examining “207 terrorist groups from 1970 to 2008,” Price
concludes that killing terrorist leaders “significantly increases the mortality rate of
terrorist groups.”16 Similarly, Johnston utilizes a statistical analysis that suggests that
terrorism campaigns are more likely to end after leadership decapitation.17
However, not all academics agree with these studies. Jenna Jordan takes a more
nuanced approach, stating that leadership decapitation is only effective in a quarter of
successful assassinations. Jordan explores evidence that several factors, such as
leadership styles, organizational cohesion, and communal support, can often change the
outcome of leadership decapitation.18 For example, Jordan finds that leadership
decapitation used against al-Qaeda affiliated groups is unlikely to succeed because of
their highly bureaucratic structure and popular support in their homelands.19 Jordan also
finds that leadership assassination attempts carry unintended consequences, such as
recruiting surges and retaliatory strikes, not to mention accidental civilian casualties.20
Second, traditional war campaigns are also popular hard offensive terrorism
tactics. A traditional war strategy generally entails the classic military strategy of

Jenna Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation
Strikes,” International Security 38, no. 4 (2014), 9.
16
Bryan C. Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to
Counterterrorism,”
International Security 36, no. 4 (2012): 25.
17
Patrick B. Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in
Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” International Security 36 no.4 (2012), 62.
18
Jordan, 21.
19
Jordan, 25.
20
Jordan, 35.
15

9

defeating the enemy on the battlefield, the strategy initially used in both Iraq and
Afghanistan in the “War on Terrorism”. Crelinsten refers to traditional war as the “war
model” of counterterrorism. In this strategy, terrorists are considered enemy combatants
and engagement is restricted to the rules of war and international law.21 As is customary
with traditional war between states, the war model utilizes “maximal force,” which is
“designed to overpower the enemy.”22 Success in a war model strategy “tends to be
defined in terms of victory or defeat.”23 Therefore, counterterrorism efforts have to
continue as long as the terrorist threat is viable, which can often lead to protracted or
“never-ending war.”24
Third, political scientists such as Trager and Zagorcheva also theorize that
counterterrorism strategies can operate similar to state deterrence. According to Stephen
Quackenbush, deterrence theory states that “in order to deter attacks, a state must
persuade a potential attacker that it has effective military capability,” it can impose heavy
costs, and that their threats will be carried out when attacked.25 Like states deterring
states, terrorist organizations can be “deterred from actions that harm targeted states” by
the use or threat of force.26 Kevin Chilton and Greg Weaver support this theory of
counterterror deterrence, calling for customized strategies “tailor made” for the unique
threat that terrorist organizations pose.27

21

Crelinsten, Counterterrorism, 48.
Ibid.
23
Crelinsten, 75.
24
Ibid.
25
Stephen L. Quackenbush, “Deterrence Theory: Where do we Stand?” Review of International Studies 37,
no. 2 (2011): 742.
26
Trager and Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism,” 88.
27
Gen. Kevin Chilton and Greg Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” Strategic
Studies Quarterly (2009), 34.
22
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Other political scientists like Robert Pape have criticized the effectiveness of
deterrence, stating that terrorists are irrational (therefore undeterred by cost-benefit
calculations), are so highly motivated they don’t fear death, and lack a return address for
states to retaliate against.28 In response, Trager and Zagorcheva argue that terrorist groups
do in fact often have rationally ordered goals, have less motivated individuals that
support them, and can be tied down to specific geographic locations.29 For example,
lower level support for terrorists such as financiers, religious figures, or lower level “foot
soldiers” can be easily dissuaded using deterrence by punishment or deterrence by
denial.30 In doing so, even the most highly motivated terrorist can be undone by this loss
of support.31 This line of thinking is also supported by Chilton and Weaver, who believe
these support components of terrorist networks are incredibly susceptible to influence by
counterterrorist efforts.32
However, more substantial doubts can be leveled at deterrence through
quantitative means. In one study, counterterrorist retaliation by Israel often resulted in no
significant deviation from the quarterly rate of terrorist attacks.33 From this observation,
the authors posit that “terrorists have rational expectations about the retaliation they
receive,” meaning they are rarely surprised by counterterror retaliatory strikes.34 In fact,
the only reprisal that produced any kind of change was the Israeli reprisal in response to
the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, one of the first notable terrorist attacks in the

Trager and Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism,” 87.
Trager and Zagorcheva, 89.
30
Trager and Zagorcheva, 96.
31
Trager and Zagorcheva, 98.
32
Chilton and Weaver, “Waging Deterrence,” 37-38.
33
Bryan Brophy-Baermann and John A. C. Conybeare, “Retaliating Against Terrorism: Rational
Expectations and the Optimality of Rules versus Discretion,” American Journal of Political Science 38, no.
1 (1994), 197.
34
Ibid.
28
29
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twentieth century.35 The lack of the element of surprise puts heavy doubt on whether
deterrence (specifically retaliatory strikes) is a tenable long term strategy for disrupting
terrorism.36
Are there ways that the use of hard offensive strategies can become
counterproductive? Pape believes that when hard offensive counterterrorism is utilized
and becomes a protracted occupation, suicide terrorism increases. Defined, occupation is
the “exertion of political control over territory by an outside power,” which could create
resentment in local populations.37 As evidence, Pape refers to the rate of suicide terrorism
in Iraq. Before the U.S. occupation, there were no recorded incidents of suicide
bombing.38 By 2003, the first suicide attacks began shortly after the U.S. invasion and
increased over “the course of the next few years.”39 What, if any causal mechanisms can
explain this phenomenon?
Three potentially significant causal mechanisms can explain harmful effects of
hard offensive counterterrorism. First, occupation is looked to by political scientists as a
possible source of backlash to hard offensive counterterrorism. Pape is one proponent of
citing occupation as a harmful effect. Pap, as mentioned previously, defines occupation
as “the exertion of political control over a territory by an outside group” and believes that
a local community chafes at a foreign military when force is used to prevent a change in
government “that would otherwise occur” if foreign troops left.40 In turn, occupation

Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare, “Retaliating Against Terrorism,” 196.
Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare, 209.
37
Pape, Robert A. and James K. Feldman. Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism &
How to Stop it, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), 20-21.
38
Pape and Feldman, Cutting the Fuse, 30.
39
Ibid.
40
Pape and Feldman, 20-21.
35
36
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pushes members of the community to “extreme sacrifices” to resist foreign influence,
such as engaging in suicide terrorism.41
Second, political scientists examine the role of collateral damage. Luke Condra
and Jacob Shapiro define collateral damage as “what happens when civilians are caught
in the crossfire.”42 More simply put, collateral damage is the unavoidable, but
unintentional damage (such as injury or death) to civilians who are uninvolved in
combat.43 Causally, Condra and Shapiro studied the war in Iraq and determined that the
more civilian killings that were attributed to the United States resulted in an increase in
insurgent violence.44 Conversely, the more civilians killed by insurgents resulted in less
support for insurgent groups.45
Thirdly, the literature examines alienation as a detrimental effect. Studying the
Uyghur population in China, Christopher Cunningham believes that the alienation of the
Uyghur minority in Xinjiang province by China has led to an increase in terrorist
activity.46 According to Cunningham, alienation can be defined as resentment or anger in
a community when they are discriminated against or are prevented from expressing their
culture and religion.47 Alienation is defined in various ways across the literature, but
alienation is a solid potential factor of harmful counterterrorism.

41

Pape and Feldman, Cutting the Fuse, 20.
Luke N. Condra and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Effects of Collateral
Damage,” American Journal of Political Science 56, no. 1 (2012), 167.
43
Colin H. Kahl, “In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs? Norms, Civilian Casualties, and U.S. Conduct in
Iraq.” International Security 32, No. 1 (2007): 10.
44
Condra and Shapiro, 175.
45
Condra and Shapiro, 167.
46
Christopher P. Cunningham, “Counterterrorism in Xinjiang: The ETIM, China, and the Uyghurs,”
International Journal on World Peace 29, no. 3 (2012), 20.
47
Cunningham, 19.
42
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In comparison to hard offensive terrorism, does using a softer counterterrorism
method yield better results in countering terrorism? For instance, what if
counterinsurgency, or COIN, used during the Surges in Iraq and Afghanistan worked
better than traditional war strategy? Unlike other counterterrorism strategies, COIN
doesn’t fit neatly into any of the categorizations of counterterrorism in Figure 1. Because
of this, I would argue that COIN is a hybrid counterterrorism strategy borrowing tactics
from multiple categories. Counterinsurgency is defined as a strategy that “recognizes a
military solution to a conflict is not feasible, only a combined military, political, and
civilian solution is possible.”48 Because of its reliance on winning hearts and minds of the
populace, COIN borrows many ideas from soft counterterrorism, in addition to tactics
borrowed from hard offensive counterterrorism. Therefore, perhaps a COIN strategy
results in less blowback than utilizing a true hard offensive counterterrorism strategy.
To further explore COIN, Rinehart separates two competing types of
counterinsurgency campaigns, classical and modern. Classical counterinsurgency (the
model for the Surge in Iraq and Afghanistan) is “confined within the borders of a single
state” and focuses on training local forces, developing quality local governance, and
blocking opponents form receiving outside support.49 On the other hand, modern
counterinsurgency takes on a more global meaning. Global COIN is similar to classical
COIN, but the scale is much larger, like the international fight against various al-Qaeda
franchises.50

Rinehart, “Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,” 40.
Rinehart, 41.
50
Rinehart, 42.
48
49
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The drawback to COIN being utilized as a counterterrorism tactic is that it might
not actually be a counterterrorism tactic at all. According to Michael Boyle,
counterterrorism and COIN “aren’t necessarily compatible or mutually reinforcing,”
meaning that using both interchangeably might be counterproductive.51 Clearly
distinguishing between COIN and counterterrorism in Afghanistan, Boyle states that “a
CT mission would focus exclusively on al-Qaeda, offering little or no support to the
Karzai government.”52 Conversely, a COIN mission would entail “a comprehensive
commitment to defeating the Taliban and rebuilding the Afghan state while destroying alQaeda operatives there.”53 The problem with fusing the two approaches is that the United
States runs the risk of generating offsetting costs such as popular backlash, a legitimacy
gap, and diminished leverage.54 The legitimacy gap is a very real risk in Afghanistan: the
Afghan government needs to be seen as the legitimate state, but this is difficult when they
must allow for unpopular strikes against the enemy. 55 Balancing both strategies could
mean that the Afghan government will be less willing to cooperate with U.S. forces in the
future.
In the next section, I propose a methodology to measure and compare the
effectiveness of hard offensive terrorism and counterinsurgency strategies against each
other, and see which strategy resulted in counterterrorism backlash and failure. First,
several conceptual issues are resolved. Second, a hypothesis is presented to predict what
findings are expected from the comparison between the two counterterrorism strategies.
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Third, independent and dependent variables are identified, and several data sources are
introduced.

Methodology
In order to accurately measure the backlash of counterterrorism, several
conceptual issues must be resolved. First, a working definition of terrorism is needed. For
the purpose of this research, a useful definition might be the one provided by Kydd and
Walter. According to the authors, terrorism is “the use of violence against civilians by
non-state actors to attain political goals.”56 Kydd and Walter’s definition restricts the
ideas of terrorism away from terrorist military targets as well as the use of terrorism by
states. By avoiding these two categorizations, Kydd and Walter help to simplify terrorism
into a less controversial definition by limiting points of academic contention. In order to
limit the scope of the methodology even further, future research should be limited to a
specific region of terrorism. To better measure occupation, alienation, or collateral
damage, a possible area of terrorism to look at is terrorism occurring in the Middle East
region. By limiting the research in such a way, measurements on the dependent variable
can be neatly kept in a single population group.
I hypothesize that if a highly aggressive hard offensive counterterrorist strategy is
utilized then it is likely the overall counterterrorism campaign will fail. To measure the
hypothesis, counterterrorism strategies will be considered the independent variable. Two
levels of dependent variables are critical to the study. First, the direct impact of
counterterrorist strategies should reveal increased levels of occupation, alienation, and
collateral damage. Occupation will be measured by the number of troops stationed in the
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country, specifically of foreign origin, as recorded by troop level database. Alienation can
be measured through political surveys that record negative public opinion (such as anger,
rage, humiliation, etc.) in a given country. Collateral damage can be measured by the
number of civilian casualties reported. At the second level of dependent variable, there
should be a correlated rise in terrorist attacks in tandem with an increase of occupation,
alienation, and collateral damage, which then helps evaluate whether a counterterrorism
campaign was effective or not.
The invasions, counterinsurgency campaigns (or Surge), and withdrawals in both
Iraq and Afghanistan by the United States are optimal cases and help to build a most
similar systems comparison. This comparison allows for control over the independent
variable, as well as the first level of the dependent variables. By doing so, I can examine
how the “traditional war” stage of American occupation, COIN Surge, and withdrawal all
correlate with the rate of terrorist activity, examining the success or failure of the
counterterrorism campaign.
To measure the independent variable of hard offensive counterterrorism, I will
provide qualitative evidence of how tactics differed between the preliminary invasion and
the Surge that followed. Along with a plethora of other sources, Peter Mansoor as well as
Peter Hahn have extensive historical and military backgrounds on the Iraq War in each of
their published books which will be incredibly helpful.
For the dependent variables, several sources of data will be used. For measuring
occupation, I will look at the number of troops used during each military campaign. U.S.
and NATO records, such as the Boots on the Ground reports provided to Congress, can
provide this information. To measure alienation, public opinion polls from the country in
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question will be used, from media outlets such as the BBC and Gallup, as well specific
polling sources such as the Brookings Institute Iraq Index and the Asia Foundation.
Measuring collateral damage will involve data sets that provide an estimate of the
number of civilian deaths in a period of time. A good source of this information is the
Brookings Iraq and Afghanistan Indexes, Physicians for Social Responsibility, and the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan which provide various data on a
variety of statistics such as civilian deaths.
Finally, measuring the rate of terrorism requires an effective dataset. One
particularly useful dataset is the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) compiled by Gary
LaFree and Laura Dugan. The GTD compiles data on all known terrorist incidents, and
classifies terrorist attacks with an adjustable filter on the definitional boundaries of
terrorism. The GTD is highly customizable and provides information helpful to a variety
of different quantitative research methods. For example, data can be filtered by country to
country, or isolated by specific terrorist methods. Another strength of the GTD is that it is
tailored to avoid the political biases of states, built upon a privately compiled database
originally used by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Agency.57 Designed by Pinkerton,
the database was 56 utilized to help corporations gain information on potential areas they
might decide to do business, and less tailored to a state’s agenda. Corporate biases remain
to be discovered, but removing state bias lends credibility to the data set.
In the subsequent two chapters, the case studies of both U.S. wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan are presented. The chapters are split into four sections. Two sections will
focus specifically on the history and politics of the war in question, divided into Pre-
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Surge and Surge/ withdrawal eras. Two additional sections will investigate the variables
of troop levels, civilian casualties, and public opinion with each of their respective data
trends, divided again between the Pre-Surge and Surge/ withdrawal eras.
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CHAPTER 3
The Iraq War: How Effective was U.S. Counterterrorism in the Invasion, Surge,
and Withdrawal?
The 2003 Iraq War is a useful case study to investigate the hypothesis of whether
hard offensive counterterrorism tactics lead to counterterrorism failure. In the early stages
of the war, the United States pursued a traditional military strategy, which can be defined
as a strategy in which a military invasion and occupation of a foreign territory occurs.
The traditional military strategy can be classified as a hard offensive counterterrorism
tactic when the invasion is designed to counter a terrorism threat, which was one of the
primary reason for toppling the government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Ultimately, this
traditional strategy gave rise to a nascent insurgency involving increasingly violent
sectarian and terrorist attacks. American policy makers soon realized their initial strategy
had made matters worse and were forced to go back to the drawing board. Facing
mounting public pressure, President Bush ignored calls to withdraw U.S. from the Iraqi
Civil War and implemented a counterinsurgency strategy in what is now called the
“Surge.”
The following analysis looks at which counterterrorism strategy was ultimately
the most effective in Iraq. First, the politics and strategy of the initial stage of the Iraq
War from 2003 to 2006 is examined. Second, variables such as troop levels, civilian
casualties, and public opinion are scrutinized to see if the tactics of 2003-2006 resulted in
an increase in terrorism. Next, the politics and strategy of the 2007-2011 “Surge” and
withdrawal phases of the war are presented. Lastly, Surge and withdrawal troop levels,
casualties, and public opinion data are evaluated to record the differences between all
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three Iraq eras with regards to the hypothesis that hard offensive counterterrorism results
in a failed counterterrorism campaign.
History and Politics of Iraq 2003-2006
Prior to the invasion of Iraq by U.S. and Coalition forces in March 2003, the Bush
administration had led the United States public to believe that standing up to Iraqi
dictator Saddam Hussein was crucial to the “War on Terror”. As Colin Powell told the
United Nations, the U.S. believed that a “sinister nexus between Iraq and al-Qaeda”
existed.58 Powell claimed to have evidence of Iraq possessing weapons of mass
destruction (WMD’s) and the capability to use them. In response to the purported threat
of Iraqi WMD’s, President Bush delivered an ultimatum to Hussein. On March 17, 2003,
Bush demanded that Hussein relinquish power within 48 hours or risk a U.S. invasion of
Iraq.59 Believing that the United States “lacked resolve and was afraid to risk an
invasion,” Hussein refused to step down.60 This refusal led to the immediate deployment
of U.S. troops to Iraq and kicked off a war that would continue until 2011.
In 2003, the United States prepared to wage war, stressing “rapid, decisive
operations and quick victories by high-tech warfighting forces.”61 Proponents of the Iraq
War had been preparing since the end of the First Gulf War. However, they had planned
little for the occupation after the initial invasion, and expected a quick occupation and a
transfer of power to “Iraqis within 90 days.”62 This short term mentality largely ignored
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findings by U.S. agencies such as the Department of Defense, Department of State, and
the Central Intelligence Agency.63 For example, the Department of State’s “Future of
Iraq” initiative recommended that the military needed to protect critical infrastructure
such as “water and electricity” and plan for “lawlessness perpetrated by criminals” in the
immediate aftermath of the invasion.64
By ignoring recommendations from government agencies, the Bush
administration set itself up for failure. Proponents of new pre-emptive strategy for the
global “War on Terror,” such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz dominated planning for Iraq. The two men at the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and specifically its subsidiary the Office of
Special Plans (OSP), rushed the war planning to avoid prolonged discussions of post war
complications, which they saw as a ploy to “weaken the case for a preemptive strike.”65
While no illegal wrongdoing occurred, as some believe, both OSP and the OSD at
large promoted misguided assumptions about Iraq.66 OSP planners focused largely on
post-invasion governance of Iraq, and decided that it would take too long for the Iraqi
interim government to vet out Ba’athists from government.67 Instead, OSP argued that the
interim government should mainly consist of returning Iraqi expatriates. OSP’s
suggestion contradicted guidance from the Department of State and CIA, who warned
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that a government of externals in Iraq would lack important domestic legitimacy.68 In
addition, OSD had inaccurately likened Iraq to the occupation of Germany and Japan
after the Second World War.69 As Pete Mansoor illustrates, these earlier occupations
were much better planned than Iraq. General George Marshall had begun planning in
earnest for the occupation of Germany and Japan “one month after the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor,” and that “the foundation of a military government in Germany had been
laid 18 months prior”.70
In contrast to General Marshall, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
authorized the creation of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
(ORHA). Under Lieutenant General Jay Garner, ORHA began planning for the
occupation of Iraq on January 20, 2003, “two months before the beginning of the
invasion.”71 The result of this rushed occupation planning was an ORHA organization
that “was disjointed, fragmented, chaotic, and riven with bureaucratic rivalries.”72 For
example, because of a policy feud between Powell’s State Department and Rumsfeld’s
Department of Defense, staffers familiar with the “Future of Iraq” plan were forced out of
the ORHA.73
Under direction from Rumsfeld, the U.S. government assumed that the
overwhelming superiority of the U.S. military would quickly topple the Hussein regime.
Iraqis would “view American troops as liberators and would cooperate quickly to take
charge of their own destiny”.74 Instead, the poorly planned occupation did exactly what
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the “Future of Iraq” publication warned about. The U.S. war effort created a “chaotic
occupation that failed to deliver enough security, jobs, and essential services” to Iraqis,
resulting in a violent insurgency prone to destabilizing sectarian violence and terrorist
attacks.75
After the initial invasion, despite previous warnings and even Garner’s own
misgivings about “winning the peace,” the Bush Administration continued to ignore
advice about the occupation.76 Donald Rumsfeld insisted on restricting the number of
troops in Iraq and promoted a one month ORHA timetable to exhibit enough progress to
warrant a rapid troop demobilization.77 Additionally, because of a lack of preparation for
“language and cultural gaps” and ORHA general organizational inefficiencies, U.S.
troops found themselves in a quickly deteriorating window of opportunity for the
“creation of a new Iraq.”78
Soon enough, General Garner’s lack of progress and compliance with the
Pentagon’s wishes brought an end to the ORHA. Garner followed orders and called for
Iraqi elections within 90 days, but this imperiled the Bush Administration’ hand-picked
Iraqi politicians’ preparation for elections.79 Additionally, Garner had planned to enlist
the help of 100,000 of Saddam’s former army to gain their security expertise and train a
new Iraqi force.80 Rumsfeld bristled at retaining the Baath party soldiers loyal to Saddam,
and quickly began searching for Garner’s replacement.
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However, problems in Iraq would quickly snowball from frustrating
unpreparedness to a much more dangerous political situation. With the quick demise of
the ORHA, Ambassador Paul L. Bremer was brought in to head the new Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) tasked with overseeing the Iraq occupation. The CPA got
off to a bad start. Bremer, with little experience in the Middle East and no understanding
of Arabic, had trouble managing the CPA.81 For instance, Bremer largely ignored Iraqi
tribal politics, as the tribes were seen as “part of Iraq’s past and had no place in its
present or future”.82 Ignoring the tribes exemplifies how misguided the CPA was, as
engaging with tribal leaders would soon be an important step to combating the
insurgency in 2006.83
Additionally, Bremer failed to develop a working relationship with U.S. military
officers in Iraq. In his introduction, Bremer told military leaders that “you all work for
me.”84 Eventually, relations broke down to the point where Bremer and the head U.S.
military general in Iraq, General Sanchez, refused to speak to each other.85 All was not
well with Bremer’s relationships in Washington either. President Bush had appointed
Bremer to work directly underneath Donald Rumsfeld and was subject to Rumsfeld’s
decisions.86 Bremer twice asked for additional troops to send to Iraq but was ultimately
denied due to Rumsfeld’s strongly held belief that more troops would not help stabilize
Iraq.87
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Citing Bremer’s “control freak” personality, Mansoor writes that Bremer also
lacked cooperation with other U.S. agencies, especially USAID.88 Even though the
reconstruction of Iraq was the largest international aid package since the Marshall plan,
Bremer shut out agencies like USAID and kept reconstruction plans firmly under CPA
control. Under the “ad hoc” CPA organization, monetary waste and mismanagement
began to build, and the pace of reconstruction slowed to a crawl.89
However, these were not the worst issues with the CPA. Heavily influenced by
OSP planning, Bremer made three major decisions that would greatly contribute to the
failures of the occupation prior to 2007.90 First, Bremer announced CPA Order Number
1, dismantling Hussein’s Baath party and “barring senior and midlevel officials form
holding positions in government agencies,” hospitals, and universities.91 Banning
midlevel officials largely crippled the Iraqi technocracy, which had kept the Iraqi
infrastructure running, and replaced them with new untrained “political hacks.”92 Bremer
effectively left thousands of Sunnis barred from participating in a new Iraq, leaving them
with “no political future … and deprived of their honor.”93
Second, CPA Order Number 2 disbanded the Iraqi military, preventing a
predominantly Sunni soldiery from gainful employment. Sacked Iraqi soldiers returned
home with a vast cache of weapons which would be used against U.S. and coalition
forces. Both of these orders alienated the Sunni elite, increasing sectarian tension and
creating “the military basis for the insurgency.”94
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Third, Bremer went forward with his plan for the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC),
an Iraqi interim government that would oversee the Iraqi elections in 2005.95 The 25member IGC became a predominantly Shiite dominated body, excluding the Sunni elite,
which had been unaccustomed to limited political power since Iraq had been governed by
the Ottoman Empire.96 Out of the 25 members, 13 of the members were Shiite. In
contrast, the Sunnis had only 5 members elected due to their boycott of the January 2005
election, which left the Sunnis as a political minority along with the Kurd, Christian, and
Turkoman delegates.97 Even when Sunnis appeared to vote in droves in the subsequent
December election, Sunnis remained in the minority.98
In addition to Sunni discontent, inter-Shi’a conflict would derail the IGC and Iraqi
democracy. Many Shiites were dissatisfied because wealthy Iraqis who hadn’t lived in
Iraq for years would now be making decisions for locals. The IGC brought to power
Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi exile who had been trying to gain U.S. support to overthrow
Saddam since the 1990’s.99 Despite Chalabi’s enormous influence on U.S. policy and
OSD pre-war planning, Chalabi’s role within the IGC was ill-advised.100 Both the CIA
and State Department “were deeply skeptical about Chalabi’s leadership credentials” and
concerned about his exile group’s financial mismanagement.101 However, the Department
of Defense saw this as just more CIA and State attacks on their department, largely
ignoring their concerns.102
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In Iraq, Chalabi was not as powerful as his OSD allies thought. Iraqi exile groups
such as Chalabi’s were seen as “divided, weak, and irrelevant” by Iraqis, and had to
compete with several other Shi’a political groups that were already entrenched in Iraq.103
Religious leaders such as the moderate Ayatollah al-Sistani and radical cleric Muqtada alSadr had notable influence in Iraq. These leaders and their various Shi’a groups disagreed
over various concerns such as “cooperation with the United States, elections, governance,
reaching out to Sunnis and Kurds, the constitution, [and] federalism.”104 Often, the
argument between groups centered on who was the most Iraqi, and who had sold out by
spending exile in Iran or the West.105 As Shi’a dominance of the Iraqi government
increased in the January 2005 elections, competition between Shi’a groups began to heat
up.106
To his credit, Sistani did try to stay “above the fray” of the inter-Shia conflict,
promoting a more moderate line of cooperation with the United States and Sunnis, and
working to “deliver Iraq to the Shi’as” in a Shi’a dominated central government.107
Sistani viewed the new Iraqi state as the Shi’a state and saw “no reason to resist statebuilding.”108 Sistani was also less hostile to Sunnis than other Shi’a factions. For
example, when Sunni insurgent violence resulted in a deadly stampede at a Shi’a
religious pilgrimage, Sistani restrained Shi’as from retaliating against Sunnis.109
Not everyone was as cooperative as Sistani. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
(SCIRI), led by Iraqis who spent their exile in Iran, enjoyed close relations with the
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Iranian government. Despite a “moderate” veneer, SCIRI’s Badr Brigade military wing
used its political power in the Iraqi Interior Ministry and its Iranian support to retaliate
against Sunni insurgents.110 Badr militants dominated the Iraqi police forces, forming
death squads that would eventually be used cleanse entire neighborhoods of their Sunni
inhabitants.111 In Southern Iraq, SCIRI established itself as the theocratic independent
government of Basra, but it solved “few social problems” and tolerated “a great deal of
nepotism and corruption”.112 SCIRI’s Iranian support, sectarian leanings, and “theocracy
mixed with thuggery” would hinder the U.S. war effort.113
The United States also struggled to deal with Muqtada al-Sadr. Inheriting his
religious following from his cleric father, al-Sadr had a very weak claim to religious
knowledge. Jokingly referred to as “Mullah Atari,” al-Sadr had failed his seminary
education and was more adept in playing video games than understanding Shi’a
theology.114 To make up for his lack of religious legitimacy, al-Sadr adopted radical
politics which were “exacerbated by his unstable personality.”115 Though al-Sadr could
be manipulated by various other Shi’a leaders, he developed a rebel image which
promoted a mix of Islam and nationalism, gaining him influence as an open challenger to
U.S. authority.116 By opposing the U.S., al-Sadr utilized his father’s legacy and gained
popularity amongst the “poor and uneducated Shi’a youth.” In addition to his opposition
to the United States, al-Sadr competed with Sistani and SCIRI for political power. AlSadr argued that he alone was suitable for power as an ibn al-balad, or son of the soil,
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unlike the aforementioned exiles.117 Al-Sadr held tenuous control of the Jaish al-Mahdi
Shi’a militant group, using the militia to challenge Sistani’s leadership and SCIRI’s
control of Southern Iraq.118 As evidence of al-Sadr’s political ambition, he even tried
allying with Sunnis to undercut his Shi’a opponents.119
The rag-tag coalition of secular leaders allied with the religious al-Da’wa Party
dominated the Iraqi central government, but they had very little control over SCIRI and
al-Sadr. Leaders like Chalabi and his successor Iyad Allawi, struggled to rein in the
sectarian leanings of the Shi’a. Eventually, Chalabi had lost favor with the United States,
having been “non-compliant with U.S. wishes” in the IGC and denounced “for leaking
sensitive intelligence information to Iran”.120 The U.S. infatuation with Chalabi quickly
ended in 2004, but not soon enough to stem the more radical elements of the Iraqi Shiites.
Eventually, U.S. and coalition forces would be fighting a three-headed insurgency,
combating partisan forces led by Sunnis, Shi’as, and international terrorist groups looking
to take took advantage of the chaos.
Military strategy was also to blame for the disorganized occupation. Military
leaders stuck to traditional methods, choosing to utilize aggressive raids and cordon and
search missions to neutralize enemy combatants.121 At the highest levels, no attempts to
adjust tactics were made in 2003. General Sanchez had made the decision that U.S.
troops would remain in “Phase III (offensive operations)” through the end of the year.122
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As Blair Wilcox writes, the overall strategy was conquest rather than insurgency,
applying overwhelming force to degrade the enemy. 123 Heavy firepower and relying on
poorly trained Iraqi soldiers to bear the brunt of the violence. The result was heavy levels
of civilian casualties and human rights abuses detrimental to reducing the growing
violence.124 As the situation deteriorated, U.S. soldiers soon had to focus on
counteracting growing numbers of suicide attacks, car bombs, and roadside improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) instead of reconstruction and stability efforts.125
Another major contributor to the growing insurgency was the tactical decision for
U.S. and coalition forces to retreat back to forward operating bases (FOBs) on the
outskirts of major cities such as Baghdad and Fallujah.126 The reasoning behind this
particular tactic was that the U.S. military presence in urban areas was detrimental to
keeping the peace, like a “virus infecting Iraqi society.”127 However, this had the opposite
effect of what was intended. By retreating from the city streets, troops were not able to
protect civilians or the critical city infrastructure from harm.128 Ultimately, this decision
created more unrest and increased the sectarian tension between Sunnis and Shi’as.
The battle to control the Iraqi city of Fallujah in 2004 is most representative of
this phase of the U.S. occupation of Iraq. As U.S. forces continued to pursue “order and
stability through military action” and withdraw to FOBs, entire cities were left without
any U.S. presence.129 In Fallujah, lack of security had resulted in four U.S. contractors
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being murdered, burned, and hung from bridges by disgruntled Sunnis.130 In response,
2,000 Marines began an assault to re-establish control over Fallujah, an action “portrayed
as civilian bloodbath by the Arabic media”.131 As a result, under pressure from members
of the IGC, Bremer and Central Command generals decided to postpone the Fallujah
operation.132
Concurrently, U.S. forces also had to contend with the growing Shi’a insurgency
lead by al-Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi militia. The militia had declared open rebellion and had
further “established a shadow government to challenge the authority of the CPA” in
several southern Iraqi cities.133 Two U.S. armored divisions were sent to deal with alSadr, and they were quickly able to overwhelm the opposition with “superior discipline
and firepower.”134 Despite success on the battlefield, several political settlements
between the IGC and al-Sadr provided the Jaish al-Mahdi respite, allowing the militia to
regain strength.135
On the political side of things, the CPA transferred power to the IGC in June
2004. Inadequately trained Iraqi troops, already under strain from significant combat
roles, would now have more responsibility and less oversight from the United States.
With the power to “recruit, promote, and dismiss military personnel,” Iraqi politicians
would continue to choose important command positions “on the basis of religious and
political affiliations.”136 Less oversight meant the Iraqi military increasingly became a
source of sectarian conflict rather than a solution to it, and ethnic cleansing was
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becoming more and more common in Shi’a-Sunni mixed neighborhoods.137 To illustrate
how easy it was for Shi’as to implement sectarian actions, Shi’as dominated the January
2005 election, electing a body in which only 2 percent of elected officials represented
Sunnis.138
Problems continued to plague the Iraq war effort. Rising international pressure on
the United States began to develop when it was discovered that there was no proof that
Saddam Hussein’s regime had possessed WMDs.139 There had also been horrific reports
of prisoner abuse at the U.S. Abu Ghraib prison in the spring of 2004.140 With everything
that had gone wrong up to this point, it had finally dawned on the United States
leadership that changes were needed with regards to the political and military strategy of
the occupation.
However, change happened very slowly. After realizing that the military couldn’t
deploy to each Iraqi city and level them to the ground, the Bush administration had
decided to shake things up.141 The Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) that had been
managing the Iraqi war from 2003 to 2004 was soon morphed into Multi-National ForceIraq (MNF-I) under the direction of General George Casey. Casey steadily began to build
the foundation for future counterinsurgency operations.142 Casey’s “fresh thinking” in the
MNF-I introduced two counterterrorist experts to develop a new operational strategy, and
most importantly, ordered the creation of an academy for soldiers to learn counter-
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insurgency operations.143 These changes were slow developing steps, but they would
eventually pay big dividends in 2007.
Another reason for the Casey’s slow start was the political end game the Bush
administration was pursuing. Instead of investing for the long run, Bush and the
Department of Defense prepared an exit strategy. Concerned with the American public’s
distaste for long military ventures, the emphasis was placed on reintroducing Sunnis to
the Iraqi political fold, neutralizing insurgents and terrorists, training Iraqi security forces,
and getting U.S. troops out of Iraq as soon as possible. Many of these political objectives
were being rushed, and they had a counterproductive effect. For instance, the “premature
commitment of Iraqi forces” within 12 months led to increased violence because the
troops were “too few, too apathetic, too ill-trained and poorly equipped, and in some
cases too sectarian.”144
The political calculations handicapped the MNF-I game plan, but several other
military weaknesses were also apparent. Tactically, not much had changed between
CJTF-7 and the MNF-I. U.S. and coalition forces still remained in large FOB’s outside
the cities, and traditional military assaults were still a regular occurrence.145 For example,
the long delayed Fallujah offensive was initiated, resulting in the deaths of 2,000 Sunni
and al-Qaeda insurgents and virtually leveling the city to the ground.146 With General
Casey promising to pass the baton to Iraqi forces by the end of 2005, MNF-I did not look
feasible.147
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At the combat level, individual military commanders and units were gradually
adjusting to counterinsurgency tactics. Leaders such as Colonel Stephen Davis and
Colonel H.R. McMaster provided early case studies of how the counterinsurgency should
be fought. Both leaders saw value in co-opting the local population and bringing the fight
to the city cores in “clear, hold, and build” strategies.148 Despite individual success,
inconsistent military-wide strategy and a lack of proper intelligence collection doomed
the MNF-I to failure.149
By 2006, things were looking grim. Because of the inconsistent distribution of
units who adopted counterinsurgency to those that maintained classic war tactics,
sectarian violence continued to increase.150 Sunni al-Qaeda elements led by Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi began to participate in cleansing mixed areas of Shi’as, similar to what Shi’as
had been doing to Sunnis.151 In particular, al-Zarqawi began to target Shi’a holy sites.
Most notoriously, al-Qaeda members planted explosives at the al-Askari shrine in
Samarra in 2006, destroying the golden dome.152 One Shi’a leader stated that “this is as
9/11 in the United States.”153 Not long after the bombing, Shi’a reprisals began an Iraqi
civil war.154 The U.S. would be forced to consider a more unified counterinsurgency
effort if they wished to achieve their objectives in Iraq.
The situation in Iraq from 2003 to 2006 illustrates the environment in which U.S.
counterterrorism took place. The chaos of the occupation was complicated by both U.S.
planning and tactical mishaps, as well as the sectarian nature of Shi’a and Sunni politics.
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In the next section, the history of the early U.S. occupation is utilized to explore variables
such as troop levels, civilian casualties, and Iraqi public opinion and their effects on
counterterrorism success within Iraq.
Iraq War Data Trends 2003-2006
Based on the political and military developments from 2003 to 2006, the
prevailing counterterrorism strategy utilized was invasion and occupation. U.S. and
coalition forces did not fully embrace a counterinsurgency strategy until 2007, even
though some counterinsurgency strategies emerged as early as 2005. Therefore, if the
hypothesis that the use of hard offensive counterterrorism results in counterterrorism
failure, the “Pre-Surge” period should feature variables that signify that relationship.
First, troop levels from the Brookings Institution Iraq Index are examined to see if they
increased or decreased. Second, casualty records from the Iraq Body Count will
investigate the relation between civilian casualties and troop levels. Third, various public
opinion polls from 2003-2006 compiled by Brookings will look at whether troop levels
and civilian casualties affected Iraqi public opinion. Lastly, all previously mentioned
variables will be compared to the number of terrorist attacks in Iraq registered by the
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to test whether or not the hypothesis that hard
offensive counterterror strategies lead to failure in counterterrorism is valid.
Troop Levels 2003-2006
Overall, troop levels stayed largely below 180,000 troops stationed in Iraq from
2003-2006. As mentioned before, the Bush administration largely ignored pressure to
drastically increase troop levels, even though leaders in Iraq requested higher amounts of
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soldiers.155 As noted in Figure 1, troop levels only met or exceeded 180,000 for three
whole months after the initial invasion. In 2003, troop levels steadily declined from the
initial invasion as the Department of Defense anticipated a quick hand-off from U.S. and
coalition forces to Iraqi forces. Once sectarian opposition increased in 2004, troop levels
began to rise with major battles such as the first battle of Fallujah taking place. The battle
for Fallujah in March of 2004 was prompted by the deaths of U.S. contractors in the city,
so it is plausible that more troops were sent when major combat operations were required
during this period. The military had realized that they didn’t have enough troops to
handle taking Fallujah, sending “five Marine brigades and a U.S. army armored brigade”
when they invaded a second time in November of 2004.156
Political motives could also be in play. In February 2004, the number of total
soldiers increased from 139,000 to 162,000 by that April, in conjunction with Iraq
approving a new constitution. Numbers would mostly stagnate until the first troop peak in
February 2005. After February, troops were lowered following a successful election in
January 2005. The second increase also occurred near the December 2005, meaning that
these troop level increases were likely a means to provide stability during crucial political
developments in Iraq. By 2004, Bush had brought establishing democracy in Iraq to the
forefront of U.S. policy objectives.157 This emphasis on democracy in part helped Bush to
get re-elected in November 2004.158 With this in mind, troop increases helped to
safeguard the Iraqi elections and head off the Bush administration’s political opponents
back home. Did these troop increases have a positive or negative effect on casualties,
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public opinion, or the rate of terrorism? Or is it too few troops that lead to
counterterrorism failure as some scholars suggest?

Figure 2. Number of U.S. and Coalition Troops Present in Iraq from 2003-2006159
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Civilian Casualties 2003-2006
Iraqi civilian casualties gradually increased during the 2003-2006 period, as
shown in Figure 2. Spikes did occur, and casualty spikes were correlated with periods of
major events such as military operations. In April 2004, a spike in casualties occurred
around the same time as the first battle of Fallujah, decried by the media and IGC as a
“civilian bloodbath.”160 The same could be said in November 2005, as the second battle
of Fallujah took place. Mansoor claims that Fallujah was likely abandoned by civilians at
this point, but there was likely many civilians still in harm’s way.161 The Iraq Body Count
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tallied the deaths from Fallujah alone at 700, a substantial percentage of the monthly total
for November 2004.162 These two spikes could be interpreted that higher troop levels, in
tandem with aggressive military offensives, led to increased civilian casualties.
A casualty spike in August 2005 might have had a different cause than the
previous spikes discussed. In this case, the casualty spike predated a troop surge by a
month, which means additional troops actually might have helped to quell higher
numbers of casualties. Terrorist attacks, which will be discussed further in a preceding
section, might have a causal relationship with the August casualty spike.
As elections were approaching, insurgent and terrorist groups might have had
motivations to up their attempts to increase instability. Both al-Zarqawi and al-Sadr
actively resisted Allawi’s government from March 2004 onward, filling in substantial
“political vacuums left by the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the cities.”163 A large
number of terrorist attacks occurred in July (and the past several months before), which
could have led to more casualties being recorded in Iraqi morgues in August. It would
appear that the following troop increase actually reduced both casualties and terrorist
attacks. Tactics started to change at the frontlines, as commanders began to shift to
counterinsurgency operations, popularly known as “clear, hold, and build.”164
Commanders like Colonels Stephen Davis and H.R. McMaster utilized “clear, hold,
build,” in areas like al-Anbar and Tal Afar respectively, but the overall U.S. strategy was
still a mix between counterinsurgency and more aggressive, traditional operations.165 The
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introduction of clear, hold, and build strategy might have been just enough to contribute
to a lower rate of casualties. However, the relative stability might have been more
influenced by the inclusion of Sunnis into the political fold in the elections than troops.
For instance, the constitution drafting committee was gradually opened for Sunni
representatives to participate in October.166
Evidence of a direct relationship between troop levels and civilian casualties can
plausibly be argued for, but it isn’t entirely conclusive. Increased troop levels, parallel
with the use of a hard offensive counterterrorist strategy, seemed to result in increased
civilian casualties. However, other factors could also be in play in the increase, such as
the many governing mistakes by the CPA and other U.S. administrative organizations,
and the general political tensions between Sunnis and Shi’as. But in general, when paired
with aggressive tactics, increases in troop levels did coincide with an increase in civilian
casualties during the 2003-2006 period.
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Figure 3. Total Number of Iraqi Civilian Casualties Recorded by the Iraq Body Count
from 2003-2006167
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Iraqi Public Opinion 2003-2006
In Iraqi public opinion, support for the U.S. and coalition’s mission in Iraq started
optimistically high in 2003, but subsequently declined as many Iraqis began to see the
foreign troops as occupiers. The high public opinion recorded in Figure 3 would decline
significantly as Shi’a and Sunni sectarian violence gained strength from 2004 to 2006. In
2003, Gallup polls ( 1) recorded that 67% of Iraqis believed that Iraq would be better off
in five years than it was before the U.S. invasion, and 62% believed the hardships they
endured since the invasion had been worth it. The Gallup poll also found that the majority
of Iraqis wished to see U.S. troops stay longer, and that a majority believed that attacks
against U.S. troops were unjustified.
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In 2003, it is therefore likely that Shi’as and Kurds were supportive of the United
States in Iraq because they were liberated from a repressive Saddam regime. Kurds, for
instance, had decorated their northern cities with “welcoming signs” for U.S. forces after
the invasion.168 At this time Shi’as had yet to begin their divisive inter-rivalries, as Sistani
“argued for truce between various Shi’a factions… [and] focus on confirming their power
at the polls.” On the other hand, Sunnis had welcomed American troops with graffiti
promising that they would “remain a thorn in the chest” of the occupiers.169 Sunnis would
become even more upset with the implementation of “draconian” de-Baathification laws
by the CPA, which would mark the beginning of a full-fledged “nationalist Sunni
insurgency”.170

Table 1. Responses in Percent to Iraqi Political Opinion Polling Questions in 2003171
Question
Will Iraq be in a better condition five years from
now than it was before the U.S.-led invasion?

Findings
Better off: 67%
Worse off: 8%

Is Iraq better off now than it was before the
invasion?
Was ousting Saddam worth the hardships endured
since the invasion?
Would you like to see U.S. troops stay longer than
a few more months?
Are there circumstances in which attacks against
U.S. troops can be justified?

Better off: 33%
Worse off 47%
Yes: 62%

168

Stay longer: 71%
Not stay longer: 26%
No: 64%
Sometimes justified: 36%
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By 2004 however, Iraqi public opinion began to slide among all groups in Iraq.
By March 2004, 83% of the population polled by the CPA had a negative view of U.S.
and coalition forces.172 A Gallup poll found that 71% think of foreign troops as occupiers,
compared to 43% who thought of them as occupiers in 2003.173 As shown in Table 2, The
CPA also found that 81% wanted U.S. and coalition forces to leave. Iraqis cited various
reasons for their answer such as viewing coalition forces as occupiers, saying they
brought too much death and destruction, saying they want Iraqi oil and resources, or
believing that Iraqis alone could administer Iraq better.

Table 2. Number of Iraqis Answering that Coalition Forces Should Leave Iraq in 2004
CPA Iraqi Public Opinion Poll174
Should Coalition Forces leave or stay in Iraq?
Leave: 866 (out of 1,068 respondents)
Why should Coalition Forces leave?
They are occupiers and must leave immediately: 418
They brought only death and destruction: 142
Iraqis can administer Iraq better: 102
They want Iraqi oil and resources: 76
They are facilitating Zionist domination of Iraq: 51
They do not respect our religions and cultures: 38
They abuse Iraqis: 23
Other/Don’t know/No answer: 16

Polling broken down amongst the three major sectarian groups are the best
indicator of the 2004 public opinion slide, as shown in Table 3. Support for the U.S. war
effort was strongest amongst the Kurds, but even Kurdish public opinion dropped. In
Kurdish dominant areas, public opinion dropped from 83.8% believing that Iraq was
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heading in the right direction in June to 72.2% in October. In the Shi’a dominant south of
Iraq, polling percentages oscillated with ten percentage points of 50% in 2004. This is
perhaps in part due to the growing competition between the Shi’a central government and
the Jaish al-Mahdi and Badr militias. Most dramatically, Sunni areas fell from 33.43% in
June to 18.3% in October. Sunnis still felt extremely alienated leading into 2005 and had
committed wholeheartedly to resisting the occupation and Shi’a rule.

Table 3. Percent Answering that Iraq is Heading in the Right Direction in 2004 Regional
Iraqi Public Opinion Poll175
Region
Kurdish areas:
South (Shi’a areas):

Sunni areas:

Do you think Iraq is heading in the right
direction?
May 27-June 11, 2004: 83.8%
July 24-August 2, 2004: 71.5%
Sept. 24-Oct. 4, 2004: 72.2%
May 27-June 11, 2004: 44.4%
July 24-August 2, 2004: 61.4%
Sept. 24-Oct. 4, 2004: 51.1%
May 27-June 11, 2004: 33.4%
July 24-August 2, 2004: 28.9%
Sept. 24-Oct. 4, 2004: 14.6%

Some measure of stability and the first successful election propelled 67% of Iraqis
to believe that Iraq was headed in the right direction in April 2005, as shown in Figure 3.
The 67% was a high water mark in a period from May 2004 to December 2005, hovering
around 50% by December 2005. Overall, 65% of Iraqis opposed the presence of
Coalition forces in Iraq, but support for the war effort continued to be split along
sectarian lines as noted in a November 2005 poll (Table 4). Sunnis were still wary of U.S.
and Coalition efforts as 85% opposed the presence Coalition Troops and only 25% of
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Sunnis believed life was better since the war started. Additionally, Sunni support of the
established Iraqi government was very low due to the lack of Sunni representation, with
only 36% approving of the new constitution. For Shiites, a slim majority of 59% opposed
the coalition, but 59% did believe life was better since the war occurred. And in contrast
to Sunni disapproval, 85% of Shi’a polled approved of the new constitution. Kurds, the
most supportive group to the U.S. and coalition effort, had a majority belief that life was
better (73%) and only 22% opposed Coalition forces.

Figure 4. Timeline of Iraqi Public Opinion Percentages on Which Direction Iraq is
Headed (2004-2005)176
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Table 4. Percentage of Yes Answers to 2005 Regional Iraqi Public Opinion Poll
Questions177
Question
Life is better since
the war
The US was right to
invade Iraq
I feel very safe in
my neighborhood
I approve of the new
Constitution
I oppose Coalition
Forces

Kurdish Area
73%

Shiite Area
59%

Sunni Area
25%

80%

58%

16%

91%

82%

21%

88%

85%

36%

22%

59%

85%

In 2006, public opinion of the U.S. military occupation of Iraq and the U.S. in
general amongst both Sunnis and Shi’as was dangerously low. Shi’as were enraged by
the al-Qaeda destruction of the al-Askari shrine dome in February of 2006 and had
greatly increased retaliation against Sunnis, setting off a civil war. Al-Sistani stated that if
the U.S. and Iraqi government couldn’t control the security situation, the Shi’a faithful
would.178 For one of the first times, the International Republican Institute polling
registered that a majority of Iraqis felt Iraq was headed in the wrong direction, as shown
in Figure 4. 52% of those polled in both March and September felt the country was
headed down the wrong path. When asked if they supported attacks against U.S.-led
forces, 47% said yes in January 2006, and then 61% in September 2006. In another first,
Shi’a approval of attacks on U.S. forces increased from 41% in January to 62% in
September, joining Sunnis in venting their frustration (Sunnis registered at 88% and
subsequently 92%).
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From 2003 to 2006, Iraqi public opinion steadily dropped. As sectarian violence
skyrocketed, both Shi’as and Sunnis became more disillusioned with the direction of the
country. During this same drop in public opinion, civilian casualties began to mount.
Civilian casualty spikes, often correlating with increased troop levels and aggressive
military tactics, were followed by a general increase in casualties per year. Therefore, it is
possible that there is a relation between the increase of U.S. troops and civilian casualties
and a decrease in public opinion during the “Pre-Surge” period.

Figure 5. Timeline of Percentage of Iraqi Respondents on the Direction of Iraq (20042006) 179

Do you think Iraq today is generally headed
in the right or wrong direction?
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Right Direction

Wrong Direction

Terrorist Attacks in Iraq 2003-2006
During the 2003-2006 campaign, terrorist incidents in Iraq occurred in very small
numbers, as shown in Figure 9. For example, several months in 2003 only registered less
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than ten attacks. According to Robert Pape, there had even been no recorded instances of
suicide terrorism in Iraq before 2003.180 As time elapsed, the number of terrorist attacks
would steadily increase. Linearly, there is a steady rise in the number of attacks per
month leading to 2007. This rise seems most related to the deteriorating conditions in
stability and the rise of insurgent violence that occurred over the four years. The linear
rise in terrorist attacks correlates to the linear rise in civilian casualties, as both terrorist
attacks and civilian casualties steadily increased from 2003 to 2006. The rise in terrorist
attacks also corresponds with a decrease in favorable Iraqi public opinion to the U.S. and
coalition occupation.
In addition to the linear increase, several bursts of attacks began to regularly occur
in early 2005. New record highs of terrorist attacks were recorded for 2005, especially
after the January 2005 election. The first election involved a Sunni voting boycott, and
when they did participate in the second election in December, Sunnis were forced to
come to the realization that they couldn’t compete politically with the Shi’as.181 Instead,
Sunnis resorted to intimidation and violence to curb Shia power and “sap their
confidence.”182 Notably, these 2005 spikes also occurred with a significant U.S. and
coalition troop increase, from 162,000 to 180,000. The period starting in late 2005 shows
a different trend for troop levels and terrorism. During the late 2005 period, troop levels
increased while civilian casualties and terrorist attacks decreased. This is in part thanks to
evolving tactics used by commanders like Colonel H.R. McMaster, but also to more
Sunni inclusion in the political process in the December 2005 election.
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Figure 6. Number of Terrorist Attacks in Iraq from 2003-2006183
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For the hypothesis that offensive counterterrorism leads counterterrorism failure
to be proven, troop levels, influenced by high casualties and low public opinion, should
lead to more terrorism. In the traditional war era, this logic seems to be true, as the
indicators all point to counterterrorism failure. But again, other factors could be at play,
such as the enmity of politics between Shi’as and Sunnis in Iraq at the time, or the
ineptitude of the CPA government in navigating said Iraqi politics. In the next section,
the politics and tactics of the “Surge” from 2007 onward are examined. The Surge
featured a unified U.S. effort at counterinsurgency, where U.S. forces attempted to win
back the Iraqi people by paying closer attention to the “type and amount of force used”
and the competence and impartiality of those who wield force.184 By way of the
hypothesis that hard offensive counterterrorism causes a counterterrorism campaign to
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fail, the Surge should show that less aggressive tactics help counterterrorism efforts to
succeed.
Iraq History and Politics 2007-2011: The Surge and Withdrawal
By the end of 2006, politicians, soldiers, and the even the general public felt that
the United States was losing the war in Iraq. Sunni and Shi’a sectarian violence had
reached critical mass, and the Iraqi political system was largely deadlocked. If changes
were to be made they needed to happen fast, before things got even worse. Soon enough,
President Bush saw fit to change the direction of the war in Iraq by pushing a “Surge”
strategy. This section investigates the political and historical context of the 2007 Surge by
looking at the mounting U.S. public opposition to the war, Surge planning, President
Bush’s decision making, implementation of the Surge, the Sunni/Shi’a political breakthrough, and President Obama’s drawdown of the war. By examining these topics, it is
possible to evaluate the Iraq War from 2007 to 2011. It is then possible to look and see if
hard offensive counterterrorism causes more terrorism, or rather, if the Surge caused less
terrorism than the aggressive 2003-2006 period.
U.S. public opinion towards the war in Iraq plummeted in early 2006, and many
called for a withdrawal of U.S. troops. By March 2006, the midterm election was fully on
the minds of the American public. In a Pew poll recorded that month, 43% of those
polled thought the war was going well, in contrast to 51% who believed the war was not
going well.185 By November, “an all-time low of 29 percent” of Americans polled
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supported Bush’s management of the war, and expected Democrats to end the war if they
were elected to a congressional majority.186
During midterm campaigning, Democrats had framed the war in Iraq as a failure.
In contrast to the Bush administration’s rosy outlook, his political opponents criticized
Iraq’s fall into a civil war.187 Leaders such as Senator Harry Reid argued that the “war in
Iraq was unwinnable, owing to the country’s ethnic divisions … [and] the
administration’s failure to adequately plan for the postwar occupation.”188 The
Democrat’s plan eventually paid off. In the midterm elections, Bush was handed a
decisive defeat when Democrats took a majority in both the House of Representatives
and the Senate.189 In a rebuke to Bush’s war policy, newly minted Senate Majority
Leader Reid and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi wrote to Bush and said that “the
American people … don’t believe your current Iraq policy will lead to success.”190 They
also recommended that “rather than deploy additional forces to Iraq,” the President
should “begin phased redeployment of our forces … shifting the principal mission of our
forces there from combat to training…”191
Several months prior to the President’s disastrous 2006 midterm elections,
Congress had created the “Iraq Study Group” to study the war and suggest a new strategy
for Iraq.192 The bipartisan group was run by 10 government officials, including
Republican James A. Baker and Democrat Lee H. Hamilton, both of which had served
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distinguished government careers.193 In their examination of the war’s progress, they
noted that Iraq was not doing very well. The Iraq Study Group soberly wrote that Iraqi
violence was “increasing in scope and lethality”.194 Groups like Sunni insurgents, Shi’a
militias, al-Qaeda, and criminals were a challenge to stability, and the Iraqi government
was “not adequately advancing national reconciliation, providing basic security, or
delivering essential services.”195 Mirroring recommendations by Congressional leaders,
the Iraq Study group concluded that the United States should begin a gradual withdrawal
of U.S. troops, and transfer responsibility to the Iraqi military.196
Contrary to the conclusions of politicians, the Iraq Study Group, and the general
public, a different approach to handling the war was also taking shape in 2006. Military
discussions on whether to stay the course or create an entirely new approach were under
way. Research groups in various departments such as the National Security Council, State
Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had also begun to grapple with the
“deteriorating situation in Iraq” to find a new way forward.197 Building on
recommendations from working group members, and even the recommendations of the
Iraq Study group, a new troop surge strategy began to develop.198
The success of this planning began with General Casey’s building blocks that he
had established after taking over the MNF-I execution of the Iraq War. Frustrated by the
lack of success in curbing sectarian violence, Casey began to develop a
counterinsurgency strategy for Iraq.199 By bringing in counterinsurgency advisors, slowly

193

Hahn, Missions Accomplished? 187.
Ibid.
195
Ibid.
196
Ibid.
197
Mansoor, Surge, 34.
198
Ibid.
199
Hahn, 188.
194

52

changing tactics, and establishing a new counterinsurgency academy, Casey had helped
to set the ground work for the future Surge strategy.200
Casey had also paved the way for his successor, General David Petraeus, to
assume the mantle of leadership during the Surge period. Petraeus had lead the
development of counterinsurgency tactics in Iraq since 2003, where those under his
command had successfully provided stability in Mosul until their untimely replacement
by another brigade.201 Behind the scenes, Petraeus authored the basis for the Surge’s
counterinsurgency strategy, the Army and Marines Field Manual 3-24.202
Counterinsurgency, or COIN, would require U.S. and Coalition forces to enact a strategy
that would be “a mix of offensive, defense, and stability operations conducted along
multiple lines of operations.”203 Most importantly, the manual stressed the importance of
preserving the well-being of the Iraqi population. The field manual states that COIN
efforts “should focus on supporting the local populace and [host nation] government,”
and that “political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than
conventional military operations … in undermining an insurgency.”204
This counterinsurgency plan understood well some of the essential problems the
war in Iraq had faced so far, and that had not been addressed by the initial OSD planning
of the invasion. To secure and support the Iraqi people, the military would need to
develop skills “most associated with nonmilitary agencies.” This would entail “providing
all aspects of the basic quality of life,” like meeting basic economic needs, ensuring the
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provision of essential services, sustaining social and cultural institutions, and providing
security from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and crime.205
In response to the strong insurgency that had developed in Iraq, the Field Manual
also tried to foster a better understanding of the motivations of insurgents. Petraeus wrote
that insurgents cannot “defeat the United States with conventional operations.”206 Instead,
insurgents “do not limit themselves to purely military means” and instead “try to exhaust
U.S. national will … by undermining and outlasting public support.”207 A successful
COIN operation would need to not only secure the population from insurgent violence,
but also establish the legitimacy of the Iraqi government. Ultimately, U.S. and coalition
forces would need to stand down and allow for the government of Iraq to win on its
own.208 The new surge, would still need to “strengthen local forces” in order to remove
“foreign armies” such as the U.S., seen as an occupier.209
Offensive operations would still be critical to the U.S. war effort. Petraeus warned
that soldiers would need to be ready for a “handshake or a hand grenade” when securing
the Iraqi people.210 As Mansoor quipped, “there was plenty of killing involved” in the
new Surge strategy.211 The Field Manual noted that there would be times where it would
be necessary to eliminate extremists “whose beliefs prevent them from ever reconciling
with the [Iraqi] government.”212 Additionally, the new COIN strategy would make the
population secure, but would ultimately leave U.S. and coalition forces less secure.213 No
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longer would troops “remain in their compounds … [and] lose touch with the [Iraqi]
people.”214 Aggressive tactics, such as “saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening
post operations” would need to be conducted, and would entail sharing more risk with the
population.215
However, unlike the general strategy in Iraq from 2003-2006, the Surge would
require restrictions on the use of force. Petraeus and other contributors realized early on
that the “United States did not have the leeway … to undertake counterinsurgency …
focused … on killing the enemy regardless of the collateral damage caused to civilian
lives and property.”216 The American public and the international media would not
tolerate “such excesses” any longer.217 The military would need to pay close attention to
the appropriate level of force, and be sure that those able to wield force were legitimate
and committed to impartiality.218 Public perceptions of “both police and military units”
were thus critically important to effective COIN operations.
In addition to his conceptual work in completing Field Manual 3-24, Petraeus
enlisted several of his staffers, such as Mansoor and McMaster, to advise the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS) on how to rethink strategy for the Iraq War.219 Aptly nicknamed the
“Council of Colonels,” the group criticized Rumsfeld and Casey’s conclusion that Iraqis
had rejected the U.S. occupation, necessitating U.S. and coalition troops withdrawing
from Iraq’s cities.220 Instead, the JCS discussed various strategies described as ‘Go Big,

214

Field Manual 3-24, 1-27.
Ibid.
216
Mansoor, Surge, 38.
217
Ibid.
218
FM 3-24, 1-25.
219
Hahn, Missions Accomplished? 190.
220
Mansoor, 41, 45.
215

55

Go Long, or Go Home”.221 The JCS ultimately stressed the need for more troops and
implementing a long haul counterinsurgency approach.222
In parallel with the progressing military COIN planning, President Bush had
perceptively felt that America was losing the Iraq War.223 Bush had come to his own
conclusions without having consulted with the JCS or the other COIN recommendations.
Partly, this was in order to avoid politically radioactive evidence of the Bush
administration having second thoughts about the war before the 2006 election.224 Instead,
Bush directed his National security Advisor Steve Hadley to undertake a secret review of
Iraq policy.225 First, Hadley invited several “outside government” experts to brief the
President on their views on the Iraq War.226 These experts recommended a shift to
counterinsurgency methods, stressing increased troops and holding military leaders in
“Iraq and Tampa accountable.”227 Second, members of Bush’s staff asked Petraeus for his
advice on what would need to be done.228 Petraeus, of course, recommended a “fully
resourced counterinsurgency strategy”.229
Third, after the “rebuke” of Bush in the midterm election, Bush accepted
Rumsfeld’s resignation as Secretary of Defense.230 The President immediately appointed
Robert Gates as Rumsfeld’s replacement. Gates had been a member of the Congressional
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“Iraq Study Group,” but unlike the group’s final assessment, Gates had concluded that a
“temporary reinforcement of U.S. troops” was necessary.
Fourth, Bush met with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to see if his vision for
Iraq was similar to that of the United States. After having been appointed Prime Minister,
Maliki’s office had been known to prevent the detention of Shi’a hardliners, fill the
military leadership with Shi’as, and neglect Sunni areas of important resources.231 It was
unknown if al-Maliki was “just too weak to prevent such actions, or if he was a willing
participant” in them.232 Maliki relied on the support of al-Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi, which
constrained his public actions in support of the United States.233 When Bush met in
private with the Iraqi Prime Minister, al-Maliki promised to commit more forces, allow
more U.S. presence in Shi’a dominate neighborhoods, rein in Shi’a militias, and begin the
process of political reconciliation of Shi’as with the other various Iraqi factions.234
Finally, with the influence of West Point professor Fred Kagan and retired
General Jack Keane, Bush had decided to choose “victory in Iraq” over an embarrassing
withdrawal.235 Bush took Kagan and Keane’s advice of committing more resources,
securing Sunni and Shi’a mixed areas in Baghdad, and training Iraqis without abandoning
a properly secured Iraqi population.236 As General Casey was still committed to
“transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces as soon as possible,” Bush’s new
Secretary of Defense Gates recommended that Petraeus take over command of U.S.
forces in Iraq.
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By January 2007, Bush had finalized most of the major decisions regarding the
transition to the Surge, and all that was left to do was inform the American people of his
decision. In the face of incredible opposition towards the escalation of the Iraq War, Bush
doubled down and announced his new strategy for Iraq. Bush admitted personal
responsibility for the direction the war had gone, and stated his intention to “change
America’s course in Iraq.”237 Because “failure in Iraq would be disastrous to the United
States and the region,” a new strategy was needed to succeed.238 In addition to the 15
brigade combat teams already in Iraq, a surge of 24,000 troops would head to Iraq to
enact a counterinsurgency mission.239 20,000 of the troops would be sent to Baghdad,
while 4,000 others would be sent to the restive al-Anbar province.240 Bush would allow
Petraeus to enact his vision of U.S. troops fighting alongside Iraqis to protect the
population, build the Iraqi Army and Police Forces, and begin reconstruction of the
country.241 As Bush concluded his speech, “we can, and we will, prevail.”242
The President had taken major political risk to enact the new Surge strategy in
Iraq. Bush had felt that it was necessary to go ahead with the troop increases, stating that
“the Surge was our best chance, maybe our last chance, to accomplish our objectives in
Iraq.”243 Bush’s political opponents were quick to oppose the escalation of the war. In the
public, the Democratic Congress, and even his own Administration, Bush had to
overcome major opposition to the Surge.244
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In January 2007, 61% of Americans opposed sending more troops to Iraq, while
only 36% agreed.245 The public opposition to Bush’s Surge was in part thanks to his
unpopularity. Even though he went public with the Surge announcement, Bush was
unable to reframe the war in the eyes of the American people.246 Despite his warnings
that a withdrawal would increase the threat of “Radical Islamic extremists,” the public’s
disapproval continued through the Democratic Congress.247 However, despite their
landslide victory in the 2006 midterm elections, Democrats did not have a veto-proof
majority in Congress.248 In order to pass a funding cutoff for the war, Democrats would
also have to gain Republican votes as well. If Bush could keep the Republicans in support
of his efforts, the Surge could continue unimpeded.249
In the Bush Administration, many cabinet and military members agreed with
General Casey that the U.S. should train Iraqi forces and “quickly minimize its presence
in Iraq” in the existing “Stand Up/Stand Down” policy.250 In order to resist Democratic
pressure, Bush would need to placate his cabinet and ensure the support of the military.
For instance, senior political advisor Karl Rove “believed that if any generals were to
resign in protest of the Surge,” it would have caused rebellion in the Republican ranks
and cause the formation of a bipartisan antiwar alliance.”251
In this effort, the President was largely successful at containing dissent. By
replacing Rumsfeld and Casey with their popular successors Gates and Petraeus, Bush
was able to gain the approval of his skeptical cabinet members. For example,
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Condoleezza Rice had expressed her doubt in the new policy, but because Gates was now
in command of the Department of Defense, she agreed to “fully endorse” the Surge.252
With the backing of his full Administration, Bush could now attempt to influence the
fractured opinions of the Republican Party (GOP).
Several GOP members had been both publically and privately opposed to the
Surge in 2007, and the Bush Administration needed to address these concerns. Bush sent
Rice, Gates, and Petraeus, all popular with the GOP establishment, to plead their case.253
Rice, Gates, and Petraeus all were good choices because they held far more credibility
with Congress than the President.254 For instance, Petraeus made use of his 67% approval
rating amongst Republicans.255 With the help of his subordinates’ full court press on GOP
members, Bush managed to placate GOP concerns about the Surge. First, the Bush
Administration publicly suggested that the surge would be a “short-term approach,” even
though they privately knew this was unlikely.256 Second, they promised Republicans that
a comprehensive review of the strategy in September 2007.257 By promising these two
major concessions, Bush was able ensure Republican unity towards the Iraq war.
With his Republican alliance, Bush could now divide and discredit Democratic
opposition to the war.258 Republicans like Senator John McCain reframed the Democrat’s
antiwar sentiment, reiterating Bush’s stance that withdrawal Iraq would harm both U.S.
troops and national security. McCain helped to defeat a bill that would contain set dates
for withdrawal by stating that any benchmarks would act as “a date for certain
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surrender.”259 This type of rhetoric preserved Republican support, as the American public
was “receptive to the Republican argument that Democrats were precipitously conceding
defeat.”260 A July poll noted that 55% of the public was willing to wait for Petraeus’
report on the Surge in September.261 Ultimately, Democrats were never able to create
substantial obstacles for the Surge in 2007, and the Surge continued unencumbered.
Amidst the public discussion of the Surge, General Petraeus quickly enacted
Surge policy and tactics in January 2007. Despite some initial difficulty in ensuring the
timely arrival of the Surge brigades, Petraeus was immediately able to begin planning for
the first Surge operation.262 Codenamed Fardh al-Qanoon (or “enforcing the law” in
English), the military began targeting Baghdad and its surrounding areas. Fardh alQanoon would immediately reverse the tactics used in Iraq from 2003-2006. As noted
previously, the objective of the Surge was to provide security to the public. Instead of
being holed up in FOBs like before, U.S. and coalition troops would operate where Iraqis
“lived, worked, and slept,” and work more closely with Iraqi soldiers and policemen.263
By securing the public, they would become more cooperative with Americans, sharing
intelligence on insurgent activities and helping to rebuild Iraq. The Surge would also
limit the rules of engagement for soldiers, restricting the unhelpful collateral damage
towards civilians and their property.264
The major focus of Fardh al-Qanoon would be to achieve an important objective:
securing Baghdad. Planners for the operation wanted to “win the Battle of Baghdad” by
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regaining stability in urban areas and also targeting the so-called Baghdad “belts,” which
were targeted in Fardh al-Qanoon’s sister operation entitled Phantom Thunder. The belts
were the outer reaches of Baghdad where sectarian groups had garnered a substantial
manufacturing and logistical base to attack the capital.265 By choking off the belts, U.S.
and coalition troops could reduce accelerants, such as “car bombs and suicide bombers,”
from disrupting Baghdadi security.266 The extent of the belts were massive and the
operation would take months to unfold, as the full strength of the Surge brigades would
only be felt by June of 2007. The uncovering of a vast network of bomb making factories,
command centers, medical stations made it clear that sectarian groups wouldn’t give up
the area easily.
Despite an increase in violence, the operation would ultimately prove successful.
In May and June of 2007, U.S. troops had suffered a high casualty rate of 227 soldiers
killed.267 However, by December, only 23 soldiers died, a marked improvement.268 By
operating inside Baghdad, and providing Iraqis with “24/7 [security] coverage, several
developments would help to reduce violence.269 For instance, as security improved and
permanent U.S. outposts were established, Iraqis were more comfortable sharing
information with soldiers because they no longer feared reprisals from insurgent and
terrorist groups.270
The new battalion level security stations and company/platoon level outposts also
helped to restrict the movement of insurgents.271 No longer could militants move about
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the city unimpeded by U.S. military presence. Iraqi freedom of movement was also
hampered by the building of controversial “gated communities.”272 Walls were erected
around Baghdad where insurgent violence was the most prevalent.273 Though harshly
criticized by insurgent propaganda and the international media, barriers between Shi’a
and Sunni neighborhoods greatly reduced violence.274 For instance, walls constructed in
the al-Ghazaliyah neighborhood helped to lower the murder rate in that area by up to 50
percent.275 Ultimately, the neighborhood walls and various traffic obstacles seriously
limited both insurgent violence and terrorist attacks such as car bombs and suicide
bombers.276
Fardh al-Qanoon also marked the first steps towards increased reconstruction
efforts across Baghdad. Before the operation, basic services were being neglected in
many Baghdadi neighborhoods. In several places, trash and raw sewage waste was
common in the streets.277 In many cases, electricity had to be “rationed, and was only
available a few hours a day.”278 Insurgent groups could plausibly claim that the Iraqi
government had “lost complete control” over Baghdad.279 As security improved,
reconstruction efforts could begin. For example, in September 2007, a “four hundredkilovolt electrical line” know as “Tower 57” was finally repaired, after having become a
personal obsession for Petraeus.280
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Operation Phantom Thunder was also a successful operation. Though insurgent
resistance was fierce and deeply entrenched, U.S., coalition, and Iraqi troops were largely
able to clear the belts. In May 2007, the final Surge brigade had arrived in Iraq and began
work in driving hostile groups, especially al-Qaeda from the outermost parts of
Baghdad.281 The clearing of the belts was intensive work, and al-Qaeda was dug in deep.
In Baqubah, U.S. soldiers were met with a plethora of obstacles, such as “dozens of …
improvised explosive devices” and even entire rows of houses that were rigged with
explosives to kill the “Americans soldiers clearing them.”282 Efforts to stabilize the belts
“were uniformly successful” largely in part thanks to the fact that U.S. and coalition
forces would “not clear and leave, they would clear and hold.” Fardh al-Qanoon and
Phantom Thunder would help to put increasingly heavy pressure on insurgent groups, and
Fardh al-Qanoon’s initial success would lead to a growing number of COIN operations
throughout Iraq.
The success of the Surge in 2007 was also due in part to increasing U.S.
reconciliation with Sunni leaders. In the western al-Anbar province, local Sunnis began
“turning” against al-Qaeda, in what became known as the Awakening.283 Before 2007,
Sunni tribes and their sheikhs were alienated by the “end of Sunni political control in
Baghdad.”284 From 2003 to 2006, tribal leaders in al-Anbar chafed at the DeBaathification laws, which eliminated the important jobs and “sources of patronage” that
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sheikhs relied upon for their political power.285 Alienation of the Sunni tribes ultimately
led many Sunni leaders to join the insurgency or support al-Qaeda.286
However, the tribes had become increasingly incensed by al-Qaeda’s brutal de
facto rule in al-Anbar province. In 2005, some Sunni tribes tried to participate in the
December 2005 elections after the failed boycott of the January elections, and were met
with al-Qaeda violence. Al-Qaeda ruthlessly undertook a campaign of “murder and
intimidation” against Sunnis that opposed their will.287
Al-Qaeda also sought to aggressively impose a “brutal interpretation of Shari’a
law on a Sunni tribal culture that was largely secular.”288 Egregious actions by al-Qaeda,
such as the lack of burial of corpses within a 24-hour period, sacrilegious to the Islamic
faith, rankled the sheikhs.289 Most importantly, al-Qaeda had put an end to the sheikh’s
smuggling routes, which further reduced their ability to gain patronage.290 Soon enough,
al-Qaeda would face a Sunni backlash.
The Sunni tribes of al-Anbar province had tried unsuccessfully to unseat al-Qaeda
on several occasions, and their attempts only increased al-Qaeda’s retaliation. In one
rebellion, infighting had left the Sunni tribes vulnerable, and al-Qaeda took advantage.
Three fourths of the sheikhs involved in the early rebellion were murdered in what one
U.S. colonel called the “night of long knives.”291 Increasingly desperate, Sunnis began to
seek more cooperation with American forces. Sunnis had largely supported the resistance
to American occupation of Iraq, but al-Qaeda’s violence had thrown them into the arms
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of their professed enemies. As one Sunni leader put it, “Life became intolerable. So we
started looking for salvation, no matter who it was.”292
By the summer of 2006, Americans renewed interest on securing al-Anbar and its
major city, Ramadi. General Casey had tasked a brigade under the command of Colonel
Sean MacFarland with retaking the city but asked MacFarland “to fix Ramadi, but don’t
do a Fallujah.”293 Instead of pursuing the strategy known derisively as “Drive-by COIN”
that had been popular before the surge, MacFarland and his troops would pursue
reconciliation with the Sunni tribes.294
At this point, the Sunni Awakening had coalesced under the leadership of a
young sheikh named Abdul Sattar Abu Risha al-Rishawi.295 Controlling only a minor
tribe, Sattar had miraculously come to control a renewed Sunni rebellion.296 In
September, Sattar had managed to assemble a meeting of 50 sheikhs, where they
promised to “declare war on al-Qaeda” and to “consider American forces friendly, and to
forbid attacks on them.”297 MacFarland took advantage of this development to engineer
an offensive to retake Ramadi, a prototype that would be used as an example in the
following Surge. MacFarland utilized the walls and outposts defensive strategy to secure
the city, in concert with allowing the Sunni tribes to join local police forces, removing alQaeda from the city.298 With Sattar’s help, Ramadi was back under control of U.S. and
coalition forces. Al-Anbar was soon able to be put on a path towards reconstruction. The
U.S. military’s Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) was utilized to

292

Mansoor, Surge, 125.
Schlosser, 37.
294
Mansoor, 128.
295
Mansoor, 125.
296
Ibid.
297
Mansoor, 126.
298
Mansoor, 128-131.
293

66

provide millions of dollars in contracts for the Sunni tribes to fix critical infrastructure
and other essential services.299
As the Surge began to be implemented, the Awakening spread to other parts of
Iraq. As Mansoor states, “the Surge had acted as the catalyst for the spread of the tribal
rebellion across much of western and central Iraq.”300 Under the direction of General
Petraeus, supporting the Awakening and reconciliation with Sunnis “was not optional.”301
As Awakening franchises became ubiquitous across Iraq, the U.S. began to support local
armed neighborhood watch groups such as the Ibnaa al-Iraq (or Sons of Iraq).302 Even
though they had been trying to kill American troops just weeks prior to this development,
but the U.S. command thought it was well worth the risk based on how violent Iraq had
become.303 Eventually, the Sons of Iraq became crucial to ensuring Iraqi security, and
many soon entered into both the U.S. and the Iraqi governments’ payroll.304 Partly a
strategy to assuage fears of Sunni militias by Shi’a leaders, the Sons of Iraq being paid by
the government nonetheless gave the Awakening some legitimacy in the eyes of the Shi’a
leaders.
Despite notable reconciliation between Shi’as and Sunnis there was still a lot of
work to be done. Shi’a leaders such as Prime Minister al-Maliki were still deeply
suspicious of Sunni intentions. Even worse, the central government could barely control
the Shi’a militias. It was clear that the U.S. would also need to spend considerable effort
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defeating the Shi’a insurgency. Surprisingly, initiative from the Prime Minister’s office
would serve as the unlikely catalyst for bringing the Shi’a militias to heel.
With the emergence of the Surge and the Awakening, Sunni insurgents, as well as
al-Qaeda, were in disarray. Shi’a militias would now be the main target of U.S. and
coalition forces. At the end of 2007, groups linked to the Jaish al-Mahdi were continuing
to attack U.S. forces, and now had deadly new techniques at their disposal.305 In
November, Shi’a militants attacked a U.S. combat outpost with explosives and ballbearings, which wounded 12 soldiers, and damaged or destroyed 24 vehicles.306 The new
tactics were linked to Iran, which increasingly began to meddle in Iraqi politics.307
Iran’s main goal was to ensure a “weak and pliable state in Iraq,” which could be
influenced to help Iran pursue its interest of establishing Iranian hegemony in the Middle
East.308 During increased sectarianism of 2006, a branch of Iran’s Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps military wing called the Qods force, began to infiltrate sections of the Jaish
al-Mahdi. Their goal was to “create a client proxy force” beholden to Iran, much like Iran
had done with Hezbollah in Lebanon.309 In 2006, Qods personnel were active inside Iraq,
and had been smuggling arms to the Jaish al-Mahdi.310 These arms were increasingly
deadly, like explosive penetrators that “could destroy an M1A1 tank.”311
Initially, the main obstacle to combating the Jaish al-Mahdi militia was Prime
Minister al-Maliki. Al-Maliki’s government was full of sectarian ministers that had
largely failed to produce any political progress alongside the progress of the Surge. In
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private, al-Maliki had promised President Bush that he would allow for U.S. operations to
take place in predominantly Shi’a neighborhoods, which had been previously off
limits.312 But in practice, al-Maliki’s government was beholden to al-Sadr and the Jaish
al-Mahdi for political support, which constrained his actions.313 Until Maliki was willing
to stand up to the Shi’a militias, the Surge would likely fail.
Soon, an opportunity presented itself for al-Maliki to assert more control over the
Shi’a militias. With the growing influence of Iran and increasing pressure from the U.S.
Surge, al-Sadr began to lose control over the Jaish al-Mahdi.314 Since al-Sadr had entered
government, he was forced to moderate his political aims to align with al-Maliki’s
government. Sadr’s moderation pushed parts of his militia to “turn their backs on alSadr’s leadership,” and turn to funding themselves by way of “organized crime.”315
In the spring of 2007, the Jaish al-Mahdi pulled out of al-Maliki’s government,
increasing al-Maliki’s willingness to retaliate against them316. In addition to their political
exit, the Jaish al-Mahdi increasingly fought against its rival, the Badr Brigade. The Badr
Brigade had become increasingly close to the central government and was embedded in
its security forces. The Jaish al-Mahdi battled for control of Southern Iraq, and had
undertaken several assassination attempts of government figures, both successful and
unsuccessful.317
The final straw for al-Maliki would be the violence in the city of Karbala, where
Ayatollah Sistani had threatened to cancel the religious celebration of mid-Sha’ban in the
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city. Likened to the “pope canceling Easter or Christmas Mass,” cancelled celebrations in
Karbala would likely see the end of al-Maliki’s government.318 The government
immediately began a “show of force” to assert its control of Karbala that August.319 At
the head of a large vehicle convoy, al-Maliki personally oversaw the arrests of several
Sadrist leaders in Karbala.320 The Karbala fiasco provided huge political gains to alMaliki’s government. The Shi’a community blamed al-Sadr and the Jaish al-Mahdi for
the violence in Karbala, and al-Sadr was forced to agree to a cease fire with the Iraqi
government and U.S. forces in order to save face.321 With al-Maliki’s intervention, a
temporary improvement in security conditions occurred.322
Despite the success of the Surge in reducing violence, there was very little in the
way of political reconciliation taking place.323 Al-Maliki was front and center in the
political stalemate. Despite the veneer of a balanced ethnic government, al-Maliki was
extremely suspicious of the Sunnis. Attempts had been made to distribute power amongst
the various ethnic groups, but the Prime Minister undercut the other groups at every
possible chance.324 For instance, al-Maliki used his Office of the Commander in Chief to
bypass Sunni officials and work directly with the predominantly Shi’a military.325
Additionally, Maliki was wary of the Sons of Iraq, crucial to the Sunni
Awakening movement. Calling them the “hidden army,” al-Maliki was fearful that the
Sons of Iraq would work to undermine the government.326 As Mansoor states, the Sons of
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Iraq were hardly hidden. All Sons of Iraq members had been entered into a biometric
identification database run by the government and were also paid directly by MNF-I (and
by extension the Iraqi government).327
Relations with other political figures were also sour. Al-Maliki and his rival Sunni
Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi both competed during the improving security to
advance their own political gains. Hashemi tried to lay claim to the Sons of Iraq, which
fortified al-Maliki’s “hidden army” claims.328 The United States was relying on an
increasingly divisive Iraqi government, and huge political developments, such as
repealing De-Baathification, passing a budget, oil sharing, and signing a Status of Forces
agreement looked nearly impossible.
However, several political developments began to take place. At the local
government level, leaders of the Sunnis in al-Anbar province and Shi’as in Karbala came
together to discuss ways to increase cooperation between the two religious groups.329
Both groups managed to come together to sign a reconciliation accord, as well as to
“address … the issue of displaced Iraqis.”330
National government political progress quickly heated up as well.331 Despite alMaliki’s dysfunctional handling of politics, political progress would be pushed by other
national leaders. Lack of political progress motivated several Iraqi leaders to propose
forming a new government, and this vote of no confidence had scared Maliki enough to
bring him back into political negotiations with Sunnis and Kurds.332 In the Iraqi Council
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of Representatives, Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashadani began to skillfully engineer political
compromise. In a matter of a few months, Iraqi lawmakers had passed a “grand bargain,”
where the 2008 budget, amnesty for Baath members, provincial powers act, and even a
symbolic redesign of the Iraqi flag had all been approved.333 Despite national
reconciliation not being achieved, political progress was being made.334
The political progress in early 2008 led al-Maliki to adopt an almost
overconfident outlook in Iraq. This overconfidence would lead al-Maliki to pursue further
control of his Shi’a political base, ultimately leading to another showdown between the
government and the Iranian backed Jaish al-Mahdi.335 The showdown would occur in the
southern city of Basra, a bastion of the Jaish al-Mahdi’s power, where al-Maliki pursued
an action similar to the one in Karbala. The al-Maliki led an assault on Basra which
would become known as Saulat al-Farsan, or “Charge of the Knights.”
At the beginning of 2008, the military situation in Basra was dire. As part of the
coalition forces, the United Kingdom was tasked with keeping the peace in Basra and had
largely held the city without incident prior to 2007.336 However, while the United States
began implementing the Surge, the British began to withdraw. By 2007, British troops,
who were anticipating a withdrawal from Basra due to their own domestic political
pressure, consolidated their forces to one single base at the Basra airport.337 So, like the
United States had done elsewhere in Iraq prior to 2007, British troops left the Iraqi army
and police to patrol Basra, opening the door for increased sectarianism inside the city.
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Eventually, competition between the Badr Brigade and Jaish al-Mahdi gave way to the
Jaish al-Mahdi’s sole control over Basra, with al-Sadr claiming personal responsibility
for “forcing the British out of Iraq.”338
Since the British pullout, al-Maliki was unable to reassert government control of
Basra.339 However, with the political “grand bargain” in 2008, al-Maliki was politically
empowered to do something about the city.340 During the 2008 Shi’a Ashura holiday, the
Jaish al-Mahdi tried to kidnap al-Maliki’s national security advisor, Dr. Mowaffak alRubaie, giving al-Maliki the perfect opportunity to rally a military response.341 With alMaliki “on the warpath against Iranian-backed militants of the Jaish al-Mahdi special
groups,” the United States began to pay closer attention. 342 U.S. leaders warned al-Maliki
and his generals that a quick excursion like that in Karbala would not be feasible in
Basra, due to the “deeply entrenched militias and criminal organizations.”343 It would be
possible to clear Basra, but only if Iraq had enough time and resources to implement it.344
Despite U.S. advice, al-Maliki rushed to “clean up Basra.”345 In March, al-Maliki
informed the U.S. he intended to deploy troops within 24 hours, and would go
“personally to Basra … with his AK-47, to meet with local leaders to resolve the
situation.”346 This caught MNF-I unawares, leaving the Iraqi Army to begin the invasion
by itself. Due to poor intelligence, logistics, and weaponry, al-Maliki’s offensive stalled
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when it entered the outskirts of the city.347 Al-Maliki was forced to hunker down while
Jaish al-Mahdi rocket fire thundered overhead, which resulted in the killing of his head of
security.348
Concerned that al-Maliki’s defeat in Basra would ultimately endanger al-Maliki’s
national political control, General Petraeus stepped in to ensure MNF-I could help in any
way possible.349 U.S. and British forces rapidly deployed to Basra and were able to
augment the Iraqi army and helped to push back the Jaish al-Mahdi. Despite al-Sadr
trying to broker a ceasefire, al-Maliki continued the offensive to its conclusion, and
ensured that the “Jaish al-Mahdi never again contested control of Basra.”350 Al-Maliki’s
ultimate victory in Basra forced Iran to reconsider who it supported in Iraq. With the
downfall of the Jaish al-Mahdi in Basra, as well as in other cities, Iran had come to the
“conclusion that Iranian interest would be better served if Maliki remained in power.”351
With Iran’s Qods force supporting the legitimate Iraqi government, and successful
operations by the Iraqi and MNF-I forces across Iraq, the security situation in Iraq
improved dramatically by July of 2008. The only question remaining was how long the
Surge would continue to be U.S. policy. With the U.S. presidential elections coming up,
the future of U.S. forces in Iraq was in question.
On November 17, 2008, both the U.S. and Iraqi government signed a status of
forces agreement that would see U.S. and coalition combat troops withdraw from Iraqi
cities and towns by the end of June 2009, and all troops leave Iraq by 2011.352 The basis
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of the agreement was that Iraq “had exercised its sovereignty” and that the “tenure of
U.S. forces on Iraqi soil was finite.”353 The status of forces agreement also stipulated that
U.S. contractors and military personnel would now be subject to Iraq’s laws.354 Most
importantly, the three year withdrawal date would also give both the U.S. and Iraq to
negotiate a longer term agreement for U.S. presence in the country.355
In reality, the negotiations for continued U.S. presence in Iraq did not materialize.
The Iraqi government made no significant attempt to keep U.S. troops in Iraq. Nationalist
sentiment in Iraq had pressured Iraqi politicians to call for the end of the foreign
occupation.356 Similarly, in the U.S., President Obama took office and initiated a
campaign promise to withdraw from Iraq.357 The U.S. would honor the previous status of
forces agreement, continue its withdrawal, and leave Iraq before the December 2011
deadline.358 U.S. combat forces would leave by 2010, and then the U.S. role would be
strictly limited to advising Iraqi forces.359
The ultimate result of both the U.S. and Iraqi efforts to avoid a protracted conflict
would be the return of sectarianism. Mansoor writes that after the last U.S. troops
departed, political crisis returned to Iraq. Prime Minister al-Maliki quickly “went after his
political enemies,” especially Sunni Vice President al-Hashemi, who he accused of
running a Sunni death squad.360 Additionally, as the U.S. withdrew, al-Qaeda was “given
a second lease on life”, resurfacing as ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). 361
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Increasing sectarianism and the emergence of the powerful ISIS group would haunt Iraq
for years to come.
Despite the end result, the Surge may have important insight into what kind of
counterterrorism strategy is the most successful. Was the Surge more effective than the
previous 2003-2006 period and the subsequent withdrawal? In the next section, the
tactics and politics of both the Surge and the withdrawal will be taken into consideration
while evaluating trends such as U.S. and coalition troop levels, Iraqi civilian casualties,
Iraqi public opinion, and the rate of terrorism. The comparison will help to determine
whether hard counterterrorism does in fact result in a failed counterterrorism effort.
Iraq Surge and Withdrawal Data Trends 2007-2011
From 2007-2011, a general counterterrorism strategy of counterinsurgency was
used. In comparison to the traditional war strategy utilized from 2003-2006,
counterinsurgency utilizes tactics that are less aggressive and more cognizant of collateral
damage. Therefore, the Surge and withdrawal periods should show trends that indicate
lower troop levels and civilian casualties, higher public opinion of the United States and
the Iraq war effort, and lower rates of terrorism, pointing to counterterrorism success. In
the following section, the hypothesis that hard offensive counterterrorism causes
counterterrorism failure will be tested against a softer counterterrorism approach in the
Surge. First, the troop level trends of U.S. and coalition forces is examined. Second, the
relationship between troop levels and civilian casualties is analyzed. Third, troop levels
and civilian casualties are investigated to understand their role in Iraqi public opinion
trends. Fourth, trends in troop levels, civilian casualties, and Iraqi public opinion will be
looked at to explain trends in the rate of terrorism during the Surge period. Lastly, the
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implications of all aforementioned trends will be discussed to help determine whether the
hard counterterrorism of the 2003-2006 period was more or less successful than the
Surge.
Troop Levels 2007-2011
During 2007-2011, two general trends of troop levels are apparent. First, from
January 2007 to October 2007, troop levels increased from 146,650 troops to 182,668
troops as the five additional U.S. Surge brigades were introduced to Iraq (Figure 5).
Second, From November 2007 to November 2011, a very gradual troop withdrawal from
182,668 in 2007 to a complete withdrawal of U.S. combat troops occurred in 2011. These
two trends coincide with military planning during the Surge period.
The general consensus was that the Surge would be a temporary fix, as domestic
pressure was mounting to end the war. As Mansoor stated, the Surge “would be our last,
best shot at salvaging victory.”362 Additionally, Petraeus aimed to make the withdrawal of
Surge forces official by July of 2008, not long before the U.S. election which would spell
the end of Bush’s second term in office.363 This way, the Bush administration ensured
that Iraq’s future would be determined by the new President, Barack Obama. The two
trends demarcate the change of policy from President Bush to President Obama, where
Obama enacted a policy of facilitating full withdrawal of American combat troops. This
break in policy is best signified by when the war was renamed from Operation Iraqi
Freedom to Operation New Dawn in 2010.364 In the new strategy, Obama would ended
combat operations in Iraq in 2010, and honoring the agreement to withdraw all forces by
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2011.365 In the next section, these two trends of troop levels will be examined to
determine the relationship between troop numbers and civilian casualties.

Figure 7. Total Number of U.S. and Coalition Troop in Iraq from 2007-2011366
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Civilian Casualties 2007-2011
From 2007 to 2011, Iraqi civilian casualties gradually dropped from more than
3,000 in January 2007 to an average of 500 per month past July of 2008. During the true
Surge from 2007 to 2008, casualties were still very high due to increasing military
operations which were needed to wrest control from Iraqi sectarian and terrorist groups.
General Petraeus and his staff were aware violence would be prevalent during the surge,
as the U.S. made efforts to better secure the population.367 Parallel to civilian casualties,
U.S. and coalition troop casualties in the first five months of the Surge were the most of
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any five month span of the war.368 However, by the summer of 2008, the successful
military operations gave way to decreases in both Iraqi civilian and U.S. military
casualties. Casualties didn’t completely disappear, but they had eventually reached
controllable levels. So, compared to the troop level counts, the trend of civilian casualties
were extremely similar. Troop level and civilian casualty trends point to a relationship
where less troops correlated with less civilian casualties. Likely, changes to
counterinsurgency strategy helped to bring the Iraqi civil war under control, and by the
end of the Surge, military offensives were less aggressive as well as less needed.
However, this reduction in casualties as troop levels increased could also be attributed to
other factors, such as the reintegration of Sunnis via the Awakening.
However, evidence points to the fact that civilian casualties most likely increased
after the U.S. withdrawal was complete. By 2014, a huge spike in civilian casualties
occurred, and civilian casualties were much higher than during the Surge. Likely, this
spike can be attributed to the U.S. withdrawal, which allowed political upheaval and
terrorist violence to return to Iraq.
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Figure 8. Number of Total Iraqi Civilian Casualty in Iraq from 2007-2016369
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Iraqi Public Opinion 2007-2011
In continuance with the declining Iraqi public opinion of U.S. and Coalition
forces and the progress of the war from 2003 to 2007, the Surge period started out with
dismal approval ratings. In February 2007, 78% of those polled opposed the presence of
U.S. and coalition troops (Table 5). Additionally, 31% of those polled blamed the
international military presence for the violence occurring in Iraq, more than double the
percentage of any other entity blamed as seen in Table 6. Split into ethnic groups or
regions, the same pre-Surge trends continued. Both Shi’as and Sunnis opposed the
continuing presence of U.S. and Coalition troops, while 85% of Kurds believed the
security situation in Iraq would become worse with their withdrawal.370
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Table 5. Percentage of Iraqis Who Support U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq371
Do You Support the Presence of U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq?
Strongly/ Somewhat

Strongly/ Somewhat

Support

Oppose

21%

79%

Shia

17%

83%

Sunni

2%

98%

February 2007

22%

78%

November 2005

32%

65%

February 2004

39%

51%

September 2007

Table 6. Percentage of Responses on Who is Most to Blame for Violence in Iraq
(February 2007)372
Who Do You Blame Most for the Violence that is Occurring in the Country?
February 2007

August 2007

U.S. / Coalition Forces

31%

19%

Iraqi Government

8%

9%

Sunni Militias/ Leaders

5%

6%

Shiite Militias

6%

7%

Al Qaeda/ Foreign Jihads

18%

21%

Iran

7%

11%

371
372
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Eventually, the success of the Surge in achieving better security across Iraq led to
slightly better outlook of the war in public opinion. As early as September of 2007, Iraqis
blamed the U.S. and coalition less (19%) and Al Qaeda and jihadist groups more (21%)
for the violence in Iraq (Table 6). However, overall approval for U.S. and coalition troops
would only very slightly improve. In contrast with 78% disapproval of international
forces in February 2007, 73% disapproval was recorded in February 2008 (Table 7).

Table 7. Percentage of Iraqis Who Support U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq 373
Do You Support the Presence of U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq?

February 2008

Strongly/ Somewhat

Strongly/ Somewhat

Support

Oppose
26%

73%

Shia

23%

77%

Sunni

5%

95%

21%

79%

Shia

17%

83%

Sunni

2%

98%

September 2007

Despite miniscule gains in international forces approval, the growing security
conditions in Iraq led to better future outlooks of the war’s progress. February 2009
marked a high water mark for the Surge, with the transition to withdrawal taking effect.
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Iraqi public opinion reflects the Surge improvements in Iraqi security. 52% of Iraqis
believed the security situation in Iraq had improved over the past 6 months before 2009
(Table 8). Also, 58% of Iraqis believed that things were going well in Iraq, compared to
35% in February 2007 (Table 9).

Table 8. Percentage of Iraqis Who Believe Iraq is Heading in the Right Direction374
In the Past Six Months, has the Security Situation in Iraq Become Better, Worse, or
About the Same?
Better
About the Same
Worse
February 2009

52%

39%

8%

February 2008

36%

37%

26%

August 2007

11%

28%

61%

Table 9. Percentage of Iraqis Who Believe Things in Iraq Are Good Overall375
How Would You Say Things Are Going in Iraq Overall These Days?
February 2009

February 2008

Very Good/ Quite Good

58%

Very Good/ Quite Good

43%

Very Bad/ Quite Bad

41%

Very Bad/ Quite Bad

56%

September 2007

374
375

February 2007

Very Good/ Quite Good

22%

Very Good/ Quite Good

35%

Very Bad/ Quite Bad

78%

Very Bad/ Quite Bad

65%
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By 2010 however, Surge gains in public support began to decline. As U.S. and
coalition forces withdrew, public opinion took a drop. Iraqi beliefs that the security
conditions were improved fell from 74% in October of 2009 to 59% in April 2011 (Table
10). In addition, 51% of Iraqis had believed the country was headed in the right direction
in October 2009, whereas only 38% believed so in April 2011 (Table 11).

Table 10. Percentage of Iraqis Who Believe Security Has Gotten Better Over the Last
Year376
Has Security Gotten Better or Worse Over the Last Year?
April 2011

October 2010
Better

59%

Better

65%

Worse

22%

Worse

20%

June 2010

376

October 2009
Better

74%

Better

74%

Worse

23%

Worse

16%
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Table 11. Percentage of Iraqis Who Believe Iraq is Heading in the Right Direction 377
Is the Country Headed in the Right or Wrong Direction?
April 2011

October 2010

Right Direction

38%

Right Direction

35%

Wrong Direction

52%

Wrong Direction

57%

June 2010

October 2009

Right Direction

41%

Right Direction

51%

Wrong Direction

59%

Wrong Direction

43%

Trends in public opinion reveal that while most Iraqis didn’t support U.S. and
coalition forces in Iraq, they did support gains in Iraqi security from sectarian and
terrorist violence. As international forces withdrew, public opinion once again slid. A
change in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy, coupled with troop
withdrawals, led to reduced civilian casualties as well as improved public opinion in
some facets. However, it should be noted that too few troops led to decreased public
confidence in Iraq at the end of the U.S. presence.
The Rate of Terrorism from 2007-2011
During the surge and subsequent withdrawal of U.S. and coalition troops, three
trends in the rate of terrorism can be noted. First, the initial two years of the Surge
resulted in dramatic spikes in terrorism, higher than most months of 2006. In June and
October of 2007, terrorist attacks reached record numbers, at 223 and 198 recorded
attacks respectively. Likely, this increase in attacks can be contributed to backlash against
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U.S. and Sunni Awakening gains by al-Qaeda.378 Second, while record spikes occurred,
subsequent months leveled out, and spikes were far less common after 2008 as security
improved. Additionally, after the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, terrorist attacks
predominantly led by ISIS began to pick up and by 2014, had surpassed even the highest
levels of attacks recorded during the U.S. occupation.
The record setting spikes in terrorism from 2007 to 2008 can be explained by two
phenomena. First, the changing tactics of U.S. and coalition forces are partly to blame, at
least at first. By focusing on securing the Iraqi population, the U.S. military had begun to
interfere with insurgent and terrorist operations. Because COIN tactics impeded the
movement of various violent groups, they tried to combat the improving security stability
in Iraq.379 Second, the large terrorism spikes can be interpreted as the high water mark of
the sectarian Iraqi Civil War. Aggressive tactics during the 2003-2006 period led to
increasing instability in Iraq, which had made the U.S. enact the Surge to rein in sectarian
and terrorist violence. In order to curb the violence, U.S. and coalition forces first had to
increase the security situation in the country. After the implementation of the Surge,
terrorist attacks did in fact lower, though not as substantially as the U.S. had hoped.
Possibly, the short term Surge might not have been long enough to ensure the
stability of the Iraqi government or the security of Iraq in general. Perhaps, as some
suggest, the Surge should have been more concerned with the long term security of Iraq,
rather than a ploy by the U.S. government to save face.380 Surge terrorist attacks
diminished from 2007 levels, but the withdrawal period witnessed terrorist attack levels
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that were higher than levels of terrorist attacks seen during the 2003-2006 period.
Relative stability in attack levels that had been achieved were quickly reversed once U.S.
troops no longer had a significant presence. By March 2014, the emergence of ISIS as a
grave threat to Iraq had prompted terrorist attack levels to hit an all-time high of 503
attacks in a single month.
In comparison to troop levels and civilian casualties trends, terrorist attacks levels
do yield some correlation. Tactics seem to be a relevant factor, like the new Surge focus
on improving security and moving off of FOB’s, which yielded important dividends. If
tactics hadn’t changed from 2003-2006 it could be argued that increased troops yield a
reduction in both civilian casualties and terrorist attacks. As time went on, it is clear that
less troops in later years opened the door for an increase in casualties and terrorist attacks
after the U.S. withdrawal. Terrorist attacks would increase linearly into 2014, so perhaps
a more sustained U.S. and coalition military effort could have helped to further reduction
of terrorism. So, a change to softer counterterrorism strategies could have plausibly
resulted in less terrorism. Therefore, the hypothesis that hard offensive counterterrorism
decreases counterterrorism success is possible, but not entirely proven. Other factors,
such as increased political cooperation between Shia’s and Sunnis, and the emergence of
the Awakening during the Surge could also be at play.
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Figure 9. Total Number of Terrorist Attacks in Iraq in the Surge and Withdrawal Eras
(2007-2011)381

Terrorist Attacks
250
200
150
100
50

2007 January
March
May
July
September
November
2008 January
March
May
July
September
November
2009 January
March
May
July
September
November
2010 January
March
May
July
September
November
2011 January
March
May
July
September
November

0

Figure 10. Total Number of Terrorist Attacks in Iraq after the U.S. Withdrawal from
2011-2017382
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Conclusion
In attempting to understand the impacts of hard counterterrorism versus other
counterterrorism tactics, understanding the U.S. war in Iraq is crucial. By looking at both
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the post invasion period from 2003-2006 and the Surge and withdrawal from 2007-2011,
it is possible to compare the strategies. In the 2003-2006 period, temporary increases in
troops, paired with the use of aggressive military tactics, might have led to an increase in
civilian casualties, Iraqi public discontent with the war, and a rising level of terrorist
attacks in Iraq. With the Surge and subsequent withdrawal, COIN tactics and a more
sustained increase in troops initially led to an increase, but then eventually a minor
decrease, in terrorist attacks. Possibly, if the Surge had maintained adequate troop levels,
terrorist attacks might have reduced to manageable levels, instead of even an increase in
instability during the ISIS era. But, other explanations are also possible. Maybe, al-Qaeda
and insurgent groups decided to bide their time until they knew U.S and international
forces intended to leave the country. So, the hypothesis that hard offensive
counterterrorism leads to counterterrorism campaign failure is possible, but not entirely
conclusive.
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CHAPTER 4
Afghanistan: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Strategies from
2001-2016
Since 2001, the United States has waged war in Afghanistan against the al-Qaeda
organization and its Afghan ally, the Taliban. Generally, this war effort has entailed hard
offensive counterterrorism strategies to reduce al-Qaeda’s global reach. After the
September 11 attacks, the Bush administration quickly dislodged the Taliban using heavy
aerial bombardment and help from an Afghan Northern Alliance ground offensive. Soon
enough, President Bush handed control over to the interim Afghan government and a UN
sanctioned international coalition designed to bring stability to Afghanistan, while U.S.
forces focused on hunting down al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders. However, the 2001-2008
period resulted in a renewed Taliban insurgency against the Afghan government and
international forces. Following the success of the Surge in Iraq, Obama sought to salvage
and win the war in Afghanistan following a similar counterinsurgency strategy from
2009-2016. Despite considerable efforts, the Surge in Afghanistan failed to bring about
the end of the war, and U.S. forces are still committed to the country to this day.
The following chapter looks to analyze which strategy was the most effective at
countering terrorism in Afghanistan. First, an in-depth qualitative section looks at the
history politics, and strategy of the 2001-2008 period of the war under President Bush.
Second, trends in troop levels, Afghan civilian casualties, Afghan public opinion, and
terrorist attacks during the first phase of the war are presented. Third, the history, politics,
and strategy of the Obama Surge and withdrawal eras are examined. Lastly, the
aforementioned quantitative trends of the Surge and withdrawal are evaluated.
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Ultimately, this chapter should help to examine the hypothesis that hard offensive
counterterrorism leads to counterterrorism failure.
History and Politics of Afghanistan 2001-2008
To understand the reasons the United States went to war in Afghanistan, it’s
important to also understand the history of Afghanistan since the 1980’s. According to
Tamim Ansary, Afghanistan became embroiled in Islamic-motivated revolutionary
activity during this period. During the Cold War tensions between the United States and
the USSR, Afghanistan became a prime target for communist expansion. When the USSR
invaded Afghanistan, the Muslim world would view Afghanistan as the nexus of a
burgeoning Islamist movement.383 Thousands of Islamist activists from around the
Middle East flocked to the country to join fighters known as the Mujahideen to repel the
Soviet invaders.384 Eventually, after several long and brutal years of war, Arab
Mujahideen fighters were able to force a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Despite
the overwhelming superiority of Soviet troops, Afghanistan fighters held their own,
benefiting from the support of the United States and Pakistan, who wished to curtail
Soviet interests in Central Asia. Despite achieving their Cold War interests, the U.S. and
Pakistan ultimately contributed to people and groups who would later wreak havoc
against them.
Fighting alongside the Mujahideen was a young Osama bin Laden. Heir to a
wealthy Saudi family, bin Laden rejected his family’s “jetsetting” lifestyle and instead
sought to leave his mark as a pious Islamist fighter in Afghanistan.385 Bin Laden’s role in
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fighting the Soviets was actually rather modest. Bin Laden was better known for the
guest house he established across the Pakistani border in Peshawar for fighters who
would ultimately enter Afghanistan to fight the Soviets.386 The house would eventually
become known as “the base,” or al-qaeda in Arabic.387 As the victorious Arab fighters of
the Mujahideen returned home following the Soviet withdrawal, bin Laden would
repurpose al-Qaeda as the name for his newly created Islamist organization.388
Al-Qaeda would start to gain notoriety as bin Laden began to develop a grudge
against Saudi Arabia and the United States. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and
began threatening Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, bin Laden confidently told the
Saudis that he could defend the country with an Islamist Arab army.389 However, Saudi
Arabia turned to the United States to defend them from Iraq, allowing U.S. forces to use
Saudi territory as a base.390 Bin Laden was infuriated that the Saudis refused his help, and
publicly criticized the Saudi royal family.391 Soon enough, bin Laden was asked to leave
the country.392
Bin Laden ended up moving to Sudan, where he and his al-Qaeda organization
began to research the possibilities of terrorism in achieving their political goals.393 By
November 1995, al-Qaeda began testing their methods of terrorism, most notably the
bombing of a U.S. compound in the Saudi capital, Riyadh.394 The Riyadh attack was
successful in killing several Americans, prompting the CIA to take notice of bin Laden
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and al-Qaeda.395 CIA pressure on the Sudanese government forced bin Laden to once
again relocate, this time to his old stomping grounds in Afghanistan and Pakistan.396
From the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, bin Laden would grow his organization
and carry out several more terrorist attacks against the United States.
During this time, bin Laden developed relationships with both the Taliban
government in Afghanistan and the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (or ISI) in
Pakistan.397 To gain the Taliban’s trust, bin Laden funded Taliban efforts to buy the
loyalty of various Afghan warlords.398 Once the Taliban had taken control of the Afghan
capital of Kabul, bin Laden fully embraced the religious sentiment of the Taliban
movement’s founder, Mullah Omar.399 As reward for his loyalty, the Taliban awarded bin
Laden control of various properties throughout Afghanistan, such as Tarnak Farms and
Tora Bora.
Soon enough, al-Qaeda had built up an impressive infrastructure for future
terrorist operations. In 1998, despite his dubiously low level of religious authority, bin
Laden issued a fatwa which declared war against Israel, the United States, and the
West.400 Al-Qaeda claimed that killing Americans was now religiously acceptable, and
al-Qaeda promptly planned more attacks against the United States. Soon after the fatwa,
al-Qaeda operatives successfully carried out attacks against the U.S. embassies in
Nairobi, Kenya and Dar al Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 200 people and injuring
thousands.401
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Parallel to the rise of al-Qaeda, the Taliban emerged out of the chaos of the postSoviet Afghan period. The early 1990’s saw several Afghan warlords fight for power in
two successive civil wars. First, Mujahideen groups collectively fought against the
Afghan communist government that the USSR left behind. 402 After the collapse of the
USSR, the Afghan government lost all financial support from the Soviets, and the
communist regime quickly lost control of Kabul.403 In the second civil war, Mujahideen
groups fought amongst each other for control of the capital. The civil war period was the
perfect incubator for the Taliban’s emergence.404 In response to the rampant violence and
corruption of the warlords, Taliban leader Mullah Omar began to implement an austere
version of sharia law.405
Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban would also have a major impact on the future
U.S. intervention. Pakistan’s ISI had supported the Mujahideen effort to repel the USSR
through arms
smuggling and monetary funds. During the Afghan civil war, the ISI had decided that the
Taliban was an ideal proxy to promote Pakistani authority in Afghanistan. The ISITaliban marriage was easily facilitated, as Mullah Omar had close ties to the Pakistani
religious community.406 In exchange for food, money, and weapons, the Taliban would
help to achieve Pakistan’s two geopolitical goals in Afghanistan.407 First, Pakistan
believed that a Pakistan friendly regime in Afghanistan would be of strategic help in case
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of a war with India.408 Second, the Taliban could be used to help train guerilla soldiers for
use in the contested India-Pakistan Kashmir region.409 By co-opting the Taliban, Pakistan
believed it could control Afghan foreign policy.410
However, Pakistan’s support of the Taliban would come back to haunt them.
Pakistan might have sent the Taliban into Afghanistan, but the Taliban would also begin
to exert their influence within Pakistan as well411. The Pakistani military elite had failed
to understand that the appeal of the Taliban would also appeal to millions of their own
citizens.412 As Ansary states, “the Taliban were not only Islamists, but Pushtoon
chauvinists” who attracted the support of Pakistani Pushtoon tribes who had a contentious
relationship with the state of Pakistan.413 The Taliban had also made important allies with
Pakistani radical religious parties and “smuggling mafias” that operated along the
Pakistan-Afghan border.414 When the United States demanded the extradition of Osama
bin Laden, Pakistan could do little to help. Taking visible efforts to combat al-Qaeda
against the wishes of the Taliban would ultimately destabilize the Pakistani
government.415
In the United States, President Clinton ordered several attempts to kill or capture
bin Laden. Despite having plenty of information on where bin Laden lived and worked,
CIA plans to target him proved unsuccessful. In plans for a “snatch operation,” the CIA
wanted to drop a 30-man special operations crew to abduct bin Laden from his Tarnak
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Farms headquarters.416 However, President Clinton backed out at the last minute.417 In a
subsequent mission plan, the CIA proposed bombing one of al-Qaeda’s training camps
while bin Laden was present. Again, Clinton refused the mission, as it could have also
killed members of the royal family of the United Arab Emirates.418 Finally, Clinton
approved a 55 million dollar air strike that dropped sixty tomahawk missiles on al-Qaeda
targets in both Afghanistan and Sudan.419
The missile strikes were a failure for several reasons. First, the missile strikes
hadn’t killed any important members of the al-Qaeda leadership, because they had most
likely been tipped off by Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif.420 Second, Clinton’s
political opponents denounced the massive strike as a distraction from the Whitewater
and Monica Lewinsky domestic scandals.421 Lastly, al-Qaeda had benefited from the
strikes, as many disgruntled Muslims sought recruitment by al-Qaeda.422 Bin Laden’s
cause against the United States was strengthened, as the world’s only superpower
validated his image as an Islamist folk hero.423
During this period following the Clinton approved strikes, bin Laden met with key
members of a radical al-Qaeda cell in Hamburg, Germany. The German cell presented
their plans for a bold new terrorist attack that involved hijacking airplanes and using them
as suicide bombs.424 On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda members flew hijacked planes
into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Southwestern Pennsylvania,
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killing thousands of Americans. Nearly a month later, the United States launched the
invasion of Afghanistan.
Directly after the attacks, the Bush Administration was motivated by an intense
domestic pressure to retaliate against the 9/11 perpetrators.425 Congress quickly
authorized President Bush to retaliate against al-Qaeda. The Joint resolution passed by
Congress stated that the United States would “use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons” responsible for the attacks.426 In effect,
the U.S. not only targeted al-Qaeda, but also the Taliban who harboring them. At first, the
U.S. pressured the Taliban to extradite bin Laden and destroy the al-Qaeda camps in
Afghanistan.427 However, the Taliban refused both demands. As far as they were
concerned, the 9/11 attacks wouldn’t affect them because they were so far away. In their
minds, “what could the Americans do to Kabul?”428 Ultimately, the Taliban’s
intransigence would cost them.
Unlike the later war in Iraq, The United States had very few barriers to eliciting
international support for invading Afghanistan. The 9/11 attacks had garnered the United
States sympathy from the international community. Great Britain responded quickly to
aid the United States in its time of need and lent its military support.429 NATO invoked
Article V of the Washington Treaty, in which an attack on one NATO member equals an
attack on all members.430 Importantly, countries like China, Russia, India, and Pakistan,
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did nothing to prevent the United States from invading Afghanistan.431 Ultimately, the
United States was given the greenlight for Operation Enduring Freedom (or OEF).
Back in Washington, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was preparing to
send troops to Afghanistan. Rumsfeld was a proponent of modernizing the U.S. military
by increasing the use of new technology as well as reducing the size of ground forces. 432
Rumsfeld’s doctrinal views would increasingly influence the course of the coming war in
Afghanistan, where counterinsurgency tactics were subordinate to massive aerial strikes
and a multitude of special operations missions. Based on a reluctance to repeat the war in
Vietnam, the Bush administration de-emphasized counterinsurgency tactics and was
hesitant to commit to any nation building in Afghanistan.433 The U.S. would maintain that
Afghanistan would be responsible for its own reconstruction.434 With this anti-nation
building strategy, the United States began its war in Afghanistan.
As bombing missions began in October 7, 2001, three main U.S. goals became
apparent. First, the United States would topple the Taliban government regime in
Afghanistan.435 Second, efforts would be made to destroy al-Qaeda’s bases.436 Third,
U.S. forces would kill and capture al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists.437 To this end, superior
U.S. firepower, in concert with special operations and cooperation with local Afghan
partners, would combat the Taliban and al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan.
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In the first phase of Operation Enduring Freedom, Tomahawk cruise missiles
rained down over Afghanistan from U.S. and U.K. ships.438 Additionally, allied bombers
dropped their loads over Taliban and al-Qaeda targets.439 With all this firepower, the U.S.
decimated enemy infrastructure and quickly ran out of targets.440 The Taliban and alQaeda quickly collapsed in the face of intense bombings. In the second phase of OEF, the
United States would “entrust the actual fighting to the Northern Alliance,” assist the
Northern Alliance with air support, and put pressure on Pakistan to cut ties with the
Taliban.441
Just months before the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban’s armed opponent in Afghanistan,
the Northern Alliance, had sent their leaders to Europe to plead for humanitarian aid.442
Led by warlord Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Northern Alliance plead their case that the
instability in Afghanistan would come to hurt the West. Massoud warned the European
Union that the Taliban acted as a front of their foreign occupier, Pakistan.443 Pakistan and
the Taliban had allowed Afghanistan to become a major terrorist training camp for
terrorists “whose only aim was to harm the West.”444 If the international community
didn’t help the Northern alliance, “it would suffer terrible consequences.”445
Unfortunately, Massoud’s call for aid fell on deaf ears. It wouldn’t be until after
the 9/11 attacks that the United States and its allies would call aid the Northern Alliance.
Two days before 9/11, Massoud was assassinated by two terrorists posing as Western
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journalists.446 Though Massoud was killed, the Northern Alliance would become
instrumental in the early stages of the U.S. war in Afghanistan. As the United States was
hesitant to send too many troops to Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance became the
primary OEF ground force. With immense logistical support and the help of U.S. Special
Forces, the Northern Alliance launched an offensive to drive the Taliban and al-Qaeda
from Afghanistan.447
Additionally, the United States had finally put enough financial and diplomatic
pressure on Pakistan to cut their support to the Taliban.448 As the Northern Alliance
closed in on the cities, Pakistan ordered the Taliban to leave their consulate in Karachi.449
Not long after, Taliban leaders quietly fled the capital Kabul back to their stronghold of
Kandahar.450 By December 7, 2001, the Taliban were also forced to flee Kandahar for the
Pakistani border.451 The United States and the Northern Alliance had successfully
removed the Taliban from power, which helped to temporarily justify Rumsfeld’s plan to
limit U.S. troops on the ground.452 However, in the Battle of Tora Bora, as well as in
Operation Anaconda, large numbers of al-Qaeda forces escaped due to coordination
difficulties between OEF air and ground forces.453 The ultimate legacy of this opening
offensive was that the United States had achieved many of its Afghan war objectives, but
had narrowly missed eliminating the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership, a
legacy that would come back to haunt Afghanistan in the coming years.454
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The immediate aftermath of the relatively successful invasion of Afghanistan was
a country without a government. The rapid pace of the Taliban’s disintegration surprised
the United States, which quickly scrambled to capitalize on the mission’s “catastrophic
success.”455 In December 2001, as U.S. and Northern Alliance forces besieged al-Qaeda
at Tora Bora, several Afghan opposition groups met in Bonn, Germany in the hopes of
forming a government to rule Afghanistan. In essence, the Bonn conference sponsored by
the United States was a conference of “winners.”456 Leadership representing the Taliban
were not invited to the conference, and the framework of the future governance of
Afghanistan would be hammered out by the groups who had sided with the United States.
The Afghan opposition at Bonn Conference could be divided into four groups.
First, the Northern Alliance, who had helped to oust the Taliban with U.S. support,
represented the ethnic minorities of Afghanistan.457 Second, the so-called “Peshawar
Group” represented the Pushtoon tribal Mujahideen that operated out of Pakistan.458
Third, the “Cypress group” was composed of various Hazara and Herati ethnic groups
supported by Iran.459 Lastly, the “Rome group” acted as the representative of various
Afghan expatriate technocrats spread across Europe and the United States, as well as
royalist supporters of the former Afghan Shah.460 However, the Bonn Conference
excluded the Taliban and largely rural Pushtoon tribes of Southern Afghanistan from the
negotiations, excluding a large portion of the population.461 In effect, the Bonn agreement
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would contribute to the growing divide between urban and rural portions of the Afghan
population, a trend that would fuel the return of the Taliban in subsequent years.462
During the Bonn Conference negotiations, the Afghan opposition groups
hammered out plans for Afghanistan’s future. With heavy guidance from Western
powers, a four step plan was introduced.463 First, the Bonn Conference would assemble
an interim government to rule the country for the first six months.464 Second, a loya jirga,
adapted from the traditional Afghan tribal assembly, would help to create a two year long
transitional government which would rule until elections were held.465 Third, Afghans
would draft a new constitution for the country.466 Fourth, Afghanistan would hold
presidential and parliamentary elections to help bring in to existence Afghan
democracy.467
After formulating the four point plan, the Afghan groups elected to appoint
Hamid Karzai as head of the interim government. Karzai was a compromise candidate for
all those involved at the Bonn Conference.468 For the United States, Karzai was the most
palatable choice, despite his lack of leadership experience, because of his extensive
connections with American Afghans and the U.S. Republican Party.469 As Ansary notes,
Karzai also had palpable Afghan tribal credibility. Karzai was a Pushtoon and his father
was a Popalzai tribal leader in Kandahar, giving him sway amongst the important
Pushtoon tribal constituency.470 In addition, Karzai’s father had been murdered by the
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Taliban, which made him a fervent opponent of the ousted group.471 With no major
enemies or supporters inside Afghanistan, Karzai “had no blood on his hands” in fighting
either the United States or anyone else, and was considered the most ideal choice for
power.472
Parallel to the negotiations between the Afghans, the international community
also made lofty plans for the future of Afghanistan. As Afghanistan ranked in the very
bottom of countries in terms of socioeconomic conditions, efforts were made to bring in
billions of dollars in aid for the country.473 At a donor conference in Tokyo, it was
estimated that the country needed twenty five billion dollars in international aid.474 In
actuality, donors only pledged three billion dollars and only half of that trickled into the
country.475 However, a billion dollars was still a large influx of donor money.476
The Tokyo Conference also devised a “lead nation” approach to rebuilding
Afghanistan.477 Instead of a singular effort to manage the funds, individual countries were
given mandates to what they would be responsible for. For instance, the United States
would aid the Afghan Army, and the United Kingdom would fund counternarcotic
efforts.478 Many other countries were involved, such as Japan, Germany, and Italy.479 The
Tokyo conference would create the backbone of aid efforts in Afghanistan over the
following years.
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On the military side of things, the international community was keen on
increasing their role in Afghanistan, much to the chagrin of the Bush administration. The
United States had been content with the international community’s role following the
invasion of Afghanistan. Although NATO invoking Article V was unprecedented, the
role of NATO was more symbolic than militarily significant.480 This arrangement suited
the Bush administration just fine, as they had “no desire to involve NATO directly in
[military operations].”481 With their new broad “War on Terror” counterterrorism
campaign, the United States didn’t wish to be limited by NATO’s complicated rules and
procedures.482
The dominant strategy of the U.S. OEF campaign in Afghanistan was revenge and
retribution, focused solely on “disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda and [the]
Taliban.”483 Ultimately, this strategy put more emphasis on the traditional war paradigm
of defeating the enemy and going home rather than ensuring Afghanistan’s future
stability. Part of this focus was born out the United States’ strong aversion to “nation
building,” which their European allies wished to promote in Afghanistan.484 President
Bush had campaigned on his promise to not engage in nation building, so the U.S. effort
in Afghanistan would remain “a purely military mission.”485 Even in 2006, Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates concluded that the effort of the United States was “significantly
hampered by muddled and over-ambitious objectives.”486 Therefore, stability minded
international troops would play a minor role in the first years of the war.
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However, an international force sponsored by the United Nations came into
existence at the Bonn Conference. The International Security Assistance Force (or ISAF)
composed of 4,500 troops would be sent to Kabul to support the Afghan Interim
government and election process, as well as to promote “national reconciliation, lasting
peace, stability and respect for human rights.”487 If ISAF’s goals seem difficult to
achieve, the United States made it that more difficult. In exchange for allowing ISAF’s
presence, the United States ensured that ISAF would only operate in Kabul, and that the
U.S. military would be independent of ISAF jurisdiction.488 Keeping ISAF restricted
would fulfill the Bush Administration’s wish for marginal international presence and also
allow the United States focus on its independent “mop up” operation against the remnants
of al-Qaeda and the Taliban without international interference.489
Eventually, the United States would become distracted with the war in Iraq by
2003, so the views towards ISAF and nation building began to change. As issues with
instability and violence in Iraq began to mount, ISAF’s role would grow exponentially in
Afghanistan. By August 2003, NATO was given command of all ISAF forces. 490 This
development was advantageous to the Bush administration. First, international
cooperation helped to “legitimize the need for continuing involvement” by the United
States in Afghanistan.491 Domestically, the keen interest of NATO and the UN helped to
prove to Congress as well as the American public that the U.S. military should continue
to fight in Afghanistan.492 The international interest towards Afghanistan was critical to
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ensuring the narrative of Afghanistan as a “good war,” especially during a time when the
American public was deeply divided over the war in Iraq.493
Second, the Iraq War was a convenient excuse for the Bush administration to pass
the burden of nation building onto the United States’ allies. Since Bush and his staff
abhorred the very idea of nation building, it was a convenient way of avoiding discussion
of nation building altogether. Passing the buck on to international forces allowed U.S.
forces to focus on their narrow counterterrorism operation, and also divert more resources
to Iraq.
As NATO assumed command of ISAF, the United Nations helped to expand their
mission. The UN Security Council authorized ISAF to expand to areas outside of Kabul
and establish stability, security and government through “all parts of Afghanistan.”494
Steadily, ISAF presence would increase through a strategic counterclockwise expansion,
which featured steady troop increases from North to South from 2004 to 2006.495 By
2006, 25 ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams (or PRT’s) were functioning in local
bases across Afghanistan.496 The expansion of ISAF lowered the burden of the United
States, and also granted its European allies a chance to meet their growing sense of duty
in Afghanistan. In NATO’s mind, “the interveners now had to an obligation to deliver
more than a government of warlords” to the Afghan people.497
Concurrently, Afghanistan began to work towards the four professed goals of the
Bonn Conference. By June 11, 2002, Afghanistan’s interim government laid in motion
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the plans to transform the country into a modern democratic nation. In keeping with
Afghan tradition, the interim government assembled a loya jirga to appoint members of
the transitional government. To nobody’s surprise, Karzai was elected to head the
election transition. According to Ansary, this process might have gone “too smoothly.”498
The highly “stage-managed” process had ensured that America’s choice for government
had been chosen.499 In effect, the loya jirga was seen by Afghans as an attempt to squeeze
other political alternatives out of the running. For example, the former king of
Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, a “countrywide symbol of reconciliation,” wasn’t allowed to
run.500
However, the process of democratization continued on. As head of the transitional
government, Karzai assembled a commission to draft Afghanistan’s new constitution.501
A loya jirga was again convened, and Afghan leaders hashed out the final structure of
government. Afghanistan formalized a bicameral legislature, where the lower house is
elected by citizens, and the upper appointed by a president, who is supposedly restricted
to two five-year terms.502 Additionally, the constitution states that Afghanistan is an
Islamic republic, with no laws conflicting with Shari’a law, although there are also
provisions common in western democracy, such as equality and other modern human
rights.503 The new Afghan constitution ratified by December, 2003 in the loya jirga, and
would set in motion the coming elections.
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By the fall of 2004, Afghanistan held its presidential election, by many measures,
it was a huge success. Twelve million Afghans had registered to vote, and 75% of those
registered had made it to the polls.504 The election was largely violence free, and long
lines at polling stations were prominent across the country. Additionally, many Afghans
couldn’t read, and candidates utilized pictures to get the word out about their
candidacy.505 Therefore, Afghan voters more or less voted to “express support for voting
itself” rather than a specific candidate.506 As Ansary states, “in this light, the election was
a big success.” As a result of the elections, Karzai once again emerged victorious as the
uncontested leader of Afghanistan. In the parliamentary election that occurred months
after, disorder and violence were more pronounced, but the two elections had left many
Afghans with the impression that “Afghanistan was on the verge of a takeoff”.507
However, the political and military developments in Afghanistan were
accompanied by a fair share of problems. The 2001-2008 period of the Afghanistan war
started off with high hopes, but ultimately the problems far outweighed the progress at
the end of 2008. The growing split between the U.S. and NATO, aggressive
counterterrorism strategies, a weak Karzai government, and growing backlash to foreign
occupation all contributed to a growing lack of stability and security in Afghanistan.
The divide between U.S. and NATO was largely centered on the extreme
reluctance of the United States to participate in nation building in Afghanistan. The U.S.
strategy continued to be focused squarely on aggressive counterterrorism, which clashed
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with NATO’s focus on stability and reconstruction efforts.508 Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates sums up the U.S. stance quite well, stating that the U.S. goal in Afghanistan
needed to “be limited to hammering the Taliban and other extremists.”509 The United
States never questioned “the supposedly unbreakable link between the Taliban and alQaeda.”510
In contrast with the United States, NATO wished to forge a wide national
reconciliation between all parties.511 NATO’s diverging view on Afghanistan would help
to increase internal military tension and contribute to a “fragmentation of effort” during
the war512. However, the ultimate result of this divide was that the U.S. counterterrorism
approach won out. Because of the United States’ dominant role in both decision making
and resources allocated to Afghanistan, the counterterrorism strategy often held higher
importance than NATO priorities.513
The results on the ground in Afghanistan from the conflicting interests of NATO
and the United States was “a complicated and dysfunctional set of command and control
arrangements that included multiple and separate chains of command.”514 OEF continued
to be separate from the ISAF mission, most notably the special operations missions that
reported directly to USCENTCOM in Tampa, Florida.515 ISAF itself had issues, as the
PRTs that were sent to various local regions of Afghanistan had very little oversight from
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central NATO command. Individual nations who each had their own PRTs, creating their
own “national bubbles” that helped to undermine NATO’s “strategic coherence.”516
The aggressive military strategy pursued by the United States, and in some cases
ISAF, also contributed to the growing instability in Afghanistan. In what became known
as the “Afghan Model,” the United States pursued a military strategy that featured a light
traditional military footprint which relied heavily on special operations, aerial strikes, and
local Afghan forces.517 In many cases, special operations and aerial strikes replaced
ground troops in remote Afghan areas.
In particular, there were a lot of airstrikes which resulted in high collateral
damage against Afghan civilians. ISAF used an incredible amount of airstrikes during
this time. In a six month span at the end of 2006, ISAF forces initiated 2,100 airstrikes in
Afghanistan, which was more strikes than had been carried out from 2001-2004.518 In
comparison, only 88 strikes were carried out during that same time period in Iraq.519
General Stanley McChrystal remarked that “over-reliance on firepower and force
protection … severely damaged ISAF’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people.”520
As reparations for civilian casualties, both ISAF and the U.S. maintained a policy
of reimbursement for civilian deaths.521 However, this further enraged Afghans who now
believed international forces thought “that compensation for wrongful death was a
business transaction.” It was also concerning was that “bombs from the air” couldn’t
replace “boots on the ground,” as Taliban infiltrators began to move into areas outside of
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the U.S. and international zone of control to take advantage of the lack of military
presence.522 By 2006, the U.S. and NATO were facing a new threat from a Taliban
insurgency.
As ISAF expanded to new regions, the United States also began new combat
operations, in the south. Military forces were now entering areas of significant Taliban
support from the local Pushtoon Afghans. After securing the relatively peaceful North,
ISAF moved into the South and Southeast, and the United States initiated a bloody 2006
incursion into Helmand Province in Operation Mountain Thrust.523 As the U.S. and ISAF
force deployed to these areas, a noticeable increase in terrorist attacks and other security
issues occurred.524 However, there was no real effort to rethink the strategy in
Afghanistan. For example, there was no concerted effort to implement a
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy as late as 2009.525
Parallel to warfighting in pre-Surge Iraq, the United States operated from large
forward operating bases (FOBs). Bagram Air Force base was the primary location for
United States forces. Bagram was a former Soviet airbase just north of Kabul that was no
being retooled for the U.S. military.526 Most Afghans never saw the inside of the heavily
secured base, and those that did witnessed “that an entire ready-made American city had
gone up within Bagram, complete with nightclubs, cinemas, restaurants, and shops (a
gross exaggeration).”527 With Afghans rarely having access to the base, it was easy for
rumors to spread about what was going on there. For example, many Afghans had begun
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to think they were selling mountains of pork, in an affront to Islam.528 Rather than
working in and around the Afghan population, U.S. forces were rather isolated,
propagating serious misunderstandings between themselves and the populace.
ISAF, however, did make some effort to get out amongst the Afghan people. The
PRTs, the main force of ISAF that operated at the local level, maintained patrols across
Afghanistan once they had been deployed across the entire country. With their
nationwide presence, the PRTs sought to stabilize Afghanistan, “extending the influence
of the central government” and “facilitating ‘reconstruction, security, governance, aid and
development.’”529 However, as previously mentioned, the PRTs had a counterproductive
effect.
Instead of promoting stability, the PRTs not only undermined NATO and U.S.
from attaining a coherent strategy in Afghanistan, but they also exacerbated tensions
between international forces and the local Afghans, especially in the Pushtoon dominated
South.530 First, individual PRTs led by different nations pursued different strategies, and
the different nations varied on how aggressive the tactics they pursued were.531 Second,
Afghans often didn’t distinguish between ISAF troops and the more aggressive
counterterrorism strategies employed by the U.S.532 Lastly, as noted in a survey taken in
five of Afghanistan’s provinces, Afghans in particularly low security areas viewed troops
as disrespectful of Afghan “culture, religion, and traditions.”533 Ultimately, the PRTs
helped to push Afghans back into the arms of the resurgent Taliban.
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The Afghan central government also contributed to a renewed Taliban presence in
Afghanistan. The thirty-year political chaos of Afghanistan and its tribal oriented society
made Afghans suspicious of central authority. But, after the Bonn Conference handed
power to the Karzai government, Afghans found itself under a heavily centralized
government’s rule. The new Afghan constitution that passed in 2004 gave Karzai “near
absolute authority… without any checks and balances to executive power.”534 Karzai’s
government was a radical change for an Afghanistan that was used to weak central
government and dominant tribal politics.535
Despite its centralized power, the new Karzai government lacked a politically
legitimate mandate for ruling Afghanistan.536 Over time, the government had lost its
novel luster, and was soon “widely and increasingly seen by many as weak, corrupt, and
abusive.”537 Corruption was rampant in post invasion Afghanistan. First, Karzai himself
contributed to the instability of the government by using his power for personal gain.
Karzai installed many members of his own Popalzai tribe to positions of power. This
nepotism included his brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, who assumed an important council
position in Kandahar Province.538 Second, other government officials used their power
for financial gain. For instance, the minister of mines, Ibrahim Adel, took a $30 million
bribe in exchange for awarding a government copper rights contract to a Chinese
company.539
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The financial aspect of corruption was the most problematic issue for the Afghan
government. As international money flowed into Afghanistan, powerful Afghans took
advantage of funds meant for reconstruction of the country. Because this money didn’t
enter the domestic economy, only Afghans who worked closely with foreign NGOs,
companies, and governments ever saw it pass through their hands.540 Ultimately, the new
and elite economy contributed to pervasive “lunch-pail corruption’ that ordinary Afghans
now had to face on a daily basis.541 For instance, cops who responded to vehicle
accidents detained anybody they could find at the scene regardless of their involvement
and force them to pay fines.542 In another case, government bureaucrats would slow down
their processing of paperwork unless the requestor paid bribes to expedite the process.543
International development funds also helped to undermine the Karzai government.
Seventy-seven percent of reconstruction funds used in Afghanistan “bypassed the Afghan
government entirely,” making the government appear as a useless bystander, instead of a
competent authority.544 In addition, the often rushed and shoddy workmanship of the
reconstruction did the government no favors. For example, an American led effort to
build a paved road between Sar-e-Pul and Shiberghan ran into a few issues.545 First, the
road didn’t do the local Afghans much good, as they rarely had vehicles and traveled
mostly by foot with their goods carried by donkeys.546 A paved road was better than the
previous dirt path, but it didn’t cut travel time by very much. Second, the new raised road
acted like a dam, water pooled on one side, and there were no culverts to divert the
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water.547 The local Afghans took it upon themselves to cut drainage ditches along the
road, which then meant that cars could no longer travel on the road.548 Ultimately, the
Afghan police got involved and arrested those responsible for defacing the road, creating
another negative interaction between the Afghan people and the central government.549
Coinciding with the poor economy and ineffective government, a robust drug
trade became a lucrative money maker in Afghanistan. Farming was tough in the
countryside, and farmers preferred to lean on their skills in growing and selling opium.
The opium crop was far superior to anything else they could grow on their properties, as
the opium plant can be grown on a small unirrigated plot of land, is relatively drought
resistant, unperishable, and can be transported easily as heroin.550 Opium farming had
funded the Taliban before the war, and it would do the same as the Taliban returned from
exile.
Of course, the burgeoning drug trade concerned the U.S. and its international
partners. As the primary lead nation for countering narcotics in Afghanistan, the United
Kingdom led an extensive eradication effort of the opium crop. Through the policy of
eradication in Helmand province, the U.K. ultimately cut into the “main source of
livelihood to thousands of farmers” as well as the “power and profits to officials and
strongmen” in Afghanistan.551 Eventually, local Afghans provided the Taliban with a
share of their profits in return for protection against international eradication efforts.552
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The West was also partly to blame for this drug economy. In a haste to achieve its
counterterrorism objectives and get out of Afghanistan, the United States relied on the
Northern Alliance and other warlords to keep control of the country. The United States
allied with warlords such as Ismail Kahn and Gul Aga Shirzai, who had gained power in
the 1992 civil war, reintroduced the “venal, predatory, and violent” relationship with the
warlords that many Afghans despised.553 The Afghans who had suffered under the
warlords before the arrival of the Taliban, were now back where they started. As a result,
many Afghans once again embraced the Taliban as way of rejecting warlord control.
The warlord debacle also cut both ways. As the Taliban group led by Mullah
Omar regrouped in Pakistan, Mujahideen warlords like Jalaluddin Haqqani and
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar began to operate under the Taliban umbrella.554 In post-invasion
Afghanistan, the Taliban group began much more diverse, and also under much less
central control.555 As Pape writes, there were really about three different independent
subgroups of the Taliban insurgency. First, the religiously motivated group of the Taliban
under Mullah Omar, which numbered around 10,000 individuals, only accounted for a
quarter of the entire Taliban movement.556 Second, the southern drug lords of Helmand
and Kandahar who profited off the opium crop, were motivated by profit and not
religious motivations.557 Third, the aforementioned warlords, such as Haqqani, were
opportunists who chose sides whenever it suited them.558 The U.S. and its partners didn’t
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quite understand these organizational divisions, and instead adopted a narrative of a
singular and unified Taliban insurgency.559
Meanwhile, as the Taliban regained control of parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan
interfered in the missions of the U.S., NATO, and the Afghan government. As the
Taliban gained strength, the Talibanist movement had directed an insurgency towards the
government in Islamabad, and Pakistan desperately needed to redirect the Islamist
momentum back into Afghanistan.560 Therefore, Pakistan sought to prevent an
autonomous Afghan government from forming in Kabul in order to combat a movement
they helped to create and subsequently lose control of.561 To achieve this goal, Pakistan
sent “agents in to [Afghanistan to] commit occasional acts of senseless sabotage.”562 To
make matters worse, the Pakistan and Afghanistan border became increasingly volatile,
with each armed border mafia creating their own militias.563 The Taliban now had a
perfect climate of instability to launch a violent insurgency.
As a counter to growing Talibanist sentiment, the Afghan government under
Karzai began to build up its own security through the Afghan National Army (ANA) and
Afghan National Police (ANP), together known as the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF). Unfortunately, the rapid deployment of many unqualified men who “were given
guns and authority” and no clear directives backfired on the government’s security
efforts.564 Many soldiers and policemen took advantage of their new found authority by
physically abusing people or collecting exorbitant bribes.565 Problematically, the ANA
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and ANP were also made up of predominantly Tajik and Uzbek ethnic groups, and
deployed to the restive Pushtoon tribal areas.566 The lack of Pushtoons further tarnished
Afghan government authority, and the resulting ethnic conflict was yet another reason
that Afghanistan struggled to achieve national unity, instead devolving into another
violent chapter in Afghan history.567
By 2006, the Taliban began their violent insurgency by targeting schools. Before
then, the Taliban had avoided violence against schools because of their fear it would
alienate their Afghan patrons.568 After a successful propaganda campaign against western
style education, the Taliban launched several attacks against school teachers and
property.569 Beyond targeting schools, the renewed violence helped to spur increasing
suicide attacks, assaults, and murders.570 Eventually, the group managed to convince
everyday Afghan people that attacks against foreigners and foreign aid were good for the
country: U.S., NATO, NGO, and other international groups were now easy targets for
Taliban violence. 571
Combined with the failing war effort and reconstruction of Afghanistan, the
violence tightened the Taliban’s grip on the country. By 2008, the Taliban had
established a shadow government directly competing with the legitimate Afghan
government.572 Despite not actually doing any government administration, the Taliban
created at least a veneer of a substitute for Karzai’s corrupt government.573 The biggest
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substitute was a Taliban run judicial system. Any Afghan of even a falsely claimed
religious scholarly background could now dispense justice as they saw fit in accordance
with their limited understanding of Shari’a law.574 The Taliban judicial system became
much more palatable to the indigenous customs of Afghanistan, and easily supplanted
law established by the central government.575
As President Obama took office in 2009, it was clear that the war in Afghanistan
was not going well. The future of Afghanistan would be up to Obama and the United
States’ international allies to find a new way forward. With the relative success of the
Surge in Iraq, President Obama decided Afghanistan needed a Surge of its own. Before
exploring the road to a Surge in Afghanistan, it is important to also examine quantitative
data on the 2001-2008 period. In the next section, factors such as U.S./NATO troop
levels, Afghan civilian casualties, and Afghan public opinion are examined to determine
whether the hard offensive counterterrorism approach in Afghanistan contributed to the
failure of the U.S. counterterrorism mission.
Afghan Data Trends 2001-2008
The United States’ counterterrorism campaign dominated strategy considerations
in the first eight years of the war in Afghanistan. Though there were efforts by U.S.
international partner nations to pursue stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan, the
period from 2001-2008 can’t be seen as a softer “hearts and minds” counterterrorism
campaign. In analyzing the data and trends of from 2001-2008, the war under President
Bush should show indicators that the aggressive counterterrorism approach utilized
resulted in a failed counterterrorism campaign. First, trends in troop levels for both OEF
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and ISAF forces are analyzed. Second, Afghan civilian casualty rates and their relation to
troop level trends are examined. Third, the relationship between Afghan public opinion
and the previously mentioned troop level and casualty trends are investigated. The rate of
terrorism is then examined. Finally, troop levels, casualties, public opinion trends, and
the rate of terrorism will be utilized to determine whether the Bush era Afghanistan
counterterrorism strategy resulted in counterterrorism failure.
Troop Levels in Afghanistan 2001-2008
During the 2001-2008 period, a steady increase of both OEF and ISAF troop
levels can be observed (see Figure 9). From January 2002, U.S. forces rose from 4,100 to
over 35,000 in May 2008. ISAF forces also increased, from 5,000 in February 2002 to
31,400 in December 2008. Two trends are mainly responsible for the increase in both
U.S. and ISAF troops. First, the declining security climate and resurgence of the Taliban
necessitated both military organizations to deepen their involvement in the country.
Reconstruction efforts, as well as ineffective and corrupt governance ultimately drove
Afghans back into the arms of the Taliban. With ample Afghan public support, the
Taliban was emboldened to carry out attacks against U.S., international, and Afghan
forces. Facing a frustrating insurgency which utilized “murders, assassinations, and
small-scale hit-and-run tactics,” OEF and ISAF troops needed to increase their numbers
to rein the deteriorating security situation.576
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Figure 11. Total Number of U.S. and ISAF Troops Stationed in Afghanistan from 20022008577
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Second, NATO’s increasing involvement was also influenced by the U.S. shift in
focus to the Iraq War in 2003. Instead of further involvement in Afghanistan, the U.S.
allowed NATO to take control of ISAF’s nation building efforts in Afghanistan. Faced
with a “growing and resilient insurgency” from 2006 to 2009, ISAF troops not only
heavily increased to improve security, but also to meet their expanding stability and
reconstruction responsibilities.578 The data also reflects ISAF’s growing importance to
the war in Afghanistan. In July of 2006, ISAF forces increased by over 10,000 soldiers,
making their overall total number of troops even with that of U.S. forces conducting
OEF. If the hypothesis that hard offensive counterterrorism leads to a failed
counterterrorism campaign is correct, than the increasing troop levels and aggressive
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tactics in 2001-2008 should point to an increase in civilian casualties, lower afghan
public opinion, and a higher terrorism rate.
Afghan Civilian Casualties 2001-2008
From 2001 to 2008, Afghan civilian casualties peaked during the initial invasion,
dipped below 500 casualties a year from 2003 to 2005, and then began to increase in
2006 as the Taliban began its insurgency. Despite not a single source that kept detailed
civilian casualty records during the first eight years of the Afghan conflict, the Physicians
for Social Responsibility group compiled data which combined several casualty counts,
helping to create a yearly estimate for civilian casualties. In Figure 10, the civilian body
count estimates both a low range estimate and a high range estimate to account for the
discrepancies between different casualty datasets.

Figure 12. Yearly Estimated Number of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan 2001-2008579
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Three explanations for the graph trend can be presented. First, the high casualty
count at the onset of the war is clearly related to the tactics of the invasion. The intense
bombing campaign against Taliban and al-Qaeda targets decimated their organizations,
causing both groups to quickly fold.580 In the haste to retaliate in Afghanistan, it can be
inferred that the bombings hit more than just the individuals that actively participated in
either al-Qaeda or the Taliban.
Second, a lull in violence helped to drastically lower the number of casualties
between 2003 and 2005. Many Afghans had high hopes for the new government that
emerged from the Bonn Conference. The influx of foreign investment and democracy led
many Afghans to believe that things were finally looking up. For instance, when
President Bush promoted a “Marshall Plan” reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, Ansary
anecdotally recalls that an Afghan man who looked like he could have been used as a
Reuter’s stock photo of the Taliban planned to build a cosmetics factory in Kabul.581 This
man believed he would be successful because Afghan women would once again freely
roam the street with the Taliban in exile, and his optimistic views for the country were
shared with millions of other Afghans. However, the lack of violence could also be the
result of the aforementioned shift by U.S. policy makers to Iraq instead of Afghanistan,
or the fractured and disorganized nature of militant groups following the highly
disruptive U.S. invasion.
Lastly, like the increased number of OEF and ISAF troops, a notable increase in
civilian casualties from 2005 to 2008 also occurred. With the Taliban on the rise, they
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began to target military personnel, schools, and even NGO workers.582 Despite
employing a “hearts and minds” propaganda campaign towards the Afghan people, their
guerilla tactics most likely caught innocent Afghans in the cross fire. In the Physicians
for Social Responsibility report, nearly 20-30% of Taliban attacks were directed at
civilians.583 The Taliban weren’t the only perpetrators of civilian casualties, however.
Pro-government forces (OEF, ISAF, ANA, etc.) accounted for a sizable portion of the
casualties. In particular OEF Special Forces and aerial bombings produced a numerous of
civilian deaths, which explains why international forces paying Afghan families for
accidental deaths backfired- too many people were being killed. A recent study found that
U.S. Special Operations Forces raids and bombings accounted for half of all U.S. caused
civilian deaths.584 Even more problematic, the spec ops mission collateral damage is
largely under-reported because many of the operations are kept secret from even the
regular U.S. military.585 Civilian casualties could even be much higher than what the data
implies.
Despite the flaws in recording civilian casualties and the lack of a single constant
body count dataset, the available record point to a plausible correlation between
aggressive tactics, troops, and Afghan civilian casualties. As more troops arrived in
Afghanistan, the security situation deteriorated immensely, with increased collateral
damage from both Taliban and OEF/ISAF forces. Once again, however, the relationship
between tactics, troops, and casualties can also be put into question. Many factors besides
just tactics and troops could account for high civilian casualties. Maybe increasing
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casualties had more to do with the resurgence of the Taliban than U.S./ ISAF troop levels
and tactics alone. In the next section, troop and casualty trends will be compared to trends
in Afghan public opinion from 2001-2008.
Afghan Public Opinion 2001-2008
Based on available polling information from the 2001-2008 period, it appears that
Afghan public positive opinion towards the direction of Afghanistan and towards the
presence of the United States slowly declined as the war approached its eighth year in
2009. Similar to data on civilian casualties, Afghan public opinion should be observed
with several important caveats. First, not much significant data polling of Afghan public
opinion occurred in the early years of the war, and useful public opinion is hard to find
from 2001 to 2005. Much of this section will rely on polling done by the Asia Foundation
and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which took place from 2006 to 2009.
Though past the 2001-2008 era, 2009 was a transition point between the Bush and
Obama strategies in Afghanistan. 2009 public opinion was therefore similar to the end of
the Bush era and is important to also include 2009 in the examination of 2001-2008.
Second, polling in Afghanistan is dangerous work. In many instances, polling
authorities were prevented from collecting data because of the unstable security situation
in Afghanistan. As the Taliban gained strength, they became more willing to target both
military and civilian international personnel. The Asia Foundation and the BBC both
reasonably tried to collect polling information across all regions of the country, but safety
of the poll workers often dictated how many Afghans could be polled. For example, when
UN staff went to survey Afghans in the Paktika province near Pakistan in 2007, they
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couldn’t get into many districts because of the increasing levels of violence and
insurgency.586
The BBC polls from 2004 to 2009 includes the opinions of about 1,500 people
from Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.587 Their data, especially in Helmand Province, was
limited by the violence and instability.588 For the Asia Foundation, they polled a total of
6,263 Afghans in 2007, but some areas had a higher percentage of Afghans polled.589
People in Kabul accounted for 19% of the data, and the Northern provinces accounted for
29%.590 In comparison, the Hazarajat and South Western Regions accounted for 7% and
9% respectively.591 These oversamples in more secure areas likely skews poll findings to
favor pro-U.S. and ISAF views. To their credit, however, the Asia Foundation did try to
compensate for their oversamples in regions like Kabul by weighting their data to be
more representative of the Afghan population as recorded by the Afghan Central
Statistics Office.592 Despite polling flaws, the Afghan public opinion that was recorded
helps to provide helpful insights into whether hard offensive counterterrorism lead to
more terrorism from 2001-2008.
As previously noted, Afghan public opinion towards the U.S. and the direction of
Afghanistan gradually decreased from 2001-2008, as noted by both the BBC and the Asia
Foundation polling. Both polls asked Afghans whether they though Afghanistan was
headed in the right direction or the wrong direction. For the BBC, their poll noted a high
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of 77% of Afghans felt that the country was headed in the right direction in 2005 (Table
12). By 2009, only 40% believed the country was in a good direction, compared to 38%
who believed Afghanistan was going in the wrong direction. However, the BBC did not
carry out the survey during 2008.

Table 12. Percent of Afghans Answering whether Afghanistan is headed in the Right
Direction or Wrong Direction by Year (BBC)593
2004

2005

2006

2007

2009

64%

77%

55%

54%

40%

11%

6%

22%

24%

38%

Mixed

8%

11%

17%

15%

14%

No opinion

16%

6%

5%

7%

9%

Right Direction
Wrong
Direction

The Asia Foundation noted a similar decline in favorable opinion about where
Afghanistan was headed. In their survey, those who had responded that Afghanistan was
headed in the right direction never reached above 50%, and declined from 44% to 38%
from 2006 to 2008 (Table 13). In comparison, public opinion that Afghanistan was
headed in the wrong direction climbed from 21% in 2006 to 32% in 2008. As the Taliban
returned, it appears negative perceptions about Afghanistan’s future were growing.

593

McGivering, “Afghan People,” 1.

127

Table 13. Percent of Afghans Answering whether Afghanistan is headed in the Right
Direction or Wrong Direction by Year (Asia Foundation)594
2006

2007

2008

Right Direction

44%

42%

38%

Wrong Direction

21%

24%

32%

Don’t Know

4%

7%

6%

Afghans also had several reasons for why they thought Afghanistan was headed in
the right or wrong direction. In the Asia Foundation’s 2006 survey, the top three reasons
cited by right direction respondents for their responses were good security, reconstruction
efforts, and peace (Table 14). From 2006 to 2008, right direction respondents fluctuated
between these three main reasonings. Oppositely, wrong direction respondent reasonings
were largely diverse in 2006 (Table 15). Several issues, such as a bad economy, bad
government, and no reconstruction were cited. However, by 2008, rising insecurity
concerned 50% of wrong direction respondents, which increased from 6% in 2006.
General corruption and corruption by officials concerned 28%.
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Table 14. Percent of Afghans Citing a Specific Reason for their “Right Direction” Survey
Answer (Asia Foundation)595
2006

2007

2008

Good Security

31%

34%

39%

Reconstruction

21%

39%

32%

Peace

29%

16%

21%

Schools for Girls

16%

19%

19%

Freedom/ Free Speech

11%

3%

9%

Good Government

9%

9%

9%

Table 15. Percent of Afghans Citing a Specific Reason for their “Wrong Direction”
Survey Answer (The Asia Foundation)596
2006

2007

2008

Insecurity

6%

48%

50%

Corruption

0%

13%

19%

Administrative

2%

15%

9%

Bad Economy

27%

12%

17%

Unemployment

22%

15%

15%

Bad Government

22%

15%

12%

High Prices

0%

1%

10%

Corruption

Ruth Rennie, Sudhindra Sharma, and Pawan Sen, “Afghanistan in 2008: A Survey of the Afghan
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The 2009 BBC survey also seem to confirm the Asia Foundation’s 2008 findings.
Like the Asia Foundation, Afghans surveyed by the BBC echoed similar reasons for their
right or wrong direction responses. On the right direction side, Afghans cited
reconstruction, good security, and peace as their top three answers, almost exactly the
same as the Asia Foundation survey responses (Table 16). For the wrong direction
respondents, violence, corruption, and the economy were the top three responses, not
much different from the Asia Foundation poll (Table 17). Clearly, Afghan public opinion
is a function of increasing Taliban violence and lack of ability of U.S. and ISAF forces to
protect the population, but also the increasing issues with corruption and a weak
economy.

Table 16. Percent of Afghans Citing a Specific Reason for their “Right Direction” Survey
Answer in 2009 (BBC)597
Reconstruction

43%

Freedom/ Free Speech

7%

Good Security

38%

Economic Revival

5%

Peace

14%

International Assistance

5%

Girls’ Schools

12%

Disarmament

5%

Good Government

12%

Free movement

4%

Democracy

8%

597
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Table 17. Percent of Afghans Citing a Specific Reason for their “Wrong Direction”
Survey Answer in 2009 (BBC)598
Security/Warlords/Violence

52%

Western Influence Too Great/

8%

Dangers to Islam
Corruption

26%

Education/Schools/Literacy

3%

Economy/Poverty/Jobs

25%

Reconstruction Problems

2%

Weak Government

16%

Neighboring Countries Cause

1%

Problems
Taliban

8%

Afghan public opinion also noted a gradual decline in positive attitudes towards
the United States and ISAF, as noted by the BBC. Despite lowering attitudes, the views
still remained relatively positive. In Table 18, majority support for the U.S. and ISAF fell
from strongly support to somewhat support from 2006 to 2009. Despite the slide from
strong support, opposition to international forces only received a slight bump during the
same period. In Table 19, justification for attacks against international forces remained
relatively low. Only 25% of Afghans believed attacks against the U.S. and ISAF were
justified, lower than the 30% recorded in 2005, whereas those who replied “not justified”
remained in the 60-70% range.
Opinions on whether international forces should withdraw remained relatively
promising for the U.S. and ISAF as well. Despite a steady decline, many Afghans felt
that forces should remain for 1-2 years or stay until security is restored, around 56%,
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compared to 37% who felt they should leave sooner.599 Also, many Afghans continued to
see the Taliban and al-Qaeda as the main threat to Afghanistan. A combined 49% of
Afghans placed blame the Taliban and al-Qaeda for the continuing violence.600

Table 18. Percentage of Afghans Polled who Strongly Support, Somewhat Support,
Somewhat Oppose, or Strongly Oppose U.S. and ISAF Military Forces601
U.S. Military

2006

2007

2009

ISAF Military

Forces
Strongly

2006

2007

2009

Forces
30%

20%

12%

Strongly Support

30%

25%

13%

48%

51%

51%

Somewhat

48%

42%

46%

15%

17%

24%

6%

13%

16%

Support
Somewhat
Support
Somewhat

Support
6%

15%

21%

Somewhat

Oppose
Strongly

Oppose
6%

12%

15%

Strongly Oppose

Oppose
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Table 19. Percentage of Afghans Polled who Believe Attacks against U.S. and ISAF
Forces Can or Cannot be Justified602
2005

2006

2007

2009

Justified

30%

13%

17%

25%

Not Justified

60%

78%

74%

64%

No Opinion

10%

9%

8%

11%

However, some polling data should have concerned U.S. and ISAF officials.
When asked if the use of air strikes by international forces are acceptable, 77% of those
polled in 2009 responded that strikes are unacceptable.603 41% of Afghans also responded
that they blamed U.S. and ISAF for mistakenly targeting civilians on the ground.604
Civilian casualties were a concern of the public, and it might have benefitted foreign
forces to take better care when planning aerial strikes to diminish Afghan opposition.
Despite polling oversamples and a lack of Afghan public opinion throughout the
entire 2001-2008 period, the public opinion polling by the Asia Foundation and the BBC
highlight the relationship between public opinion and other factors such as troop levels
and civilian casualties. As both troop levels and casualties increased, Afghan public
opinion slowly decreased. While the surveys showed that Afghan public still largely
supported the U.S. and ISAF presence, there is room for concern. As noted, oversampling
favored the views of Afghans in Kabul and other areas with high international presence.
Likely, there are more Afghans that have negative views that were not included in polling
due to poll worker safety. Additionally, those polled in the surveys provided opposition
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to bombing campaigns and excess civilian casualties by international forces. The data
provided by Afghan public opinion polls show that there is a possible correlation between
increasing troops and casualties and the declining Afghan public sentiment, despite some
evidence of polling discrepancies. Do these factors show an increase in terrorism during
2001-2008?
Afghanistan Terrorist Attacks 2001-2008
Similar to increases in troop numbers and civilian casualties, terrorist attacks in
Afghanistan increased dramatically in the 2001-2008 period (Figure 11). Once again,
however, the increase in terrorist attacks can also be linked to increasing levels of Taliban
violence, and not just rises in troops and casualties. The increase became even more
defined at the beginning of 2006. By 2006, a year which Ansary calls the tipping point,
“chaos began to inch ahead” in Afghanistan.605 2006 also marked the beginning of the
Taliban attacks against schools, which helped to stoke an increase in other insurgent
attacks, in turn reducing the security situation, and forcing international troops to increase
both troop levels and military operations.606 Additionally, the increase in terrorist attacks
also coincide with a steady decrease in Afghan public opinion about the direction of the
country and views about the presence of U.S. and ISAF troops. However, like Ansary
states, the renewed Taliban insurgency “began to drain away that aroma of hope,” and the
bright Afghan dreams for the future began to dim. The growing Taliban movement offers
an alternative explanation for a decline in public opinion rather than the tactics and troop
levels of the U.S. and ISAF alone.607
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Figure 13. Number of Terrorist Attacks in Afghanistan from 2001-2008608
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With clear trends of increasing troops, civilian casualties, and a steadily declining
Afghan public opinion, it is possible that these trends helped lead to an increase in
terrorist attacks, and the failure of counterterrorism efforts. Like the pre-surge era of the
Iraq War, the period from 2001-2008 in Afghanistan also featured aggressive
counterterrorism tactics. Specifically, the war in Afghanistan featured aggressive war
tactics, such as intense aerial strikes and numerous special operations raids to hone in on
the United States’ al-Qaeda and Taliban targets. With both the data trends and the
predominant aggressive counterterrorism tactics and strategy, it is possible to argue that
the counterterrorism strategies pursued lead to increased terrorism and ultimately failed.
Of course, there also alternative explanations to increased terrorism. For example, it is
possible that the increased terrorism was caused by growing dissent from Afghans

608

Global Terrorism Database [gtd_96to13_0718dist], National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START), (2019), Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.

135

towards the increased corruption of the Karzai government. In the following section, the
Surge era of the war in Afghanistan will be analyzed. If Obama’s replication of the Iraq
Surge in Afghanistan utilized less aggressive counterterrorism strategies, than it should
have resulted in a successful counterterrorism campaign.
Afghanistan History and Politics 2009-2016: The Surge and Withdrawal
As the conflict in Afghanistan entered its eighth year, the resurgent Taliban had
begun to make the situation for U.S. and ISAF troops look bleak. By January 2009, there
were approximately 64,000 U.S. and ISAF forces in Afghanistan, and both terrorist
attacks and civilian casualties began to mount.609 As newly elected President Barack
Obama took office, he saw fit to utilize the success of the Surge in Iraq to forge a new
path in Afghanistan. Under Obama’s watch, the Surge in Afghanistan was enacted.
However, the Surge entailed much of the same counterterrorism strategies as the preSurge period. Despite troop increases and a supposed emphasis on COIN, the Surge
failed to produce meaningful results in Afghanistan, as U.S. troops are still involved in
the country to this day. In this section, the political and historical contexts of the
Afghanistan Surge and withdrawal are investigated. By looking at Obama’s Surge
planning, the military command of the war by Generals Stanley McChrystal and David
Petraeus, how the Surge went wrong, and the resulting stalemate between international
forces and the Taliban, it is possible to examine whether the continued hard offensive
counterterrorism strategy during the Surge in Afghanistan was successful or not.
Before being elected, President Obama had made it clear that the war in
Afghanistan would be one of his top priorities. In comparison to Bush’s “bad” war in

609

Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan,” 81-85.

136

Iraq, Obama would devote more resources to the “good” war in Afghanistan.610 Obama
had criticized the Iraq War as a distraction, and blamed the Bush Administration for not
focusing on Afghanistan. On the campaign trail, Obama lambasted the lack of effort in
Afghanistan, stating that it “was unacceptable that seven years after 3,000 Americans
were killed on our soil, the terrorists who attacked us on 9/11 are still at large.”611 After
visiting Afghanistan in 2008, Obama assured the commander of ISAF that he would
provide the troops the Afghanistan campaign needed.612
In office, Obama largely kept his promises. After assuring the drawdown of the
Iraq War, the Obama administration set to work on providing more resources to
Afghanistan. After an initial review of the war, the President committed to sending an
additional 17,000 troops to the country by February, 2009.613 Before considering sending
even more troops, Obama began an additional review process that would coincide with
the fall 2009 Afghan election.614
Despite some level of support from the American public in increasing U.S.
involvement in Afghanistan, Obama had to overcome political opposition to his plan by
both the Democratic and Republican parties. The Democrats in Congress voiced their
strong opposition to any escalation in the war in Afghanistan.615 Citing their skepticism
of the Karzai government, politicians like Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and David
Obey began to warn the Obama Administration that they were unwilling to allow for
many more Afghanistan funding requests to pass through Congress.616 Pelosi stated that
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she “didn’t think … a great deal of support for sending more troops to Afghanistan”
existed “in the country of in Congress.”617 Similarly, Congressman John Murtha
threatened that any more war funding measures would be rejected by the majority of
Democrats, and that the passage of funding would have to depend on hostile Republican
votes.618 Additionally, Obama was concerned that the Democrats wouldn’t support new
war plans if he didn’t include a strict withdrawal timeline from Iraq in the near future.619
As for the Republicans, the party largely supported the continuance of the war in
Afghanistan, but pushed Obama to commit to a blank check policy to the military.620
Republicans warned that if a withdrawal timetable was included, it “would be met with
disapproval from the party.”621 Ultimately, if Obama couldn’t counterbalance both parties
and promote his own plan, his campaign promise to focus on Afghanistan would
flounder.
The divisions over the war in Afghanistan were also present in the Obama
Administration. Two camps existed on how to proceed in the country. On “Team
Pentagon,” comprised of Defense secretary Robert Gates, Secretary of State Hilary
Clinton, General Stanley McCrystal and others, they believed that Afghanistan needed a
“comprehensive, countrywide counterinsurgency” campaign, and a large influx of new
troops.622 They felt that the U.S. not only had to defeat al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but also
to ensure stability of Afghanistan.623 And like Republicans, the Pentagon group resisted
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plans for a withdrawal deadline, instead asking for a withdrawal once “conditions on the
ground” warranted it.624
In opposition, many of Obama’s cabinet members and advisors, such as Vice
President Joe Biden and the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, were dead
set against a COIN strategy and felt that the mission in Afghanistan should be a limited
counterterror operation featuring a strictly timed withdrawal.625 Heavily skeptical of both
the Karzai government and the “possibility of political progress,” the “Biden Group”
reasoned that the U.S. goal should be to kill members of al-Qaeda instead of escalating
efforts to combat the Taliban.626 In addition, they felt that Obama had limited political
capital to pursue a policy in Afghanistan unpopular with the Democrats in Congress.627
In order to rein in the competing political camps in Congress and within his own
administration, President Obama was forced to pursue a politically expedient way
forward in Afghanistan. Instead of choosing one side over the other, Obama engineered a
political compromise between them, while also tamping down each side’s dissent. For
team Pentagon, President Obama quickly and effectively ended attempts by McChrystal
and others to go public with the debate inside the administration in order to force support
for a COIN mission.628 If Team Pentagon had been successful, they might have likely
formed an alliance with Republicans in Congress, scuttling Obama’s efforts to placate the
Democrats. Obama also “sought to ensure that there would be no defections” from
military and Department of Defense leaders once he had made his final decision on
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Afghanistan strategy.629 Team Pentagon members were asked to endorse a “terms sheet”
where it was noted that the new strategy would not be “fully resourced nation building,
but a narrower approach.”630 In return for their support, Obama pledged to limit any
withdrawal with the appropriate “conditions on the ground.”631
With Team Biden, Obama took careful measures to win over their support. By
including a withdrawal date for July 2011, Obama was able to convince both Biden and
Democrats in Congress that the new plan would not be an open ended campaign in
Afghanistan.632 Before taking his plan public, Obama met with Biden and Congress to
explain his decision.633 Democrats weren’t pleased with a deepened commitment in
Afghanistan, but support from Biden kept the plan from being openly opposed. As Biden
told the Congressional Democrats, “Just so everyone knows, I’m not for drawing down
the troops.”634
After wrangling support for his plan in both the administration and Congress,
Obama pitched his plan in a speech to the American public. At West Point on December
10, 2009, Obama outlined his plan to send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan to
focus on counterinsurgency.635 Additionally, a “civilian surge” would help to fund
Afghan government efforts to stem corruption.636 Similar to President Bush in Iraq,
Obama justified the move as an attempt to prevent new threats from terrorism in the
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region.637 He warned that “the danger would only grow if the region slides backwards,
and al-Qaeda can operate with impunity.”638
With his speech, Obama was able to reframe the debate over the way forward in
Afghanistan. Having co-opted critics within his administration, the speech helped
improve public opinion of the war, and further convince Democrats of his willingness to
keep the war in Afghanistan limited in scope. By December 2009, 51% of Americans
supported the new plan, while 40% opposed.639 Most importantly, 58% of Democrats
supported the plan, up from 27% in November.640 Likewise, 55% of Republicans
supported the Obama plan, and those that opposed disapproved of the addition of a
withdrawal date.641 Democratic leaders like Pelosi seemed placated as well. Pelosi stated
after the speech that she believed that Obama effectively “articulated a way out of this
war.”642 Instead of challenging the plan, the Democratic leadership helped to curb any
strong challenges from the Democratic “doves’ in demanding a shorter withdrawal
timeline. 643
The result of the political process was that Obama’s new strategy in Afghanistan
was now neither a true COIN campaign nor a military counterterrorism campaign. The
mission in Afghanistan had been narrowed, and the bar for success lowered.644 Now, the
U.S. and ISAF would focus on “disrupting and dismantling al-Qaeda” rather than
pursuing a total victory over the Taliban and instead choosing to gradually transfer
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responsibility to the Afghan army. In actuality, the plan was a broad blend of both COIN
and counterterrorism strategies. More attention would be paid to securing the safety of
the population and nation building, but the aggressive military strategies of aerial
bombings and special operations missions would continue. Ultimately, a true COIN
mission was never authorized in Afghanistan. Instead, the campaign was the “worst of
both worlds- a troop increase that was inadequate for requirements … and a deadline that
would hearten enemies.”645
General McChrystal had first go with the new plan. A disciple of General
Petraeus, McChrystal had served as head of Petraeus’s Special Operations Forces
counterterrorism operations in Iraq, and was therefore a proponent of COIN warfare.646
After taking command of ISAF in June 2009, McChrystal set about establishing the
COIN strategy in Afghanistan that been previously used in Iraq. In his assessment in the
preliminary discussions of creating the Afghan Surge, McChrystal spoke in depth of how
he felt that the campaign strategy needed to be “focused on protecting the population
rather than seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces” and how changing the
operational culture would be necessary.647 On his watch, troops in Afghanistan would
now follow strict rules of engagement and utilize a clear, hold, and build strategy to limit
the growth of the Taliban.648
However, McChrystal’s COIN strategy worked in parallel with the
counterterrorism strategy being utilized on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to hunt down
Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda members who were still on the loose. With Obama
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reaffirming the U.S. aim of disrupting and dismantling al-Qaeda, “kill and capture”
counterterrorism was intensified.649 NATO Special operations continued to operate
throughout the country, utilizing night raids, where special ops forces would swoop in
under cover of night and bag suspected Taliban members.650 Of course, some suspects
arrested were innocent, and the noisy attacks startled the families and friends of those
taken- guilty or innocent.651 As one Afghan who worked as an interpreter for the U.S.
military put it, the strikes left women yelling, “children screaming, and babies crying,”
and the man remembered thinking as he stared at a certain child, “Whoa. We’ll be back
for him one day.”652
Drone strikes began to replace aerial strikes in the 2009-2016 period as well. By
utilizing drone strikes, the U.S. and ISAF could now target the remote areas that the
Taliban terrorists were hiding in without risking military lives in the process. In 2008,
drone strikes conducted by the U.S. military were carried out about 35 times.653 Under
Obama’s first year in office, the number of drone strikes jumped to 140.654 Despite saving
U.S. and international forces’ lives, the new method of choice for aerial targeting was
increasingly controversial amongst Afghans and even neighboring Pakistanis who also
were targeted from time to time.655 Disputes between NATO, who claimed the strikes
targeted terrorists, and the Afghans, who believed innocent people were being targeted,
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became common place.656 Likely it was a combination of both claims- the drone strikes
hit terrorists, but also resulted in high levels of collateral damage.657
In the midst of the counterterrorism campaign in southern Afghanistan,
McChrystal’s clear, hold, and build strategy would be tested. In Helmand Province,
McChrystal’s forces engaged the Taliban in one of the biggest battles of the war.658 The
city of Marjah, which was described as the “headquarters of the insurgency,” became the
center point of the battle to retake Afghanistan.659 NATO quickly defeated the Taliban in
Marjah in about a week, and proceeded to set up a “government in a box” to administer
the city, opening schools and medical facilities, patrolling the streets, and enacting
reconstruction efforts.660
However, violence continued to plague Marjah. Despite a lack of military battles
to retake the city, isolated instances of violence continued to pop up.661 McChrystal
described Marjah as a “bleeding ulcer,” as the U.S. and ISAF presence failed to keep the
city stable.662 Marjah wasn’t the only issue, as areas held by international forces and the
ANA around the country had similar problems. Like Marjah, clear, hold, and build
wasn’t working like it was supposed to across the country, perhaps in part to the different
conditions in Afghanistan than what existed in Iraq.663
McChrystal’s rein as commander of ISAF ultimately didn’t come to an end on
account of the failures on the battlefield, but rather because of his strained relations with
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the Obama administration. Tensions had already been high during the initial planning of
the Surge, as McChrystal had clashed with Team Biden on what strategy should be
pursued in Afghanistan. On several occasions, the General publicly rallied for a true
COIN mission, until confronted by the President.664 Once the Surge had been established,
McChrystal continued his political maneuvering, and the relationship with Team Biden
continued to sour. In particular, the bad relationship with Ambassador Eikenberry made
the war effort incredibly difficult, likely severely limiting any close cooperation between
the military and the Department of State.665 Ultimately, McChrystal went too far in his
public activism. After being featured in a Rolling Stone article where he heavily criticized
President Obama, McChrystal was fired and replaced by General Petraeus. 666
Petraeus was of course the obvious choice to replace McChrystal, as he was seen
as the architect for the successful Surge in Iraq.667 After the drawdown in Iraq, Petraeus
had served as the commander of CENTCOM, so after resigning his post he was able to
focus on Afghanistan.668 Much like he did in Iraq, the General exercised his adept
expertise in COIN. Petraeus reformed several aspects of the COIN strategy in
Afghanistan. First, he loosened restrictions on the rules of engagement that troops had to
follow, mirroring his approach to engagement in Iraq.669 Second, Petraeus stepped up the
number counterterror raids, while also demonstrating his ability to handle the nation
building side of COIN strategy.670 By opening a corruption task force, and working to

McHugh, “A Tale of Two Surges,” 12.
Bailey, Understanding the U.S. Wars, 141.
666
Ansary, Games without Rules, 328.
667
Ibid.
668
Bailey, 142.
669
Ansary, 328.
670
Bailey, 142.
664
665

145

build constructive dialogue with the Taliban, and improving relations with Ambassador
Eikenberry, Petraeus looked to be making progress.671
By 2011, the military situation in Afghanistan seemed to stabilize, targeted
violent areas in the country were more secure, and had provided “time and space to train”
Afghan police and military forces. And on May 2, 2011, after 10 years on the run, U.S.
Special Forces had finally located and killed Osama bin Laden. At this point, Petraeus
became a victim of his own apparent success. As the deadline for the withdrawal of U.S.
troops was quickly approaching, Obama saw the death of bin Laden as a sign that the
withdrawal could be undertaken as planned. However, Petraeus argued that the loss of the
Surge troops would adversely affect the gains that had been made the past seven months
under his leadership. A compromise agreement between Obama and Petraeus sponsored
by Secretary Gates ensured that the Surge troops would remain at least until September
2012, giving Petraeus a little more time.
Underneath the surface of Obama’s decision to withdraw the Surge troops and the
progress of General Petraeus, problems were still lingering. Gains in the South against
the Taliban were deteriorating. Both Marjah and Petraeus’ later invasion of Kandahar
were quickly dissolving. In April 2011, eight hundred prisoners had escaped from a
Kandahar prison in a tunnel that had been dug without anyone noticing.672 The focus on
the South also allowed for Taliban instability to gain steam in the north and east of
Afghanistan, prompting the CIA to report that the war in Afghanistan “was headed for
stalemate.”673 As the troop withdrawals began to gain steam, the U.S. and ISAF wouldn’t
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be able to decisively defeat the Taliban, contributing to the fact that U.S. troops are still
stationed in Afghanistan to this day.
Why didn’t the Surge in Afghanistan work very well? Much of the reasoning for
its failures can be centered on the lack of a new and specific Surge policy unique to
Afghanistan, the continued interference of Pakistan, and the continued instability of the
Karzai government. Despite the strategic facelift to the campaign in Afghanistan, much
of the U.S. and ISAF strategy in the country stayed very much the same.
For the United States, the idea of a Surge in Afghanistan closely resembled the
plan for Iraq. Like Iraq, the COIN strategy in Afghanistan was based largely around Field
Manual 3-24. Though 3-24 tried to make counterinsurgency applicable to any situation,
the reality was that it was written in a relatively quick span of 9 months. In order to have
a coherent plan early enough to begin the Iraq Surge, 3-24 was a very Iraq specific clear,
hold, and build plan. In Iraq, the COIN approach was able to rely on a strong central
government with large armed forces and big oil revenues, which Afghanistan severely
lacked.674 Additionally, the deadline for U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan sent
clear messages to both the Afghan government and the Taliban- the U.S. did not plan to
stay long. Likely, this helped to dissipate the impact of the Surge in Afghanistan.675
Another issue with relying on 3-24 is the Surge in Iraq was a largely urban
strategy. Unlike Iraq, where a sizeable portion of the population resides in urban areas,
Afghanistan was a largely rural nation. By the numbers, Iraqi population density in 2009
was close to 66 people per square mile compared to Afghanistan’s 43.5 people per square
mile. Iraq also had an urban population of over 19 million (70% of the population),
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compared to Afghanistan’s 6 million (24% of the population). Securing Afghanistan á la
Iraq would not make a lot of sense if the main goal of Iraq had been to secure Baghdad
and its surroundings. To compound this issue, Iraq had been the beneficiary of a Sunni
Awakening, a local uprising against al-Qaeda, in less populated areas. Without a similar
movement in Afghanistan, the situation would likely not improve if more rural areas were
not co-opted or better protected against gains from the Taliban.
What the U.S. war effort also overlooked was the source of violence and
resistance to occupation felt by many Afghans. The conflict in Afghanistan was more
than just the simplified government versus Taliban narrative that the U.S. and NATO had
relied upon. The continuing violence “had far less to do” with “insurgency and
counterinsurgency than they did with complex local political dynamics” that more often
than not revolved around the “narco-economy” and “rival social groups,” which had been
the basis of conflict in Afghanistan for centuries when foreign powers meddled in the
country.676 In the 2001-2016 war period, local actors often aligned themselves in relation
to insurgent or COIN forces based on what suited them the best at any given time.677
Ultimately, misunderstanding the source of violence resulted in unintentional
exacerbation of the issues, such as the British led opium eradication program.678
An increasing resistance to foreign occupation, especially in Pushtoon tribal areas,
also hindered any progress for the Surge in Afghanistan. As time went on, U.S. and ISAF
forces had to deal with the fallout of having reintroduced warlords to rural areas, as well
drone bombings and special operations military missions.679 As one provincial
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government put it, “people are slowly but surely coming to the conclusion that they are
an occupied country … and as a result of the bombings, house searches, being bitten by
dogs, people are thinking the U.S. is worse than the Soviets.”680 The problem these
actions caused were well noted, but “attempts to address [the issue] remained halfhearted.”681 Despite COIN being a priority of the Surge era, aggressive counterterror
continued during the Surge in Afghanistan.682
Besides the U.S. war effort, Pakistan continued to play a problematic role in
Afghanistan from 2009-2016. Despite President Obama’s “muted” acknowledgement of
the role of Pakistan in Afghanistan’s instability, the porous border between the two
countries continued to make it hard for ISAF to succeed militarily.683 Obama knew the
importance of stabilizing the border region, emphasizing the area as one combined “AfPak” war zone.684 But in practice, the prescribed remedy of a troop Surge did little to
alleviate the problem. U.S. and ISAF troops couldn’t just cross the border to go after
Taliban forces, and the Taliban took advantage of this by establishing a “base from which
to plan and launch attacks in Afghanistan.”685
After having been chased out of Afghanistan, the Taliban leadership under Mullah
Omar regrouped in Pakistan. Mullah Omar and others settled in the Pakistani city of
Quetta, just a few miles from Afghanistan, and established a shura, or council, to guide
the Taliban war effort.686 Despite dubious claims regarding the council’s actual
administrative control over the insurgency, the Quetta Shura was free to operate in the
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unstable border region, where they were safe from ISAF as well as the Pakistani
government.687 Highlighting the relative safety in Pakistan for the Taliban and other
groups, U.S. Special Forces had found Osama hiding in the Pakistani village of
Abbottabad, nine years after the U.S. had set out to hunt him down. The U.S. could
initiate raids or use drone strikes in Pakistan, but these often had a political cost for U.S.
and Pakistan relations, severely limiting military operability over the border.
With the issues in the Af-Pak region continuing unabated, instability also affected
the Afghan government, which the U.S. was counting on to assume greater responsibility
for the war effort after the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Corruption and the autocratic
leanings of the Karzai government continually endangered the military and stability gains
of the Surge era. Like the previous era from 2001-2008, the Afghan government was
successful in angering Afghan civilians who now had to deal with frustrating levels of
bureaucratic bribes and other modes of corruption to fill out even the most simple of
forms and applications.
The increasing levels of corruption soon leaked over into elections as well. In the
2009 presidential election, serious accusations of voter fraud were raised. A UN official
at the time recognized that the “election had been marred by ‘widespread fraud,’” even
after he himself was accused of “covering up fraud to benefit Hamid Karzai.”688 In the
2010 parliamentary elections, voter fraud concerns were once again raised.689 Combined
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with Taliban violence targeting the two elections that severely limited voter turnout,
corruption was severely undermining the new democratic system in Afghanistan.690
Negative images of the Afghan government did little to help the Surge COIN
strategy. As mentioned in field manual 3-24, counterinsurgency operations require a
strong and dependable government to work with. In Afghanistan, U.S. and ISAF forces
took for granted that the Karzai government could garner political legitimacy.691
Unfortunately, as time passed, Karzai and his government were “widely and increasingly
seen by many as weak, corrupt, and abusive.”692 Surge projects implemented by the ISAF
PRTs, such as the so-called Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), which helped to create local
“quick wins” by funding infrastructure building and improvements, ultimately worked
within corrupt local and national frameworks.693 QIPs made some progress, but they
ultimately helped to “alienate those outside the patronage networks of corrupt and violent
strongmen” who many Afghans commonly detested. The corruption was so pervasive
that is was believed that almost every Afghan in the country had been affected by
corruption in one form or another, severely crippling the already weak legitimacy claims
of the Karzai government.694. For example, a 2010 UN survey found that “one out two
Afghans had paid bribes to Afghan officials to obtain basic public services” and that the
bribe payments had reached about 2.5 billion dollars total that year.695
The highly autocratic system of government created by Karzai was also partly to
blame. Karzai’s executive branch had widely powerful influence over the whole of
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government. For instance, Karzai was responsible for appointing all thirty two provincial
governors, “creating loyalty to the state” but not necessarily to the Afghan voting
public.696 To compound the issue of government legitimacy, government services rarely
covered areas outside of “provincial and district government centers,” and the best
candidates for government jobs were often reluctant to apply.697 Combined, corruption,
inept governance, and the political disenfranchisement of the Afghan people made
relying on the Karzai government difficult at best for the United States and its
international partners.
With the U.S. suspicious of the Karzai government, a level of distrust began to
emerge between both sides. Upon announcement of the Surge, leaders of the Democratic
Party like President Obama and Nancy Pelosi warned that Karzai would no longer have a
“blank check of support” from the United States.698 After two elections marred by
corruption and voter fraud, this sentiment only hardened. For Karzai, he took the rhetoric
as a sign that the U.S. was planning to abandon him.699 Karzai’s belief was in his mind
confirmed when he found out that Ambassadors Richard Holbrooke and Eikenberry were
helping other Afghan candidates to run against him.700 At a time when the U.S. needed to
rely on Karzai, the foreign interference in the presidential election greatly deteriorated the
working relationship between them.
By 2012, the United States began its Surge drawdown, continuing ahead in their
training and eventual hand off of control to ANSF. With the chances of a military draw
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between ISAF and the Taliban inching higher, NATO troops also began to transfer power
to Afghans, with a target date of withdrawal by the end of 2014.701 Despite promises that
the ISAF withdrawal would be “conditions based,” domestic pressure from NATO
countries ensured that the “process never stood much chance of being truly
conditional.”702 The end result of the specific withdrawal timelines is that international
forces had strict time limits to train Afghan troops who were suffering from high
desertion rates and corruption. Despite “over fifty-nine billion dollars in U.S. funding,”
the ANSF continued to “suffer from inadequate logistical, sustainment, and other support
capabilities” while also being “deeply pervaded by corruption, nepotism, and ethnic and
patronage fissures.”703 Leaving Afghanistan to the ANSF on a short timeline was looked
to by many that the U.S. and Obama had adopted a “surge, bribe, and run” war strategy.
Ultimately the Surge portion of the war in Afghanistan was deemed “at best a
wildly inefficient partial success and at worst a failure”. Despite increasing troops and
professing a COIN strategy mantra, President Obama oversaw a mission in Afghanistan
that failed to ensure a U.S. victory. In reality, the United States hadn’t fully committed to
a COIN campaign, as clear from the outset when Obama agreed to a compromise strategy
somewhere between COIN and a strictly counterterror mission. Competing with
increasingly aggressive drone strikes and special operations mission, the lazily
implemented COIN portion of the mission in Afghanistan failed to produce anything but
a draw between the U.S. and the Taliban. As of 2015 post-withdrawal, 10,000
international troops remained to train the ANSF and conduct special operations mission.
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With no promise of a U.S. and Taliban ceasefire, the war in Afghanistan has continued
indefinitely, far from what was promised at the beginning of the war.
With the failures of the 2009-2016 Surge withdrawal eras in Afghanistan, it is
possible to examine whether the continuance of a hard offensive counterterrorism
strategy during the Surge contributed to its failure. In the next section, trends such as U.S.
and ISAF troop levels, Afghan civilian casualties, Afghan public opinion, and the rate of
terrorism will be evaluated to evaluate the hypothesis that hard offensive
counterterrorism results in a failed counterterrorism campaign.
Afghanistan Surge and Withdrawal Data Trends 2009-2016
From 2009-2016, the war in Afghanistan entered its Surge phase, and ultimately a
withdrawal phase. Though the new era of the war was framed as a COIN mission, the
reality is that the strategy was a hybrid between COIN and the narrower aggressive
counterterrorism campaign that predated the Surge. Therefore, because of the hard
offensive counterterrorism focus, data trends during the Surge should indicate a
continued rise in terrorism from the pre-Surge era, and also result in a failed
counterterrorism effort. First, troop level trends for both the U.S. and ISAF during the
Surge are examined. Second, casualty rates of Afghan civilians are compared to troop
level trends. Third, Afghan public opinion is examined to see if there is any correlation
between low public opinion and trends in troop levels and civilian casualties. Lastly,
trends in troop levels, civilian casualties, and Afghan public opinion are scrutinized to see
if the Afghanistan Surge resulted in a high rate of terrorism and a failed counterterrorism
campaign.
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Afghanistan Troop Levels 2009-2016
From 2009-2016, troop levels for both the U.S. and ISAF increased for most of
the Surge era, then declined as troops were gradually withdrawn from the country (as
shown in Figure 12). In January 2009, the U.S. and ISAF each had about 32,000 troops
stationed in Afghanistan. By 2011, U.S. forces had increased from 32,000 to 99,500, and
ISAF had increased to 42,400 at the peak of the Surge. By January 2015, both militaries
had drastically reduced their presence to about 10,000 troops apiece to continue training
the ANSF and continue counterterrorism operations.
These troop level trends closely mirror political developments in both the U.S.
and Europe. When President Obama announced the U.S. Surge of 30,000 combat troops,
NATO agreed to up their troop levels by 7,000 soldiers.704 Just like it had been planned,
the Surge introduced temporary increases in the number of boots on the ground,
accompanied with strict withdrawal timetables for the U.S and ISAF. The Surge
withdrawal timelines were a direct result of both the American and European public
political pressure on governments involved in Afghanistan. For example, the pressure
from both Congressional Democrats and by the President’s political advisors inside the
White House made it clear that Obama’s political tenure would depend on withdrawing
the troops.705 Ultimately, the troop levels had less to do with conditions on the ground
and more to do with the political objectives of the United States and its allies.
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Figure 14. Total Number of U.S. and ISAF Troops Stationed in Afghanistan from 20092016706

2009 January
April
July
October
2010 January
April
July
October
2011 January
April
July
October
2012 January
April
July
October
2013 January
April
July
October
2014 January
April
July
October
2015 January
April
July
October
2016 January
April
July
October

110000
100000
90000
80000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0

U.S. (OEF)

ISAF

Afghan Civilian Casualties 2009-2016
Afghan civilian casualties during the 2009-2016 Surge increased to levels higher
than even the initial U.S. invasion of Afghanistan produced (seen in Figure 13). Despite a
dip in casualties from 2011-2013, a record number of 3,701 casualties were recorded by
the United Nations. Possibly the increasing numbers of civilian casualties are a result of
the Obama administration’s increasing use of drone strikes and special operations
missions that was occurring parallel to the Surge COIN mission. Despite concerns of
“over-reliance on firepower and force protection” tarnishing ISAF’s legitimacy “in the
eyes of the Afghan people,” hard offensive counterterrorism missions continued unabated
during the Surge period.707
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In relation to Surge troop levels, increased levels of troops appear to have
contributed to the increase in casualties. Before the troop Surge, civilian casualties were
much lower. During the Surge, casualties increased and then continued to increase well
after the Surge forces began to withdraw. With the use of rampant hard counterterrorism
strategies from 2009-2016, no remarkable reduction in civilian casualties occurred as
troops increased.

Figure 15. Yearly Estimated Number of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan 2009-2016708
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Afghan Public Opinion 2009-2016
Afghan public opinion on the direction of the country and the presence of the
United States actually slowly increased after implementation of the Surge from 2009 to
2014, and then dropped as the U.S. and ISAF presence waned into 2006. Unlike the
2001-2008 period, public opinion in Afghanistan became regularly measured phenomena
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with the help of the Asia Foundation. However, the same polling challenges apply.
Polling was much easier in areas secured by higher military presence, such as Kabul, but
much more dangerous in rural areas under Taliban control. Therefore, despite efforts to
control for oversampling of urban regions, it is likely that public opinion may skew
towards urban areas where the U.S. presence was much more tolerated by Afghans living
there. Despite its limitations, Afghan public opinion polling can provide insight into how
they perceived the war, and in effect counterterrorism operations.
In 2009, 42% of Afghans polled believed Afghanistan was headed in the right
direction (shown in Figure 16). By 2013, public opinion had peaked at 58% responding
that the country was going in a good direction. Conversely, negative public opinion was
also gaining ground. In 2009, those that responded that Afghanistan was headed in the
wrong direction was polling at 29%, and by 2014 had rose to 40%. And by 2016, the
wrong direction respondents became the majority, at 66%. While the majority of Afghans
polled had a positive outlook, the rising discontent was likely disconcerting for the U.S.,
ISAF, and ANSF. With two divergent trends present, it is important to understand trends
in other public opinion polling in the country.
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Figure 16. Percentage of Afghans Who Felt Afghanistan was Heading in the Right or
Wrong Direction709
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Reasons for responses to which direction Afghanistan was headed were very
similar to the 2001 to 2008 period (shown in Table 20). Like the pre-surge era, Afghans
who responded positively cited good security and reconstruction efforts as two of the
highest percentage responses. 44% responded that good security influenced their
response in 2009, and about that many responded the same from 2010-2012, before
Afghan public opinion in general began trending downward during the Surge withdrawal.
Respondents who answered reconstruction as their explanation made up another 30-40%
of those polled from 2009 to 2014.
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Table 20. Reasons by Percent Why Afghan Respondents Feel Afghanistan is Headed in
Right Direction 2009-2015710
2009

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Good Security

44%

38%

39%

41%

24%

33%

29%

Reconstruction

36%

35%

40%

35%

33%

36%

32%

Schools for Girls Have Opened

21%

15%

10%

13%

12%

8%

9%

Peace/ End of War

9%

12%

7%

7%

7%

6%

11%

Having Active ANA and ANP

7%

6%

11%

13%

12%

10%

10%

Improvements in Education

0%

10%

16%

13%

13%

15%

10%

Good Government

12%

9%

9%

5%

5%

6%

10%

Economic Revival

6%

10%

8%

8%

6%

9%

8%

Democracy/ Elections

10%

7%

3%

3%

6%

9%

7%

For negative responses, the reasons were also similar to the 2001-2008 period.
Insecurity, corruption, and economic issues were all prevalent responses for why
Afghanistan was headed in the wrong direction (as seen in Table 21). Insecurity trended
in the upper-30% to mid-40% from 2009-2015. Corruption, through a combination of two
separate response categories regularly made up 20-30% of responses, while a bad
economy and unemployment made up another 30-40% of responses during the surge
period. Ultimately, the results on concerns of pessimistic Afghans reflect many of the
same issues leveled at the U.S. and Afghan government in the first eight years of conflict
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continued from 2009-2016. For example, over 70% of Afghans polled stated that they felt
that corruption was a major problem in Afghanistan as a whole from 2006 to 2016.711

Table 21. Reasons by Percent of Why Afghan Respondents Feel Afghanistan is Headed
in Wrong Direction 2009-2015712
2009

2010

2011

2012 2013 2014 2015

Insecurity

42%

44%

45%

38%

24%

38%

45%

Unemployment

15%

16%

13%

18%

20%

23%

25%

Corruption

17%

12%

16%

14%

23%

15%

13%

Bad Government

25%

18%

15%

11%

7%

5%

11%

Bad Economy

11%

8%

10%

10%

8%

10%

12%

Administrative Corruption

10%

15%

4%

10%

6%

10%

5%

Suicide Attacks

6%

8%

11%

11%

11%

7%

7%

Presence of Taliban

7%

6%

7%

6%

8%

6%

6%

From the public opinion polling data, there is also reason to believe that the
Afghan people were tiring of the Taliban insurgency. From 2009-2016, sympathy
(ranging from a little sympathy to a lot of sympathy) for armed opposition groups such as
the Taliban fell from about 56% to 16%, whereas those who had no sympathy at all for
the groups increased from 36% to 77% (see Figure 17). Afghans were very concerned
that as international forces withdrew the Taliban would make a resurgence in the country.
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In 2013 and 2014, a Gallup poll revealed that a large percentage of Afghans expected the
Taliban presence to increase as U.S. and NATO forces left the country, at 59% and 46%
respectively in those years.713

Figure 17. Percentage of Afghans Polled on Their Sympathy Towards Armed Opposition
Groups 2009-2016714
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With rising concerns of the Taliban re-emerging after the end of the Surge, public
opinion showed a general anxiety about international forces leaving, but also positive
perceptions and confidence in the transition to ANSF control. When asked how
Afghanistan would be after the U.S. and NATO withdrawal in 2014, around 40% of
Afghans polled in 2013 and 2014 responded that the country would be worse off after the
withdrawal, compared to 17-18% who thought Afghanistan would be better off.715
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Positive perceptions of the ANSF were also prevalent. For the ANA, around 50%
of Afghans from 2009-2016 believed that the army was honest and fair, helps improve
security, and protects civilians.716 For the ANP, the percentage was about 40% for those
that felt the police were honest and fair, and help improve security, but given that police
corruption was an endemic issue, this is not surprising.717 Confidence in the ANSF also
increased from 2009-2013, as 51% of Afghans confident in the military in 2009 jumped
to 80% in 2013.718 Afghans who didn’t express confidence in the military dropped from
42% in 2009 to 19% in 2013.719
After 2014, an aura of unfinished business permeated Afghan public opinion.
Many of the polls that recorded public opinion from 2009 to 2016 recorded a significant
drop in positive public opinion in the years following the Surge withdrawal. For example,
those who said Afghanistan was headed in the right direction declined significantly, from
55% in 2014 to 29% in 2016.720 The most obvious conclusion that can be drawn from the
decline is that Afghans had serious anxiety about the security that the U.S. and ISAF had
provided, especially in urban areas like Kabul, being withdrawn. This finding is very
similar to observations drawn about the Iraq Surge, where Iraqis supported increased
security that international forces brought, but were less supportive of the foreign troops
themselves. Though many Afghans were likely ambivalent to continued foreign presence
in Afghanistan, they also supported and enjoyed the progress in security.
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So, as U.S. and ISAF troop numbers dwindled, it seems that many Afghans were
guarded about just how low the gains of the Surge would last in the coming years. With
the reduced troop numbers, the U.S. had failed to broker peace and reconciliation with
their Taliban adversaries. It is then noticeable that in 2015, that 62.9% of Afghans
believed that the peace process could help stabilize the country.721 Despite regional
variations (less people in Kabul supported the process than in the Taliban heavy
southwest regions), a sizeable majority of Afghans most likely felt that a U.S. withdrawal
without reconciliation with the Taliban was a mistake.722
In the 2009 to 2016 period, Afghan public opinion had a reverse relationship with
troop levels. The higher troop levels were, the more optimistic and positive polling
responses were recorded. As the withdrawal entered critical phases, more negative public
opinion was prevalent. For civilian casualties however, casualties mounted as foreign
troops left in droves. Therefore, it is possible to correlate lowered positive public opinion
with increasing civilian casualties but no direct link between troop levels and public
opinion, unlike the 2001-2008 period. Likely, the public opinion findings of the 20092016 Surge era in Afghanistan point to some gains in public opinion from introducing a
renewed focus on COIN instead of relying on hard offensive terrorism. How does this
play into the rate of terrorism during the Afghanistan Surge and withdrawal phases of the
war?
The Rate of Afghan Terrorism from 2009-2016
From 2009-2016, the rate of terrorism in Afghanistan linearly increased (shown in
Figure 18). Most dramatically, 503 terrorist attacks were recorded in 2009, which
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increased to 1,619 terrorist attacks in 2016. In the first few years of the Surge, terrorism
increased, with the exception being 2011. With the Surge at full strength, U.S. and ISAF
were able to dampen the number of terrorist attacks. However, terrorist attacks that year
were still fairly high when compared to terrorist attack rates from 2001-2008.
In comparison with troop levels, like previously mentioned, terrorist attacks were
lower when more troops were present. With U.S. forces capped at 100,000 troops,
terrorist rates were much lower than when troop levels were lower starting in 2012. As
the withdrawal was put in place, terrorist attacks skyrocketed. Like in Iraq, the Surge
strategy helped to reduce terrorist attacks, but it is possible that the Surge wasn’t in place
long enough to do any long term help. Also, as some critics as the Obama administration
in Afghanistan point out, a set withdrawal date might have helped to embolden Taliban
elements as troops left the country.
The same can be said for civilian casualties. With full implementation of Surge
forces, a slight dip in casualty rates occurred, but was then followed by yet another
increase. It can be argued that the mild dip in casualties wasn’t that noticeable because of
the hard offensive counterterrorism drone strikes and special operations raids that
occurred in tandem with the Surge COIN operation. Without widespread use remote
bombings and sometimes extralegal special ops raids, the rate of casualties might have
decreased further.
In Afghan public opinion, more troops actually resulted in higher positive public
opinion towards the direction of Afghanistan and the presence of international forces.
This is very similar to findings from the Iraq Surge, where the COIN mission there also
increased public opinion. Security was of high importance for both Iraqis and Afghans, as
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both countries benefitted from increased security during the Surge eras. As public support
and interest from the United States waned towards both wars, so did Afghan public
opinion.
While comparing the data of troop levels, civilian casualties, afghan public
opinion, and the rate of terrorism in Afghanistan, a more sustained COIN mission in
Afghanistan might have been more successful. In part due to the briefness of the full
strength Surge and lingering use of hard offensive counterterrorism, the Surge in
Afghanistan didn’t achieve lasting peace. With these findings, it is plausible that hard
offensive counterterrorism does indeed result in failure, whereas a softer strategy (with
appropriate troop levels) reduces terrorism and is more successful. However, for the
withdrawal, a softer strategy combined with fewer troops actually led to counterterrorism
failure. For both conclusions, other factors are also at play. For instance, the lack of
political commitment to the Surge sent a message to the Taliban that the U.S wasn’t
likely to stay in Afghanistan long. After initial Surge success, the Taliban could have
become more emboldened as the full withdrawal deadline approached. Therefore, the
hypothesis is possible, but not entirely conclusive.
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Figure 18. Rate of Terrorism in Afghanistan 2009-2016723
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
In this examination of hard offensive counterterrorism, I first lay out a
methodology for research based on the existing counterterrorism literature. Four
categories of counterterrorism can be distinguished, though hybrids like
counterinsurgency exist. Hard offensive counterterrorism utilizes force to pre-empt
terrorist activity and include strategies like leadership decapitation and deterrence. I then
explain the hypothesis that hard offensive counterterrorism results in the failure of a
counterterrorism strategy. Additionally, I lay out variables such as troop levels, civilian
casualties, public opinion, and the rate of terrorism, as well as their respective sources of
data.
In the following chapter, counterterrorism in Iraq is discussed. In the first section,
the history and politics of Iraq from 2003-2006 reveals that the hard offensive
counterterrorism strategy of “traditional war” was used, and resulted in increased
terrorism, violence, and instability. In the following section, data shows that when hard
offensive counterterrorism was paired with increased troops, civilian casualties, lowered
public opinion, and terrorism increased. The history and politics of Iraq from 2007-2011
is also examined. The 2007-2011 period included a Surge and a withdrawal, where a
counterinsurgency approach to counterterrorism was used. In the Surge era,
counterinsurgency and increased troops resulted in lower civilian casualties, higher
public opinion, and a lowered rate of terrorism, which resulted in the Surge being a
success. In the withdrawal era, troop levels were lowered and indicators from the Surge
were reversed, resulting in a counterterrorism failure.
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The next chapter looks at the war in Afghanistan. In the first section, the history
and politics of the pre-Surge era from 2001-208 is introduced. In the pre-Surge period,
hard offensive counterterrorism resulted increased terrorism from a Taliban insurgency.
The data from 2001-2008 shows that terrorism increased as troop levels were raised, as
well as high civilian casualties and lowered public opinion. Next, the Surge and
withdrawal period in Afghanistan from 2009-2016 is examined. The Surge helped to
produce a slight decrease in terrorism and instability when it was at full strength. The
data reveals that troop levels were high, the rate of terrorism as well as civilian casualties
were reduced, positive public opinion increased, and the Surge was a relative success. It
is possible that the brief reduction in terrorism was the result of increasing hard offensive
counterterrorism in tandem with a limited counterinsurgency strategy dulled the
effectiveness of the Surge in reducing terrorism. In the withdrawal, the indicators once
again reversed and resulted in counterterrorism failure.
Therefore, based on findings from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, hard
offensive counterterrorism can plausibly lead to a failed counterterrorism campaign.
When a softer counterterrorism method is utilized, such as counterinsurgency, reductions
in the rate of terrorism can be observed. In addition, the effectiveness of troop levels is
changed depending on what category of counterterrorism strategy is used. When hard
offensive counterterrorism tactics are combined with higher troop levels, high civilian
casualties and lowered public opinion increase, and therefore, terrorism increases as well.
In contrast, when counterinsurgency tactics are used with higher troop levels, rates of
terrorism are reduced, in addition lower civilian casualties and higher public opinion.
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However, as illustrated by the history and politics of both wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the result of the counterterrorism strategies are also influenced by a myriad
of other variables, so the results of this study are still rather inconclusive. What should be
gleaned from both wars is that counterterrorism results are influenced by unique
developments in each country. The result in Iraq didn’t necessarily line up with the result
in Afghanistan, for reasons such as the rural geography of Afghanistan, the lack of an
indigenous Afghan “Awakening” against the Taliban, and the lack of political
commitment to counterinsurgency by the Obama administration.
Another finding is that lower troop levels also affected the outcome of a given
counterterrorism strategy in the level of civilian casualties and rate of terrorism. As
illustrated in Figure 19, Hard offensive counterterrorism was more successful when there
were less troops in lowering civilian casualties and terrorism. Conversely,
counterinsurgency was less effective when there were fewer troops and led to higher
civilian casualties and a high rate of terrorism. It is possible that counterterrorism
strategies and troop levels have a converse relationship.
Therefore, the occupation theory presented by Pape that links high levels of
troops to higher levels of local resistance, is too simple. The issue of occupation is a lot
more complex, and a more nuanced stance should be that the particular counterterrorism
strategy utilized also influences the outcome on an occupation. When hard offensive
counterterrorism is used, less troops results in less violence and terrorism. Conversely,
counterinsurgency with too few troops results in higher violence and terrorism. More
research needs to be done in order to further evaluate the different results from hard
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offensive counterterrorism and softer means of counterterrorism, such as
counterinsurgency.

Figure 19. Relationship Between Counterterrorism Strategies and Troop Levels
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It is important to also note that conclusions drawn from this study into
counterterrorism strategies applies mostly to hard offensive counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency undertaken by a foreign counterterrorism entity against foreign
terrorism. Findings from this study are not sufficiently generalizable without significant
testing of domestic counterterrorism strategy and policy. Domestic counterterrorism
would benefit from an analysis of its own strategies in future research.
For additional future research, other types of counterinsurgency strategies should
be evaluated against hard offensive counterterrorism. This means exploring new case
studies in counterterrorism as well as strategies such as hard and soft defensive
counterterrorism. By finding new case studies, insights into other areas and different
governments can help expand knowledge of counterterrorism. The biggest take away
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from research in counterterrorism is that every case study is slightly different. For
instance, counterterrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan had varied results that changed
depending on the situation inside the country. For Iraq, much of the focus of
counterterrorism was on urban areas, especially inside the capital city of Baghdad. For
Afghanistan, counterterrorism activities were undertaken in more remote, rural areas.
Introducing more case studies to the study of counterterrorism would elucidate more
information to infer what commonalities exist between counterterrorism strategies used in
different regions.
Future research should also look to undergo public opinion polling specifically
tailored to populations that are affected by terrorism. Polling used in this evaluation of
hard offensive counterterrorism relies upon public opinion polling more closely related to
the U.S. war effort, political reconciliation between groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
questions of rebuilding and reconstruction. More polling should be done that helps to
better understand the underlying mechanisms of alienation and collateral damage in
populations that are susceptible to participating in terrorism, and their reasons for doing
so.
Ultimately, the research on counterterrorism presented should serve as caution for
governments deciding on which counterterrorism strategy to pursue. All options should
be thoroughly discussed in order for counterterrorism and policy officials to understand
the side effects of a given hard offensive counterterrorism strategy. Governments may not
be prepared for a backlash of increased rates of terrorism when they pursue their
counterterrorism goals. Within the “War on Terror,” the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had
unintended consequences. After withdrawal from Iraq, world governments faced a new
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threat from ISIS which continued to carry out terrorist attacks after al-Qaeda had been
severely weakened. It is possible that the War on Terror was thought of as a quick entry
and exit war, whereas solving the issue of terrorism in the Middle East might require
much more patience than typically thought.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
ANA

Afghan National Army

ANP

Afghan National Police

ANSF

Afghan National Security Forces

BBC

British Broadcasting Corporation

CERP

Commander’s Emergency Response Program

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

CJTF-7

Combined Joint Task Force 7

COIN

Counterinsurgency

CPA

Coalition Provisional Authority

FOB

Forward operating base

GOP

Grand Old Party (Republican Party)

GTD

Global Terrorism Database

IED

Improvised explosive device

IGC

Iraqi Governing Council

ISAF

International Security Assistance Force

ISI

Inter-Services Intelligence Agency

ISIS

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

JCS

Joint Chiefs of Staff

MNF-I

Multi-National Force-Iraq

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO

Nongovernmental Organization

OEF

Operation Enduring Freedom
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ORHA

Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

OSD

Office of the Secretary of Defense

PRT

Province Reconstruction Team

SCIRI

Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq

UN

United Nations

UNAMA

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

USCENTCOM

United States Central Command

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WMD

Weapon of mass destruction

LIST OF NON-ENGLISH TERMS
Al-qaeda

The base

Fardh al-qanoon

Enforcing the law

Ibnaa al-Iraq

Sons of Iraq

Ibn al-balad

Son of the soil

Loya jirga

Traditional Afghan tribal assembly

Mujahideen

Islamic freedom fighters
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